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JAN 10 .J.SOO 
PREFACE 
America's :re1eti.or1s w1.th Spair1 h:nre been chronicled chiefly in 
these a.reas: the Revolutionary War era until the end of the eighteenth 
centur;::, the events leading to the Spanish-American War, and the Ameri~ 
can policy toward Spain during the Spa.nish Civil War in the 1930' s. 
Other accounts, of course, touc.h on aspects of Sl)anish-American re-
. lations, but surprisingly, no resea .. rch study of the relations of the 
two countries during the American Civil War has been made. Thus this 
thesis explores a .fascinating, fresh ar~a in diplomatic history. 
P:repa.r.ation for writing this thesis included extensive use of pre-
viously neglected manuscript materials from the National Archives. This 
study ser,res primarily as a.n introduction to the topic. A defini ti,re 
work will require the use of manuscript sources in Spain as well a.sin 
the United States. 
Tha.nks are extended to Dr. LeRoy H. Fischer who suggested this 
interesting topic and ordered special ma.teria.ls for the author's use. 
Dr. Fischer's pa.instaking editing and valuable achrice regardi:ng style 
and form are appreciated by the liuthor. Further gratitude is due Dr. 
Homer L. Knight who read the thesis and offered a.ddi tional recommenda-
tions for impro,ring its quality. Helpful librarians at the Oklahoma 
Sta.ta Unbrersity and the Uni,rersi ty of Colorado simplified research 
problems. Last but not least, the a.uthor's wife, Marga.ret, provided 
patience, cogent criticisms, a.nd typing skill which implemented the 
completion of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE . FRAME\.iORK OF . SPANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 
In 1860 the once proud and mighty Kingdom of Spain contained 
15,675,000 subjects. Only Madrid with approximately 300,000 residents 
and Barcelona with a population numbering close to 190,000 were really 
important cities. The vast majority of Spain's people lived in rural 
areas and remained completely unaffected by major changes wrought by 
the Industrial Revolution.1 
The Spanish Go,rernment was split among rival factions arranged 
aroun~ the corrupt queen, Isabella II. The entire reign of Isabella II 
was characterized by instability; in twenty-five years there were no 
fewer than .519 cabinet shtfts. '.l;'he, flu~tuating situation in which Spain 
was enmeshed renected the claims to King Ferdinand VII's throne and, t o 
a lesser extent, a cleavage among factions growing out of the Napoleonic 
War in Spain.2 
Isabella II was not the strong queen demanded by Spain in the 
1860's. A nymphomaniac whose first known affair occurred when she was 
fourteen, the Spanish queen was subject to the whims of her momentary 
1W1llard A. Smith, "The Background of the Spanish Revolution of 
1868," American Historical Review, LV (July, 1950), P• 795 . 
2W1lliam Columbus Da1ris, The Last Contuistadores: The Spanish 
Intervention in Peru and Chile, 1863-1866Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1950),pp. 1-3; the number of cabinet changes is in Smith, "The 
Background of the Spanish Revolution of 1868," American Historical~-
~, LV (1950), p. 801; Harold Livermore, ! History £! Spain (New York: 
Grove Press Inc., 1960), PP• 369-395. · 
1 
2 
personal passions. Thus the British Ambassador could write Lord Claren-
don, the British Foreign Minister, that Spain's strength was not equal 
to a woman's when compared with the power of other European states. 
Despite the obvious truth to the contrary, the belief existed among 
numbers of Spaniards that Spain's glorious empire of old was to be re-
born in 1861. Prime Minister Leopoldo O'Donnell bore no small pa.rt in 
helping to give currency to that idea.3 
The uncommunicative O'Donnell had risen to power in 1858 after 
serving as the Captain-General of Cuba ten years earlier. He immedi-
ately embarked Spain on an aggressive foreign policy: a joint Franco-
Spanish force undertook a punitive mission in Cochin-China; then in 
1859 and 1860, Spain alone conducted a small police action in Morocco. 
The fruits of the Moroccan Expedition included a guaranteed neutral zone, 
a ten-million dollar indemnity, and the loss of seven thousand Spanish 
lives. However, O'Donnell's adventurous foreign policy succeeded in its 
purpose of taking the eyes of the Spanish people off Spain's woeful 
shortcomings and directing them to the restoration of Spain's former 
glories. Not the least measurement of O'Donnell's success was the dura-
bility of his rule, a five-year period from 1858 to 1863.4 
The American Civil War presented O'Donnell with an opportunity to 
enhance his administration. He believed that the Union's split was 
permanent and that one of the two American factions would Ptirentually 
3smith, "The . Background of the Spanish Revolution of 1868," Ameri-
can Historical Review, LV (1950), p. 802; Gavin B. Henderson, "Southern 
Designs on Cuba, 185li-1857, and Some European Opinions," Journal of 
Southern History, V (August, 1939), p. 378; Sumner Welles, Naboth's 
Vineyard: ~ Dominican Republic, ~-1924 (2 vols., New York: Payson 
and Clark, Ltd., 1928), I, p. 220. 
4tivermore, History£!. Spa.in, pp. 382-384; Davis,~ Conquista-
dores, PP• 5-6. 
align itself as an ally of Spain. Attempting to carry out O'Donnell's 
foreign policy was Foreign Minister Saturnino Calderon Collantes, a 
3 
sharp contrast to his superioro Carl Schurz, America's minister to 
Spain in 1861, found O'Donnell "cold and reticent" as compared to Col-
lantes who struck Schurz more as a schoolmaster than a politician.5 An 
even better portrait of the subordina te Spanish official is to be found 
in a dispatch from Schurz to William H. Seward, Secretary of State of 
the United States: 
Calderon Collantes is a man of quixotic propensities, vain 
and bombastic; altogether not born to be a hero, he possesses the 
courage commonly falling to the lot of those who have not strength 
and clearness of mind enough to measure the difficulties of what 
they are undertakingo Besides, he has committed so many blu.nders 
in the management of his impo,rtant department that he has to fear 
more from_the attacks of the opposition than anyone of his col-
leagues .fiji/. Tenacious of office as he is, he will eagerly grgsp 
at anything that bids fair to relieve him of his embarrassments. 
The collapse of the O'Donnell Government in early 1863 ushered in 
two years of confusion. Replacing O'Donnell as prime minister was 
Fernandez de Pinedo Pando, the Marquis of Miraflores, an unspectacular 
politician, according to the American minister to Spain, Gustave Koerner. 
Miraflores' successor, Lorenzo Arrazola, was no better. Koerner was 
amazed when Arrazola asked him what language was spoken in the United 
States! Fortunately, Arrazola was in office only a short time before 
another interim government headed by Alexander Mon replaced him. With 
Spain's fortunes de~lining at every stepj a successor to Mon was an 
5Dexter Perkins, ~ Monroe Doctrinej 1826-1867 (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), pp. 284-285; Carl Schurz, The Reminiscences 
of ,2!!:l. Schurz (3 vols., New York: The McClure Company, 1907), II, p. 
252; the quote is from ibid., p. 266. 
6schurz to Seward, September 27, 1861, Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives, Washington, 
D. C. . . 
4 
urgent need. Stepping forth to a.ssume the post was Mlrsha.l R. M. 
Narvaez, an old political warhorse who had headed Spain's government on 
numerous occasions dating from 1844. Narvaez struck Horatio Perry, 
charged'affaires in Madrid, as the man with ability adequate to es-
tablish in Spain a government capa.ble of withstanding the shock created 
by the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Santo Domingo, a land only re-
cently reincorporated into the Spanish empire.? However, the London 
Times said, "Narvaez • • • has long ceased to be the formidable man he 
was. He has subsided into a respectable old fogey. ••8 Happily for 
Spain during those years of tumult, she had but one representative in 
Washington, a man who impressed many Americans with his diplomatic 
flair, Gabriel Tassara.9 
rAlring the American Civil War,· diplomatic etiquette dicta.ted re-
ciprocal gestures of respect and a summoning up of the myth of past 
Hispanic-American friendshipe In actua1ity, Spain and the United Statas 
recognized each other's existence and that was all. A reluctant ally 
of France in the American Revolution, the Spanish were worried primarily 
about the potential of the United States. Their worst fears came true 
as the ever-aggressive Americans pushed into Florida, recognized the 
independence of the revolting Latin-American colonies of Spain, and be~ 
gan to cast greedy eyes on Cuba. Hence it is not surprising tha t the 
7 Thomas J. McCormack, ( ed e ) , ~ Memoirs .2f: Gustave Koerner, 1809-
1896 (2 vols., Cedar Rapids 1 Iowa: The Torch Press, 1909), II, pp. 308 , 
393-394; Davis,~ Cqnguistadores, ppo 7~8; Perry to Seward, Septem= 
ber 18, 1864, Papers Relatin_g_ to Foreign Affairs, m (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 18b5), IV, pp. 98- 99. 
8London Times, September 10, 1e62, P• ?b. 
9 
Howard K. Beale, (ed.), ~ Diary .2f. Edward Bates, !§22.-1866 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933)~ p. 205. 
English journal Spectator expressed t he opinion that Spain, of all na-
tions, would benefit the most from the disruption of the American 
5 
Union. The accumulated ill will of Spanish-American relations lived on 
through the war and was renewed in the question of American recogniti on 
of the Cuban insurgents in 1869.lO 
Considering these facts , is it any wonder that the news of the 
election of 1860 evoked unmitigated joy among Spain's ruling classes? 
Spaniards gleefully watched the widening discord caused by the North 
American republic's selection of Abraham Lincoln as President. Such 
discord neutralized the power of the republic, and rendered the United 
States powerless to interfere in Spain's current controversy with Vene-
zuela stemming from Spain's demand for an indemnity and an apoJ ogy for 
the Venezuelan murder of Spanish ci tizens. As the crisis grew more 
serious , some jubilant Spaniards real,ized it was to their. national ad ... 
vantage t o have the Union split into two quarreling factions . 11 
Predictably~ the Spania.rds bl~nted their own power by dividing in-
to cliques which were utterly at loggerheads with each othere While the 
elite, ruling classes saw the Civil War as a great blessing f or Spain 
and a time for Spain to adopt a. more adventur esome foreign policy , most 
of the Spanish people were ignorant and indif ferent to the general 
lOJames Breck Perkinsj France and the American Revolution (Boston 
and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company , 19IT1':"'w- 512-51_, ~ quotes the 
French ambassador in Madrid, Armand ~re, Comte de Montmorin, as writing 
Foreign Minister Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes , Octoher 19~ 1778 , 
that he believed "the Spanish are in singular dread of the prosperity 
and progress of the Americans ; " the question of recognizing Cuban bel-
ligerancy and Grant' s feelings about Spain's actions i n the Civil War are 
dealt with in Allan Nevins, Hamilton llih,: ~ Inner Histo:r_,v ..2f. ~ Gran! 
Administrati on (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1937 ), ppo 125, 236. 
llPreston to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, November 26, 1860, Dis= 
patches from the United States Ministers to Spain , 1792=1906, The 
National Archi,res; Preston to Seward, April 14, 186l j ibid. 
6 
operations of their government. Those few who were vocal on the mattar 
expressed themselves for the Union. Perry accounted for the feelings 
of the latter group by explaining that they viewed the United States as 
the land of democracy and the world's beacon of freedom. 12 
While minister in Madrid, the pro-Confederate William Preston 
capitalized on this divergence of opinion when he sought by flattery 
and ostentatious display to win the elite over to a. similar line of 
thought. His success may be judged by an early dispatch of Perry's: 
"Extraordinary as it may seem, you L'ser,mri/ are in danger from the dense 
ignorance and robust prejudices of certain classes [:i e elit2] in 
Spain."13 This split in Spanish sentiments remained unhealed through-
out the war. As the war progressed and the Conf'ede:i:•ate cause grew more 
hopeless, the elite9 s bellicosely anti-Union sentiments became more sub-
clued. 
The gulf between the classes and factions on this aspect of f oreign 
policy was presented graphically in the newspapers of the peninsula 
kingdom. Early in the war, the prevalent f eeling ·. h t t he Confe.deracy 
was bound to achieve its independence was express8d in the Pensrunien!,,2 
Espanol: "The war may continue a long time or a short t i me, but the in.~ 
dubitable result will be the independence of the Southern States. itl4 
Later, as General Robert E. Lee 6 s soldiers were invading Ma.:r,yland in 
12Preston to Cass 9 December 1, 1860, ibid.; Perry t o Sew2rd 9 Sep-
tember 21, 1862, delineates class feelings in Pa:Qer , Relating ~ Fo:rei_g_:r:1 
Affairs, 1862 (hashington: Government Printing Office, 1863), pp~ 515-
516. 
13Perry to Seward, April 20, 1861 , Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, J.792-l906j The National Archives . 
l~uoted in F.dwin J. Pratt, "Spa.nish Opinion of "ti"ie lforth American 
Civil War, 11 His:Qanic American Historical £9view:1 X (February, 1930) ~ p. 
20 . 
the fall of 1862, the same paper visibly gloated that in 
the model republic of what was the United States, we can 
see more and more clearly of how little account is a so-
ciety constituted without God, merely for the sake of men. 
look at their wild ways of annihilating each other, confis-
cating each other's goods, mutually destroying ea.ch other• s 
cities and cordially wishing each other extinct! The 
Federals declare their enemies' slaves free, and the latter 
refuse to allow Federa.l regiments of whites and blacks any 
right of war. Both muzzle the press; both vie with each 
other in reprisals; and at the end of a year of war they 
are both on the road to becoming barbaria.ns. The history 
of the model republic can be summed up in a few words. It 
came into being by rebellion. It was founded on atheism. 
It was populated by the dregs of all the nations in the 
world. It ha.s lived without the law of God or men. Within 
a hundred years, greed has ruined it. Now it is fighting 
like a cannibal, and it will die in a flood of blood ~nd 
mire. Such is the real history of the one and only state 
in the world which has succeeded in. constituting itself ac-
cording to the flaming theories of democracy. The example 
is too horrible to stir a.ny desire for imitation in Europe.15 
7 
It is true that such an attitude reflected the feelings of the pro-
royalist, anti-American wing of Spanish politics. 
/ 
But Charge Perry be,. 
came sufficiently aroused over such expressions to attempt to influence 
Spanish newspapers. Perry had no qualms about indulging in this ac-
ti vi ty because he discovered proof that Foreign Minister Collantes wa.s 
supplying the semi-official~ Epoca with snatches of Seward's diplo-
matic communications. In retaliation Perry launched a three-pronged 
tttruth" campaign. 
First, he encouraged the clergy, liberals, and other elements 
favorable to the United States to put more friendly news in their jour-
nals. Next, he personally dashed off editorial columns for certain 
papers. Finally, he flatly asked Collantes to restrain blatantly anti-
American sheets. Thus the Spanish press bega.n to present a more 
8 
attractive picture of the United States in the latter years of the waro 
Immeasurable strength was added to the hands of Perry, the Spanish lib .. 
erals, and the clergy when the IDnancipation Proclamation was issued on 
January 1, 1863.16 
Immediately after the Union's disastrous defeat at Bull Run in 
July, 1861, Minister Schurz felt the full . impact of Europea.n scorn and 
contempt for the Northern states. Aft er great consideration, he came t o 
the conclusion that respect for the United States could be instilled in 
:furopeans in one of only two ways: the Union might win a speedy a.nd de-
cisive military victory over the Confederacy, or the Union's efforts 
might be elevated to a higher mora.l level by a. clearcut lash against 
slavery. In dispatches and letters, Schurz ,rigorously pounded on the 
a.nti-slavery theme. Increasingly he came to believe that the Union's 
entire battle hinged on the question of sla,rery, and Spain's liberal 
press a1so played on the same theme. Secretary Seward was quite aware 
of the diplomatic trump slavery offered the North. He was even more 
cognizant of the fact that the trump had to be played at the correct 
time for optimum benefit to result. In short, Seward realized that an 
16collantes' lacking of information to La Ja>oca is in Perry to 
Seward, April 17, 1862, Dispatches from the United States ~ftnisters to 
Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Perry ' s efforts encouraging 
more friendly treatment of America is reported in Perry to Seward, July 
18, 1863, ibid.; Koerner to Seward, February 28, 1864, Foreign Affairs 9 
1864, IV, pp. 9-10• Schurz to Seward, August 19, 1861, Dispatches from 
the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives., 
mentions a.n early attempt to get more favorable trea tment of America; 
Perry's talk to Collantes to quiet down some violent anti-American 
papers is mentioned in Schurz to Seward, September 5, 1861, ibid.; 
Perry's influence on the segments of Spanish press was illustrated by 
clippings sent in Perry to Seward, January 10, 1862, ibid.; some of 
Perry's ghosted editorials are in Perry to Seward, July 19, 1863, . ibid ., 
9 
early emancipation would be construed as an act of despair i n Europe. 17 
He brusquely answered Schurz's passionate pleas, saying "foreign sym-
pathy, or even foreign favor, never did and never can create or even 
18 
maintain any state." 
After a period of quiescence on the slave question as propaganda 
bait, the issue was revived by Perry in late September, 1862. The Union 
had fought and won a marginal victory in t he bloody Battle of Antietam, 
and the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation had been issued. A month 
later Perry reported the tremendous boost given to the Union's prestige 
by these combined acts. Ironically , the enthusiasm generated by the 
Emancipation Proclamation did not sufficiently inspire the Spanish to 
free the numerous slaves in their own colonies for many years.19 
An unexpected dividend of the Emancipation Proclama.tion was the 
surge of Lincoln's popularity in Spa.in. For the remainder of the war, 
ordinary Spanish citizens presented petitions of thanks for Lincolnis 
actions. The assassination of Lincoln was followed by a generous out-
l?Schurz's sentiments are in Schurz to Seward, September 14, 1861, 
ibid.; Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the No:r•th Ameri can Ci,.ril War," .!fil-
pani,,Q_ American Histor:j..cal Review, X (1930) , p. 23, conta.ins an excerpt 
from a liberal newspaper opposed to slavery; Seward's answer to Schurz 0 s 
plans is in Schurz, Eeminiscences, II, pp. 302-303; Frederi.c Baricroft, 
The Life of William H. Sewa~d (2 vols ., New York and London : Harper and 
Brot'Ilers,1900), II,-pp. 323-:327; consult Glyndon G. Va.n Dusen and 
Richard C. Wade, (eds. ) , Fo~ Policy~~ !merican Spirit: Essays 
!?I, Dexter Perkins (Ithaca: Cornell University Presst 1957 ), pp. 222-223~ 
for Seward's recognition that a proper time was needed to emancipat e the 
slaves. 
18schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 277-279'j 286. 
19Perry's revival of the emancipation issue is in Perry t o Seward, 
September 21, 1862, Foreign. Affairs , 1§~, pp. 516-517, news of the Pre-
liminary Emancipation's effect is in Perry to Seward, October 25, 1862, 
Dispatches from the United States Mirrl.sters to Spain, 1792-1906, The 
National Archives. 
10 
pouring of grief on the part of Spanish commoners.20 
The distrust of America by the Spanish elite was nothing new, for 
the republic across the sea had long been an object of contempt. The 
war in America seemed to prove what those elements had long said, that 
America was destined to fall because of its republican structure and 
fluid class lineso On the other hand, most Spaniards appear to have 
eventually felt a vague sympathy for America due largely to the in-
fluence of the clergy and, to a much lesser extent, to the liberals. 
This dichotomy effecti vely neutralized Spain. The nation could neither 
f'ully take advantage of the Union's distress nor could she be of prac-
tical assistance to speed the conclusion of the struggle. 
The American minister to Spain on the outbreak of the Pivil W:l.r 
was Preston, a Kentuckian. He had been named to his post in 1858 after 
Senators Stephen Mallory of Florida and Judah Benjamin of Louisiana and 
Vice President John C. Breckenridge declined to serve in ~drid. Pres-
ton resigned his position as minister to return to his native state as 
the situation in America became more serious.21 
20The presentation of petitions is recorded in Koerner, Memoirs, II, 
p. 39q; Koerner to Seward, May 23, 1863, Papers Relatin~ to Foreign!£.-
fairs, 1863 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 18 41, II, p. 900; 
Beile Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman, ID.lrop~ Looks at the American 
Civil ~ ( New York: The Orion Press, 1960) , pp. 267 , · 275; Perry to 
Seward, December 15, 1864, Forei~ Affairs, 1865, II, pp. 470-471; 
Spanish sentiments about Lincoln~ assassination are in the Appendix!£ 
Diplomatic Correspondence ..2! 1865, pp. 530~532, 534-540. 
21Roy F. Nichols, 1112. ~sruption .2f. Amei-ican Dethocrac (New York: 
Collier Books, 1962), pp. 23~-233, discloses the bac ground of Preston's 
nomination as minister, for Preston9 s attempts to sow ill will against 
the United States see Koerner to Seward, November 15, 1862, Dispatches 
from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Ar-
chives; Perry to Seward, September 21, 1862, Foreign· Affairs·, 1862, · 
p. 515; Barbara Donner, "Carl Schurz the Diploma-r.," . Wisc·onsin Maga:-
~ .2£ History, XX (March, 1937), p. 293n; Pratt, "Spanish Upinion ol 
the North American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X 
(1930), pp. 15-16. 
11 
Replacing him ad interim was Perry, a New England-born graduate of 
Harvard, class of 1844. After service in the Mexican War, Perry found 
his health declining and so journeyed to Spain. There he assumed the 
position of legation secretary in 1849. He was still in this position 
when Pierre Soul{, a French-born Louisiana Democrat, arrived in Spain 
in 1853. At first the two men got along well, as was indic~ted by the 
/ fact that Soule served as the godfather of Perry's first child. Trouble 
arose, however, when Perry sent a copy of a letter to President Franklin 
\ 
Pierce to the Washington Intelligencer. In the letter Perry attacked 
Soul6's mission. The upshot of the affair was that Soul6 labelled Perry 
a "liar" and sought his dismissal. It was later discovered that Perry 
and his Spanish-born wife had also been guilty of showing Soul~'s dis-
patches to the British ambassador Lord Howden. Thus Perry was shelved 
on inactive status until the war broke out in America. 22 
/ During the course of the war Perry was destined to serve as charge 
d'affaires more than half the period due to changes in ministers and 
their leaves of absence. But Perry did not ask for this appointment in 
1861. Well aware of his capabilities, Charles Sumner, Republican Sena-
tor from Massachusetts, secured his nomination to the Madrid position. 
Perry remained in relative obscurity throughout the war, although he as-
pired to be more than a charge, but the domestic political situation 
frustrated his promotion. He stayed at his post, performed his required 
duties, and eventually died in Spain many years later. Schurz, Koerner, 
22F.dward Wheelwright, ~ Class ~ 1844, Harvard College: Fifty 
Years After Graduation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: John Wilson and Son, 
1896), pp. 177-178; A. A. Ettinger, ~ Mission .!e Spain~ Pierre ~e, 
1§.il-~: ! Stud:{~~ Cuban Diplomac* of~ United States (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), pp. ~470. 
12 
Benjamin Moran, the second secretary of the American legation in London, 
and in fact all who came into contact with Perry during the war com-
mented on his fitness for the job. Perry filled the vacancy existing in 
Madrid between Preston's departure and Schurz's arrival.23 
Schurz was a prominent German-born American who had been active in 
Lincoln's campaign for the Presidency in 1860. As a matter of course, 
he expected a ministerial appointment to a European capital. Italy was 
Schurz•s first choice because he felt his liberalism would be a valuable 
asset to him there. In February, 1861, he heard rumors that he would 
be sent to Sardinia. On March 28, 1861, however, Schurz unofficially 
learned of his proposed appointment to Madrid as Minister Plenipoten-
tiary and Envoy Extraordinary. Flushed with enthuaisam, he wrote his 
wife that after Mexico "Spain is the most important diplomatic post--
and it is mine." Seward apparently had difficulty placing men in minis-
terial positions who were acceptable to the governments concerned. 
Seward was in favor of native-born Americans serving their country over-
seas; he knew that Schurz 9 s radical views on slavery and his revolution-
ary background might combine to make him unacceptable in Madrid. Being 
aware of the possible difficulties of serving in such a nation as Spain, 
Schurz asked the Spanish Minister, Tassara, about the feelings of the 
23sumner's role is disclosed in F.dward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters 
of Charles Sumner (4 vols., Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1893), IV, pp. 14, 
27; favorable comments about Perry are to be found in Schurz, Remini-
scences, II, pp. 229, 254-255, a.nd in Koerner to Seward, November 6, 
1862, Foreig__n Affairs,~, p. 886; Koerner, Memoirs, II, pp. 258-259 9 
said Perry's faults included a yen for the sensational and a tendency 
to procrastinate; Sarah Agnew Wallace and Frances Edna Gillespie, (eds.), 
~ Journal £!. Benja.m1n, Moran, 1857ml8~5 (2 vols., Chicago: The Univer~ 
sity of Chicago Press, 1949), II, pp. 40, 974. Moran found Perry a 
laggard at first but later thought him "educa.ted ••• gentlemanly, and 
much better qualified than the present minister LKoernei}' for the post 
at Madrid." ibid., p. 1176. 
13 
Spanish Government regarding his appointment. Tassara assured him that 
Spain fully accepted him. Secretary Seward wired Schurz on April 27, 
1861, that he was the new minister to Spain at a salary of $12,000 per 
year plus an $800 annual contingency fund.24 
A fortnight before Schurz was officially notified of his selection, 
Fort Sumter had been fired upon. Schurz immediately plunged into the 
task of raising a regiment of Germans from New York for service in the 
war. Meeting Lincoln, he told him that he felt his place was in the 
volunteer armies of America. The President, however, told Schurz his 
position in Spain was more important. Consequently Schurz departed for 
Madrid, stopping en route in London where he impressed Moran as an indi-
vidual who "will represent us both to his own and our credit."25 Short-
ly thereafter, Schurz 0 s enthusiasm had waned after contemplating the 
glory to be won on the battlefield as compared to the quiescence of the 
Spanish legation, and he wrote his brother-in-law how distasteful he 
24 
On Schurz's appointment see Joseph Schafer, (ed.), Intimate 
Letters of Carl Schurz, 1841-1862 (Madison: State Historical Society of 
W:tsconsi'n'; 1928), PPo 21i:2f2, 250-253; Frederic Bancroft, (ed .)9 
Speeches, Correspondence~ Political Papers of Carl Schurz (6 vols ., 
New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), I, pp. 172-176, 180, 
hereinafter cited as Speeches _2! Carl Schurz; Roy P. Basler, (ed.),~ 
Collected Works of Abraham Lincolri"l8 vols., New Brunswick, New Jersey~ 
Rutgers University Press, 1953), I V, pp. 280-281; Barbara Donner, "Carl 
Schurz as Office Seeker," Wisconsin Magazine Pl. History, XX (December 9 
1936), pp. 129, 132-133, 137, 139; Schurz, ~:m,:L_niscences, II , pp. 221= 
222; Seward to Schurz, April 27 , 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the 
Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives; on 
Schurz's military plans, consult Ihmas Malone, Allen Johnson , Harris 
Starr, and R. L. Schuyler, (eds.), Dictionary .2£. American Biog~ap_}Jy (22 
vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928~195S), XVI, P• 467. 
25 
Journal .2f. Benjamin Moran, II, p. 833. 
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thought the diplomatic routine would be.26 
For the remainder of his tenure in Spain, Schurz constantly thought 
of the military situation in Americao Even though the ceremony in which 
he presented his credentials to the Queen went correctly, and despite 
the fact that he had assuaged the fears of Spaniards who remembered 
/ 
Soule, Schurz stubbornly refused to be sidetracked from his desire to 
return to America. He spoke of his passionate desir e to fight for 
America and escape the "hateful business" of explaining away such events 
as Bull Runo M!ldrid was a "dull place" to Schurzo Even after Seward 
wrote him of the important job he was doing in Spain, Schurz continued 
his agitation to be recalled to the United States.27 
Despite his desire to return home, Schurz did not serve idly in 
Ma.drido He was very influential in Spanish liberal circles; the liberal 
press, due in no small part to Schurz 9 s efforts, fully embraced the 
Union causeo In order to win the sympathy of large segments of the 
E;uropean population, Schurz sought to impress upon Seward the importance 
of ,.emphasizing emancipation of slaves as a moral cause. Because Seward, 
in a position to be a better judge Df domestic events, refused to accept 
26Bancroft 9 Speeches .2£ Q!!:1 Schurz 9 I 9 Po 1820 
27For Schurz 0 s reception see Perry to Seward 9 July 14, 1861, Dis-
patches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The 
National ,Archives; indications of Schurz's oesire to leave Spain are to 
be found in Schurz to Seward, August 6 9 1861, ibid.; Schafer, (ed.), 
Intimate Letters ,2! Carl Schurz, ppo 262~266; Bancroft, Speeches 2!,Q!!:l 
Schurz, I, ppo 183~1~193-195; Seward@s appeal to Schurz is in Seward 
to Schurz, September 3, 1861 9 Diplomatic Instructions of the Department 
of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives; Donner, "Carl Schurz 
the Diplomat," Wisconsin Magazine .2f. History, XX (1937), p. 305, quotes 
Perry0 s writing to Sumner: "The contest at home absorbs his whole soul 
• o • he must go home or he will be .seriously illo His brain and his 
g~eat heart will be too much for his body unless their force can be sent 
outside himself into the struggle for America at least for a time." 
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Schurz 0 s slavery solution, Schurz finally determined to return home 
through resignation or leave of absence. Returning from Spain in Janu-
ary, 1862, Schurz resigned as minister in April, 1862, to enter the army 
and put to use the military tactics he had been studying privately while 
in Madrid. 28 
To succeed Schurz, Lincoln nominated Koerner who like Schurz had 
worked for the Republican ticket in 18600 Koerner had been approached 
in Febru.ary, 1862, by Senator IiYman Trumbull of Illinois and intµiated 
his intention of accepting the Madrid post. It was not until June, 1862, 
that Koerner•s nomination was confirmed by the Senate. vbrried by the 
possible expense of his new post, Koerner inquired if N. B. Judd, Ameri-
can Ml.nister to Berlin, would be interested in exchanging places with 
him. Judd refused and Koerner set out on a leisurely journey to Spain 
via Germany. Only toward the middle of October, 1862, did he arrive in 
Madrid. Four months later Koerner asked Seward to grant him a leave of 
absence because of a nervous affliction and the harshness of J4a,drid's 
climate. Receiving no satisfactory answer, Koerner thereafter repeattd 
~s request. In response Seward appealed to Koerner's patriotism and 
asked him to reconsider his appeal since the United States was at the 
climax of the rebellion, but all of Seward 9 s pleading could not.dissuade 
Koerner. Besides bad health and Madrid0 s climate, the increasingly 
28schurz 9s influence on the liberals is treated in ibid., pp. 299, 
'.309; P.ratt, "Spanish Opinion of the ·North American Civil War," Hispanic 
American Historical Review, X (1930), po 18; Schurz 0 s ideas about the 
importance of slavery are in Bancroft, Speeches .£t ~ Schurz, I, pp. 
19.5-199; Donner~ "Carl Schurz the Diplomat," Wisconsin Magazine£! 
History, XX (1937), pp. 302-304; on Schurz 0 s leaving see Schafer,~-
~ Letters ,2! Carl Schurz, Po 266, and Dictionary ,2! American .m:.a-
sraph.y, XVI, Po 4b7; Schurz's Reminiscences, II, Po 2?4, reveals his 
study of tacticso 
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unhappy Koerner now claimed his salary wa.s inadequate and he wished to 
return to private business. Faced with Koerner's implacable dissatis-
faction, Seward acquiesced and Koerner was permitted to leave Madrid on 
July 20, 1864. His resignation, however, was not effective until Janu-
ary 1, 1865.29 
After Koerner's departure, Perry acted again as interim minister 
for the United States. Toward the end of the war, John P. Hale, an ''old 
hack" in the eyes of Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, was named 
Minister to Spain.30 He arrived after the war was over. 
Seward did not give any indication of being overly concerned with 
Spain during the war years. The essential fact was tha.t Seward recog-
nized Spain as a secondary theater in comparison with Britain and France. 
It is unfortunate, however, that in view or Spain's record of unstable 
conditions, more devoted American diplomats were not sent to Madrid to 
provide a more coherent and accurate interpretation of events in Spain. 
Lack of personal interest in the affairs or the legation, dissatisfac~ 
tion with their appointments, and unfamiliarity with the language and. 
culture of Spain characterized the chief American envoys or the 1861-
1865 period. But given the politics and circumstances of the time, 
what more could be expected? 
29D1ctionary .2f. American Biography, X, p. 496; Basler, (ed.), £21-
lected Works or Abraham Lincoln, V, pp. 100, 383; Koerner, Memoirs, II, 
pp. 211-212, 224-227, 246, 256, 290-291, 403, 407, 419, 438, deal with 
Koerner's nomination and reaction and relief; Koerner's attempts to ob-
tain leave are covered in Koerner to Seward, February 22, 1863, and 
April 29, 1864, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 
1792-1906, The National Archives; Seward's plea is in Seward to Koerner, 
April 17, 1864, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 
1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives. 
30Howard K. Bea.le, (ed.), ria)y of Gideon Welles (3 vols., New 
York:, W. W. No.rton & Company, 19 0 , ll, P• 255. 
CHAPTER II 
THE QUESTION OF CONFEDERATE RECOGNITION 
As the situation in America darkened following the election of 
Lincoln in November, 1860, the Buchanan administration took a positive 
step to hinder the seceding states' attempts to form a uniono Should a 
Confederate representative arrive in Madrid, Secretary of State J. S. 
mack instructe.d Preston to use his own judgment in selecting methods 
to thwart official Spanish recognition of the seceded states.1 
Upon assuming office in March, 1861, Seward, the new Secretary of 
State, expanded the original instruction by suggesting that Preston ad-
vance the argu,m.ent that an independent Confederacy would be an obvious 
threat to Spain's New World possessions. Special emphasis was put on 
the danger to Cubao In stressing Cuba's significance, Seward was merely 
continuing a policy, the non-transfer of the island of Cuba, long sup-
ported by the political parties and people of the United Stateso In 
implementing their orders~ Schurz, Perry, and Koerner, the American 
representatives in Spain, repeatedly al.luded to the same themes: Spain's 
colonies could be jeopardized should an independent Confederacy come in-
to existence; Southerners and Southern-dominated politicians of the 
1850's were instigators. of the drive to acquire Cubao Indeed, it was 
the result of the opposition of the free states to the acquisition of 
lBlack to Preston 9 Februa:tf 28, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of 
the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, '!he National Archives. 
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new slave territories like Cuba, Nic·a.ragua, and Kansas, that led the 
South to revolt. That same slave-supporting opposition now sougnt inde-
pendence from the Union in order to be in a position to gain territories 
the remainder of the United States had previously prevented it from ac-
quiring. After the Emancipation Proclamation in January, 1863, Seward 
observed the illogical nature of the policy of the United States to 
seek additional slave lands at the same time that it was eradicating 
the institution of slavery. 2 
When Pierre Rost, a Confederate agent in Europe, met Spanish 
Foreign Minister Collantes early in 1862, he did not avoid the issue of 
the South's old desire for CUba. Anticipating Collantes• d911bts, he 
told the Spaniard that both sections had been equally greedy and ex-
plained the advantages each section had expected to gain: the South had 
hoped to even the balance of power in the Senate, while tile North had 
expected to receive trade benefits. Rost's statements were accurate. 
The March, 1862, issue of the Atlantic Monthly noted that both 
North and South coveted Cuba. The drive for annexation of the island 
had long been a favorite contrivance of those interested in diverting 
the attention of the American people away from the widening strife of 
2Howard c. Perkins, (ed.); Northern Editorials on Sec~ssion (2 
vols., New York: D. Appleton-Cenfury Company, 1942),II, P• 817, quotes 
from the New York World on America's pa.st policy toward Cuba; the main 
themes of American officials on the danger to Cuba are in Sewa.rd to 
Perry, April '21, 1861, Papers Relatin' 12, Foreign Affairs, ~ (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1862 , n. 2'59~ Perry +.o Seward, June 13, 
1861, ibid., P• 261; Seward to Per:ey, Foreign Affairs, g~62t II, Septem-
ber 3, 1863, PP• 906 .. ·;N, ~ ..:a,Ja:t'w i,u .. -e.1.·:i.·y, Ap:i:01.l. 15, 11::> , oreign ~-
fairs, ~, pp. 49'.3 ... 494; Pratt, "Spanish Opi·nion of the North American 
Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), p. 16; James 
Morton Callahan, Cuba and International Relations (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1899), pp': 331-333, 338-339; Schurz, Reminiscences, II9 
P• 253; F. W. Seward, Se;mard at Washington as Senator and Secretait 21.. 
State, (3 vols., New York: Derby and M:iller-;-1891), II-:1). 638, I~, p. 
69. 
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the 1850' s, and the proposal for Cuban a.cquisi tion had been advanced il:1 
the name of all Americans. Previously the abolitionist National ,b had 
also declared in favor· of acquiring Cuba., arguing tha.t the United States 
would profit economic~lly while Cuba would benefit through abolition of 
the slave trade. '!he major trade cities.of New York and New Orleans 
had displayed considerable interest in the destiny of the island, and 
politicians had reflected the national interest in the fate of Cuba.3 
Thus the Democratic platform of 1860 had contained a plank favorable to 
procurement of the Spanish colony. In the Lincoln.Douglas debates of 
1858, Lincoln had stated, the general American opinion when he said, 
"The time may come, indeed has now come, when our interests would be 
I 
advanced by the acquisition of the ·island of Cuba. When we get Cv,ba we 
must take it a.s we find it • .,4 Judging from the evidence, it appears 
Seward's point of emphasis on Cuba was well taken by the Spanish. Con-
federate attempts to win recognition by promising to respect Cuban in-
tegrity pleased Spain, but did not facilitate reoognition.5 
Besides stressing the threat to Spain's colonies in the Western 
3Atlantic Monthl.z, IX (March, 1862), pp. 362-363; Ha:rper0 s New 
Monthlr Magazine, XXV (1862), P• 262. For a more detailed account'"or 
American interest in Cuba consult Basil R.a.uch, American Interest in 
~' 1§~~°!~5.5. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 19r,:aj, pp. :ur.5, 
191-192, 207-208; Horace Greeley, ~ American Conflict: A Histoiji ,2! 
~ Great Rebellion :!,u the United States 2!_ America., ~""1.[@'. Hartford: 
O. D. Case and Company,""IS'64), p. 278, brings up the pa.st Democratic· 
interest in Cuba. 
4i3a.sler, (edo), The Collected Works ,g! Abraham Lincoln, III, p. 
11.50 
5Toombs to Helm, July 22, 1861, in James D. R:iphardson, A Complia-
:t!.2.u ,2!. the Messages !!19. Papers -2!, ~ Qf,nfederac;y; (2 vols., Nashville: 
United States Publishing Company, 1905), II, pp. 4?;..48; Callahan,~ 
and Intemational Relations, pp. 335..;337, 34.5; Perry to Seward, July 31, 
iB1)1, Dispatches from the United States Mini-stars to Spain, 1792~1906, 
The National Archives. 
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Hemisphere, Seward and the American representatives in Madrid appealed 
to Spain9 s self-interesto Ultimately this was to become the prime 
factor in the evolution of Spain's policy toward the United States and 
the Confederacy. Meanwhile, United States officials ma?'shalled a series 
of arguments designed to align Spain safely on their side. 
As previously noted, Seward's initial dispatch ordered Schurz to 
seek to prevent the reception of any Confederate agents in Madrid. The 
minister was to stress how unequal Spain and the Southern states were 
/ . 
in terms of goods produced. Charge d'Affairs Perry denied that the re-
bellion was the true sentiment of the majority of southern citizens. 
Actually, he claimed, the rebellion had been engineered by the large 
slave holders who constituted a small minority of the population. 
Though never in an open admission, Perry implied that two cou.1d play the 
re"irolutionary ga.meo He hinted that Spain's colonies were not imnru.ne 
from rebellion and mused about the consequences of recognition being 
granted the rebels by a third power. Perry was well aware th.at Spain• s 
history was replete with examples of insurrections which sundered the 
wil.1 and energies of the Spanish people. As recently as the 1830's t4e 
rival royalist faction called Carlists had succeeded in winning control 
of considerable Spanish territory. Union diplomats were quick to com-
pare that episode wi'th their om internal eruption. AnothAr important 
point advanced by Perry was that the overwhelming resources of the Unic,n 
were certain to prevail in the end. Since it was impossible for the re-
bellious states to win independence, Perry a.rgued, the issue of recog-
nition actually was nonexistent~ 
As a result of his skillful exposition of the Um.on cause and the 
apparent advantages to be reaped by not interfering in -what was clearly 
a domestic affair, Perry was able to report to Seward that the Spanish 
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Govermnent had assured him that recognition would not be immediately ex-
tended to the Confederacy. Slightly more than one month later, on July 
15, 1861, Schurz wrote Seward that no Confederate emissaries had ap-
peared in Madrid. The reason for their absence could be round in a 
letter written that same day from Confederate agents w. L. Yancey and 
A. Dudley Mann in London to their superiors in. Richmond. The note ex-
plained that while Spain and other lesser ID.lropean powers held friendly 
feeling for the Confederacy, the critical decision for recognition would 
have to emanate from the major powers in London or Paris. 6 
The results of Perry's efforts in Madrid were embodied in the 
proclamation of neutrality signed by Isabella II on June 17, 1861. 
While a conversation with Collantes on June 13 had led Perry to expect 
a stronger statement, the proclamation was not as disappointing as other 
ID.lropean declarations. For example, supplies could not be .furnished to 
privateers, but warships could be outfitted to engage in operations 
against the ,re.ssels of the party issuing letters of marque. 7 Thus Perry 
wrote Seward, "If the position it {spain'if assumes is not all that could 
be desired, I beg you to consider that after the exa..m.ples of England and 
. 8 
France it is all that could be expected." At the time of the 1868 
6seward to Schurz, April 27, 1861, Foreign Affairs, ~, p. 259; 
Perry to Seward, June 13, 1861, ibid. , pp. 261:-263; Schurz to Se-ward, 
July 15, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 
1792-1906, The National Archives; Yancey and Mann to Toombs, July 15, 
1861, Richardson, Messages .!E9. Papers .2.f. ~ Confederacy, II, PP• 42-43; 
Preston had arrived at the same conclusion as Yancey and Mann in Preston 
to Seward, May 25, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1861, p. 260; Perry wrote 
Seward that Spain would keep the question of reoogrg_tion of the Con ... 
federacy open to be set~led only as circumstances Li.a., the policies of 
Britain and Francfi[ developed, Dispatches from the United States Minis-
ters to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
7The Royal Decree is transmitted in ibid., June 19, 1861. 
8 Ibid., June 17, 1861. 
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Cuban insurrection, Spain's royal decree was to be remembered by Presi-
dent U. s. Grant as an unfriendly act, but the initial American response 
was just the opposite. Minister Schurz expressed America's gratification 
at Spain's action in a note to Collantes. In America Seward told Spa.nish 
~tlnister Tassara that the United States wished to continue to be Spain's 
close friend. In an article, Harper's~ Monthly Magazine concluded by 
stating Isabella II was set in her decision to uphold strict neutrality.9 
Harper's estimate of Spanish intentions remained accurate for the 
remainder of 1861. Spain undertook no actions of a nature to incite 
United States' fears concerning recognition of the Confederacy. Seward 
became confident enough of the domestic situation to write Perry in-
structions to inform Collantes the 
Government of the United States is not to be misunderstood 
as fearing to encounter the interirention of Spain in favor 
of the insurgents of this country if Her Catholic Majesty's 
sentiment and purposes have been misconstrued. We are aware, 
we think, of all the perils of our situation, and have not 
overlooked the not unnatural one of foreign alliances with 
our disloyal citizens.10 
Even though Collantes made it clear that Spain did not plan to recog-
nize the Confederacy, when in discussion with him Schurz never missed a 
cha.nee to emphasize any act implying that recognition of the Confeder-
acy would lead to a split in Spanish-American diplomatic relations.11 
The stern tones of Seward and Schurz were modified somewhat when 
9For Schurz's expression to Collantes, July 31, 1861, see Forei3n 
Affairs, 1861, pp. 270-271; Seward's announcement to Tassara is in 
Perkins, The Monroe. Doctrine, ~-1867, PPo 299-300; Harper's~ 
Monthly Magazine, XXIII (1861), p. 40b. 
lOseward to Schurz, September 18, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of 
the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives. 
llschurz to Seward, October 9 and October 26, 1861, Foreign!!.-
fairs, ~, pp. 284-285, 287. 
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Seward's son, Frederick, wrote Schurz that· the United States was too in-
volved in suppression of the rebellion to become involved in foreign 
disputes. The younger Seward's sentiments collated fully with the re-
ticent O'Donnell's desire to remain on a friendly course with the United 
States. Accordingly, in the immediate wake of the Trent affair, Perry 
assured Seward that Spain would remain neutral in the event of war with 
Britain.12 
Apparently Spanish policy concerning the recognition question 
changed with the opening of 1862. The prospect of extended war in 
America, plus Spanish conceit resulting from successf'u.lly resolving 
difficulties in Santo Domingo and to a lesser extent in Mexico, coupled 
with the opportunistic nature of Prime Minister O'Donnell, contributed 
to this change in point of view. Per:i:,y continued to receive assurances 
of Spain's intentions to remain loyal, but he suspected the Spanish 
Government was considering more strongly the recognition of the Con-
federacy. Perryvs pessimistic impressions were reflected by Seward who 
admitted th.at a nation which indulged in civil war ev~mtually had to ex-
pect intervention and possib.1e conquest by foreign powers •. Thus, de-
spite the assurances of non-recognition given by the Spanish diplomats 
and the widely held opinion that France and Britain had to initiate 
action, Confederate hopes were fairly high as Rost set out for Madrid 
from Paris in early 1862.13 
12seward 0 s message is in F. W. Seward to Schurz,, Foreign Affairs, 
~, pp. 288-289; O'Donnell's assurances to Schurz are contained in 
Schurz to Seward, November 9, 1861, Foreign Affairs,~, p. 478; as-
surances regarding the Trent affair are in Perry to Seward, December 29, 
1861, ibid., p. 482. 
13Perry0 s expression of fear regarding Spanish change is in Perry 
to Seward, January 4, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers 
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Rost was under orders to secure recognition based on mutual ac-
knowledgment of the similarity between the Spanish and Southern social 
system and Cuba's propinquity to the gulf states of the Confederacy. He 
was to attempt to remove the stigma of the revolutionary label by stat-· 
ing that the South was in revolt against the Union because the latter 
had broken the compact that previously had bound the states together. 
The compact theory of go,rernment, Rost was to explain, was a voluntary 
association of the several states for the benefit or all. Should one 
section assert itself to the detriment of another, the injured states 
possessed the right to choose to disassociate themselves from the union 
if their interests cou.1d not be protected in any other way. The Federal 
Union was not a perpetual thing, for membership was voluntary, and 
severance of association was equally left at the discretion of the states. 
Unfortunately for Rost and the Confederate cause, news of General 
Grant's Tennessee victories had preceded his arrival in Madrid. Never-
theless, Collantes met Rost, and the Southerner smoothly constructed his 
case for recognition of his government. First, he analyzed, two powers 
would be present on the North American continent: first, one would be 
free from the "puritan fanaticism" tha.t so annoyed Catholic Spain, and, 
second, the Confederacy was Spain's natural ally with its similarity of 
social structure. Finally, Rost tried to soothe Spanish fears for Cuba 
to Spain, 1792-1906, The Na.tional Archives; Seward's sentiments are in 
Seward to Perry, February 22, 1862, Foreign Affairs,~, pp. 469-470; 
the belief for the necessity of Franco.British action first may be found 
in Schurz, Reminiscences, II, p. 275; Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the. 
North American Civil .War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), 
p. 15; Rost to Jefferson Davis, December 24, 1861, Richardson, Messages 
~ Papers 2£. ~ Confederacy, II, p. 134; Charles Helm wrote to Con-
federate Secretary of State R. M. To Hunter that Cuba's Captain-General 
Francisco Serrano felt recognition by Britain, France, and Spa.in to be 
forthcoming within sixty days, Helm to Hunter, January 17, 1862, ibid., 
P• 152. 
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by pointing out the universal American interest in the island and prom-
ising that an independent Confederacy would not look greedily upon the 
Spanish colony, especially if Spanish recognition was granted to the 
Richmond governmentol4 
Rost•s discuss~on with Collantes led nowhere. The Spaniard told 
the Southerner that his nation would not take the lead in recognizing 
the Confederacy until Britain and France had dealt with the blockade of 
Southern ports. Spain was not going to risk herself before Britain and 
France had entered the fracas. The discouraged Rost eventually left 
M.adrid and some weeks later returned to Richmond, convinced that recog-
nition would be granted the Confederacy only after a victorious con-
clusion of the war she was waging.15 
While Rost visited Madrid, the Atlantic Monthly ~peculated on the 
'. 
14Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the North American Civil War," ~-
panic American Historical Review, X (1930), p. 16, discloses Rost's in ... 
structions; M. Po Crugat to Confederate Secretary of the Navy s. R. 
Mallory, M.arch 24, 1861, Richardson, Messages !:m! Papers .2£. the ~-
federacy2 II, pp. 11-12, 72, states his belief that Spai~ would be the 
South's warmest friend in E.urope, because of the similarity of institu~ 
tions; Rost•s visit to Madrid was known fully by Perry who was tele-
graphed by Minister Dayton in Paris about Rost• s departure, Perry to 
Seward, March 8, 1862, Foreign Affa.il's, 1862, p. 483; Collantes haq told 
Perry any conference with Confederate agents would be the same as recog-
nizing the independency of the Confederacy, Perry to Seward, December 28, 
1861, ibid., pp. 481-482; it must be stated, .howe,rer, that Collantes 
notified Perry that Rost, living in Madrid as a. "private citizen," was 
trying to see him. He told Rost he would see him only as a "distint-
guished foreigner," Perry to Seward, May 3, 1862, ibid., p. 494; Rost•s 
presentation of the Confederacy's cause is in Rost to Benjamin, March 
24, 1862, Richardson, .Messages !.m! Papers 2£. the Confederacy, II, pp. 
202-204; Harper's~ Monthly Magazine, XXV (V3b2), p. 262. 
I 
15Rost to Benjamin, March 21, 1862, in Richardson, Messages~ 
Papers .2!.~ Confederacy, II, pp. 205-206, includes Rost•s impressions 
of what Spain would do; Callaha.n, Cuba and International Relations, p. 
337; Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the North American Civil War,'' Hispanic 
American Historical Review, X (1930) , p. 17; Harpel"' s ~ Monthly Maga-
~, XXV (1862), Po 262. 
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probable existence of an agreement among Spain, France, and Britain to 
aid the Confederacy if United States power declined. Such an accord 
did not exist, howevero Perry continued to reitera.te his statements 
condemning the Confederacy and emphasizing the advanta.ges Spain would 
receive from a preserved Union.. Collantes grew bold enough to state 
that he considered the United States "overbea.ring a.nd aggressive" and 
guilty of paying very little attention to the rights of other nations. 
But in the same discussion he informed Per:ry that }).e believed the Con-
federacy's cause was doomed.16 
Seward certainly agreed with Collantes' conclusions; in fact, he 
informed Perry of his belief that the war would not enter a third year. 
Thus the remainder of 1862 found Spa.nish-American relations unchanged. 
Seward told Tassara, the Spanish minister in Washington, of his desire 
to see Spanish~American relations remain cordial. In Madrid, Collantes 
emphasized Spain's similar desire to continue good relations. When 
Koerner, the newly arrived American minister to Madrid, inquired about 
instructions for his new post, Seward promptly told him to consult 
Schurz' s old instructi.ons on file at the legation because circumstances 
still rendered them va..lido Seward's confidence stemmed from his belief 
in the inability of the Confederacy to prosecute the war much longer, 
in addition to the belief that once aga.in Europe 0 s intramural squabbles 
would produce a crisis that would monopolize the attention of its 
governments, thus freeing America from the sometimes troublesome Conti«, 
nental interest. Moreover, the United States was becoming stronger with 
16 Atlantic Montt..lx, IX (1862), p. 364; Perry to Collantes, March 
22~ 1862, Foreign Affairs,~, p. 491; Perry to Seward, March 30, 
1862, ibid., pp. 488-490; Perry to Seward, July 7, 1862, ibid., p. 508. 
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the passage of timeo He concluded tn.at no European nation could recog .• 
nize the Confederacy without fear of punitive action by the United 
States.17 
The Confederacy resolved to make one more attempt to win official 
Spanish support. In April, 1862, the Confederate Senate a:pproved a 
resolution em.powering Confederate emissaries to draw up treaties with 
Britain, France, and Spain. Rost remained quite pessimistic concerning 
helpf'u.l action on the part of Spain. Bu.t Confederate Secretary of State 
Benjamin authorized John Slidell of Trent fame to proceed to Madrid from 
Paris to uncover further Spanish intentions. In Slidell's instructions 
Benjamin hinted tha. t Slidell should appeal to the vanity of the Span-
iards: if Spain really wished to be a first-rank power, she must take 
the initiative and recognize the South. Any chance for Slidell to be 
successful was crushed when the O'Donnell regime collapsed and threw 
Spain into a succession of weak governments. In fact, Slidell did not 
even bother to journey to Madrid but simply reQU.ced his activities to a 
single discussion with Xavier Isturiz, the Francophile Spanish ambassa-
dor to the court of Napoleon III in Paris.18 
17seward to Tassara, September 9, 1862, ibid., p. 527; Koerner to 
Seward, November 6, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 885; Seward's 
directions about instructions are in Seward to Koerner, August 18, 1862, 
Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 274; Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 230; for Seward's 
belief in a short war, consult Seward to Perry, April 22, 1862, Foreign 
Affairs, 1862, p. 470; Seward's growing confidence is reflected in 
Seward to Koerner, August 25, 1862, Diplomatic Instructions of the De-
par'bnent of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives; see also 
Seward to .Koerner, October 21, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 475-
476. · -· - -
18 
Uo S. Senate Document Number 234, 58th Congress, 2nd Session, 
1904-1905 (7 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-1905), 
II, 192-193; Rost to Benjamin, November 28, 1862, Richardson, Messages 
~ Papers .2! ~ Confederacx, II, p. 328; Slidell's instructions are 
in Benjamin to Slidell, March 26, 1863, and May 9, 1863, ibid., pp. 
463-466, 482-484; the collapse of the O'Donnell regime and the 
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Slidell spa.red himself a. fruitless trip because O'Donnell's regime 
was replaced by a. caretaker government headed by the Marquis of Mira.-
£'lores. On occasions when he met the Marquis, Koerner found it neces-
sary to spend time modifying the Spaniard's vast ignorance about Ameri-
ca. An elderly, indecisive man, the Marquis did not enjoy :full 
obedience from his subordinates. Perry's attention was thus caught by 
the activities of one such subordinate, General Juan Concha, the Minis-
ter of War and Colonies, who obviously was scheming to install a pro-
Confederate policy. Concha believed Spain's importance could be re-
stored by unilateral Spanish recognition of the Confederacy. Then a 
joint Spanish-French-Confederate coalition could be formed to prevent 
any further expansion by the Anglo-Saxons. The machinations of General 
Concha. collapsed upon the arrival of the news of the Union's great vie-
tories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. The question of Spanish recognition 
of the Confederacy was now solved, Perry believed. In early August, 
1863, Perry and his Spanish-born wife were received in an audience by 
Isabella II and her husband, Francisco de Bourbon. Isabella and her 
husband immediately launched a conversation in which they said they "al-
ways" believed in Union victory.19 
consequences are in Slidell to Benjamin, May 28, 1863, ibid., pp. 493-
494; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 146: Koerner to 
Seward, March 1;-m6~Di·;p~tches to t~nUed States Ministers to 
Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
19Koerner's impressions of Miraflores are in Koerner to Seward, 
April 11, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, pp. 896-897; conscious plot-
ting is disclosed in Perry to Seward, July 25, 1863, Dispatches from the 
United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; the 
effect of Vicksburg and Gettysburg is recorded in Perry to Seward, July 
29, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 18ftJ, II, p. 903; Callahan, ~ ~ Inter-
national Relations, pp. 346-3 7; Isabella's friendly greeting is re-
corded in Perry to Seward, August 2, 1863, Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
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OJ.ring the last ha.1f of 1863 a major remaining task for Koerner 
and Perry was to counteract the pro-French faction General Concha ex-
amplified in Spanish politics. The danger of unilateral Spanish recog-
ni tion of the Confederacy being past, Perry and Koerner worked to 
counter the influence a.nd intrigues of Spanish factions who wished their 
country to follow the lead of France in the recognition question, Col-
lantes even told Perry that the threat of Confederate recognition by 
France could be used to keep the United States in line. Perry actually 
acknowledged that policy would be followed by Spain. In reply to 
Perry's worries, Seward indicated the belief he shared with Lincoln in 
continued Spanish-American fri.endship, bu.t emphasized that Spain would 
be the power to suffer the most if she allowed herself to be seduced by 
any alluring plot directed against the Uni~d States. Seward apparent.ly 
thought Spain was more likely to follow Britain than France. 
Meanwhile, Koerner col'l.tinued to report his theory that France was 
seeking to provoke Spain into action first ~n regard to the Confederacy. 
When Napoleon III and his Spanish-born wife, Eilg'enie, personally visited 
Spain, Koerner concluded that it was to seek cooperation. The minister, 
however, overlooked the fact that multitudes of Spaniards had harbored 
little love for France since Napoleon I had struggled to conquer their 
peninsula in the years from 1808 to· 1814. French attempts to win Spail'l 
to its ways were doomed to end in failure because of France's own 
actions of an earlier day. 20 
20Perry's fears about French influence are in Perry to Seward, July 
?, 1862, Foreign Affairs,~, p. 508; Perry to Seward, July 12, 1863, 
Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The 
National Archives; Seward's ideas about Spain are in Seward to Perry, 
August 10, 1863, Foreign Affairs, !863, II, pp. 904-905; Seward's be .. 
lief' that Spain would follow Brita n's lead is in Beale, (ed.), Diary 
.2!, Gideon Welles, I, p. 399; Koerner's reports on Napoleon III's visit 
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The year 1864 was completely devoid of any a.ttempts by the sinkipg 
Confederacy to win Spanish support. Similarly, French influence de-
clined greatly. As the war in the United States drew to a close, Perry 
tried to win Spain to a policy of withdrawal of the 1861 deoree on neu~ 
trality and therefore an implied statement of confidence in the United 
states. SUch a course, Perry claimed, would enable the Iberians to im-
prove Spanish-American relations and refute the argument of those who 
complained that Spain acted only in the wake of Britain and France. 
Despite promises to study Perry's proposals, the Spanish waited until 
June, 1865, four years from its issuance, to withdraw their decree of 
neutrality. 21 · 
Spain did not recognize the Confederacy because she lacked the es-
sential ingredients to enforce the consequences of such a step. In-
itially, with O'Donnell at the helm, the Spaniards wished to take ad-
vantage of the Union's distresso The bitter realization that Spain was 
but a second or even third-rank power prevented such a step. Any chance 
of Franco-Spanish cooperation in recognition was destined to fail be-
cause of the antipathy of Spaniards for the French and Napoleon III's 
personal hesitancy. A host of other factors entered the situation: 
the rising strength of the United States, the physical distances in-
volved, the memory of the filibustering expeditions against Cuba, and 
· and his attempt to seek Spain• s ''co-operation" as well as the coldness 
of his reception are in Koerner to Seward, September 20, 1863, October 
11, 1863, and November 1, 1863, Dispatches from the United States 
Ministers to Spain, 1792 ... 1906, The National Archives. 
21Perry to Seward, March ll, 1865, Papers Relatin~ to Foreign M.-
fairs, 1865 (Washington: Government Printing Office, l 6b}"', II, pp. 
515-516; Seward to Perry, April 4, 1865, ibid., p. 521; Csllahan, ~ 
and International Relations, pp .. 351 ... 352; announcement of the with-· 
drawa.1 of the June, 1861, decree is in Perry to Seward, June 5, 1865, 
Foreign Affairs, 1865, II, P• 540. 
31 
the instability of the Spanish political structure after the fall of 
the O'Donnell government in ea.rly 1863. Spain thus missed her golden 
chance to be a decisive factor in the American Ci,ril War due to lier 
own inherent shortcomings. 
CHAPTER III 
CUBA IN SPANISR-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 
Despite their oarei'ul attempts to show that theory for Cuba 
emanated solely from the Confederate states, United States diplomats in 
Madrid discovered the influential classes of Spain were singularly un-
moved by such assurances. Wealthy Spaniards were haunted by the spec-
tre, Perry emphasized, of the "United States surrounding the Gu.1f of 
Mexico from Florida to Yucatan and then quietly drawing into the open 
jaws of that great serpent their fascinated and powerless island of Cuba 
without effort and without defense. nl Faced with the dilemma. of se-
lecting the lesser evil, the Spanish chose to remain inert. In effect, 
they tacitly adopted a policy oriented toward the Union, regardless of 
the consequences to Cuba. 
In Cuba itself the ruling elements appeared to have no worries 
concerning their island's future should the Confederacy emerge victor-
ious. Without exception, Confederates visiting briefly in Cuba were 
hospitably entertained and often reported on the friendliness felt by 
the Cuban people for the South. For instance 9 Special Agent James M. 
Mason, waiting on the island to boa.rd the Trent for ID.lrope, noted the 
widespread Cuban sympathy which ranged .from the Captain General, Fran-
cisco Serrano, do-wn to ordinary citizens. After an interview with 
1Perry to Seward, April 17, 1862, Dispatches from the United states 
Ministers to Spa.in, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
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Serrano, Confederate agent Charles Helm reported Serrano had granted him 
permission to come and go as he pleased. For a number of reasons, Ser-
rano later expressed deep regret to Helm that Spain could not take the 
lead in recognition of the Confederacy. The Confederacy retained this 
warm attitude until the conclusion of the war. 
Cuba's special feeling for the Confederacy may be traced to a 
number of factors. First, slavery existed in Cuba, thereby creating a 
social structure akin to that or the ante-bellum South. Second, Cubans 
were highly provoked by incidents in Cuban waters involving Union ves.,. 
sels. Third, human nature then, as always, tended to favor the under-
dog in its struggle with a vastly stronger foe •. Finally, Cuba and the 
South had enjoyed close pre-war economic ties.2 
Given the sympathy in Cuba for the Confederacy, it is not sur-
prising that Serrano opened Cuban ports to vessels flying the Confeder-
ate flag. The decision was so predictable that the Un1ted States v~ce-
consul in Havana, Thomas Savage, did not even bother to protest it. It 
was just as well that Savage remained q:uiet. Spain's policy was well 
expressed by Foreign Minister Collantes who told Minister Schurz in 
2Admiral Semmes of Alabama fame knew of the sympathy Cubans felt 
for the Confederacy. However, he attributed Spain's responsiveness to 
the United States to the nearness of Cuba to the United States~ See U. 
s. Department of the Navy, Official Records ,2! ~~and £,2nfeder-
ate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (30 vols. and index, Washing-
ton': GovernmentP.rinting Office, 1894.-1927), Se?'ies II, Vol., II, p. 140; 
Mason's friendly treatment is reported in Virginia Ma.son,~ Public 
~ .!!!9, Diplomatic Correspondence ,.2! James ![. Mason (New York and 
Washington: The Neale Publishing Company, 1906), PPo 202-203; Helm to 
R. M. T. Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State, November 8, 1861, 
Richardson, Messages !!l2. Papers .2!.~ Confederacy, II, pp. 112-113, 
contains Serrano's friendly instructions to Helm; Helm to Hunt~r, De ... 
cember 12, 1861, ibid., pp. 124-125, has Serrano 9 s regrets for Spain 9 s 
not being able to take the lead in recognizing the Confederacy; Koerner, 
Memoirs, II, P• 291, mentions possible reasons for Cu.ban sympathy for 
the Confederacy. 
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Madrid that Spa.in would follow her own commercial interests and, if the 
United States was not happy as it watched Southern shipping in Spain's 
ports, all it had to do was enforce its blockade. Moreover, Collantes 
stressed that trading with the Confederacy did not imply recognition. 
Accordingly Cuba became a convenient entrepot for the Con:f'ederacy.3 
Because Cuba developed into such an important Confederate-oriented 
trading area, numerous incidents took place in and a.round its waters. 
Though the problems were always easily solved, Schurz found that the 
sheer numbers of them occupied a large part of his time. Finding them-
selves to be in control of a popular rendezvous point for blockade 
runners, the Spanish government became highly sensitive to any inter-
ferences with ships or individuals under their jurisdiction. The 
amazing fact was that the United States, though well aware of Cuba's 
importance to the Confederacy, tolerated its con.tinued intercourse with 
the S~uth via hlockade runners. 4 Early in the war Seward told Schurz, 
'Who in turn relayed the informa.tion to Collantes, that. the Um,. ted states 
could not remain idle 'While Cuba. was turned into a. ''lever for over-
thro'Wing either this Union or its institutions of human freedom and 
3Helm to Hunter, November 8, 1861, Richardson, E:Iessa.ges ~ .f.aperJ!. 
.2!, the Confederacy, II, p. 111; Sa.vage 0 s apathy is in Savage to Seward, 
September 6, 1861, Foreign Af'fairst 1861, pp. 275-276; Spain's policy 
is stated in "Memorandum of a. conversation between Schurz and Calderon 
Colla.ntes," October 16, 1861, ibid., pp. 286-287; Callahan, Cuba and 
International Relations, PP• 333-334, 337-338; see also Serrano's an-
swer to Consul-General Savage in the eases of the Allan Ao Chapman and 
Bamberg in Serrano to Savage, September 20~ 1861, Foreign Affairs, iB'61, 
pp. 282 ... 283. -- -
4schurz, Reminiscences, II, Pe 287; F. Wo Seward, Reminiscences of 
!. l'.f!t.-~ Statesman !m. Diplomat~ 1830-~ (New York and London: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1916), P• 213, reveals Seward 9 s awarene.ss of what was 
going on in Cuba.. 
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selt-governmento"5 But only on that single instance was such a warning 
issuedo The only reason Seward apparently did not issue an ultimatum. 
inspired by Cuba's role seems to be his hope that the ever tightening 
Union blockade would preclude the necessity or such a drastic stepo 
Pursuing the suspected blockade runner manche, the United States 
Navy warship Montgomery violated Cuba 6 s :marl time boundaries o In the 
wake or the affair the privilege or United States ships to communicate 
with the United States consul on shore in Havana was revoked. The 
United States first appealed to Spain to relax this restriction in De-
camber, 18620 The question was thrown into confusion, however, when 
the Confederate commerce raider Florida.was allowed in Havana harbor 
after destroying a Union vesselo The Florida shipped out or Havana 
while a Northern vessel was refused admission to the harboro About this 
same tirri.e another vessel, the Reane:yll communicated with the United states 
warship Oneida in Havana harbor. Shortly.thereafter she was halted by a 
Spanish ship which fired a shot across her bowo Then, a month later 
near the end of February, 1863, Spain announced the lifting or the ban 
against .American ships communicating with the consul on shoreo But in 
the diplomatic flurry over the Florida and the Reaney, nothing actually 
was done to remove the restrictiono Thus notes were exchanged in which 
the new Spanish. Foreign Minister Serrano smugly expressed tacit surprise 
over the happenings in Cubao Seward foun<i such naivete difficult to be-
lieveo Koerner denounced the firing on the Reaney as ''wholly unjusti-
fiable" and sought to show the Reaney in the righto The problem of 
5seward~···seward .U WtshiPJtcm.'.!,! Senator and :Secretar:y ·~-State, 
_II,.·p .. 638; see aiso Call.a.ban, ~ and,Internat!'onal Relations, p~ 3340 
communication betwen ship and shore in Havana harbor continued to re-
main unsettledo Finally, in July, 1863, orders were sent to Cuba 0 s 
Captain-General Domingo Du.lee to revoke the prohibition against Ameri-
can shipso6 The Blanche affair, the Florida, and the Reaney incidents 
pointed .to the sensitivity of which the state Department was well aware 
and .led to the most bizarre episode involving Cuba"s coastal limitso 
Tassara'initially complained to Seward that Cuba's six=mile terri-
torial limits were being violated in Jiay, l862e Seward retorted that 
American ships never had been ordered to violate Cuba's waters and such 
violations would not be sanctioned in the f'utureo In reply Tassara 
maintained that the close patrol or Cuban waters was really a form of 
blockade which hurt the comme:1:ce of a friendly powero Seward then re-
ferred the question of Spain° s claim to a six,.,mile limit to Welles., 
Lincoln9 s crusty Secretary of the Navyo .Welles proceeded to tear to 
shreds Tassara's aiiegations of the necessity for such exaggerated 
limitso He made it clear to Seward that Americaffs interests were not 
best served by adherence to Spain°s proposalo Seward closed the ques ... 
tion for the year 1862 by announcing there would have· to be general ac- ·. 
ceptance among all int.erested powers before the United States agreed to. 
6 America0 s request for removal of the prohibition ts in Seward to 
Koerner, December 8, l8p2·, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, po 888; Seward to 
Koerner, January 30, 1863, ibido, ppo 889-890, brings up the Florida 
and Reaney events; Spain's intentions of removing restrictions in Febru-
ary, 186'.3, are in Seward to Koerner, February 28, 1863, ibido, Po 892; 
Callahan, ~ ~ International Relations, po '.344; more correspondence 
on the Florida and Reaney is ·in Koerner to Seward, March 1, 186'.3, I2£-
!!m Affairs, 1863, II, Po 892; Seward to Koerner!I March 1, 1863, ibic;lo, 
~-g-93; Koerner to· Seward, April 4, 1863, ibido, ppo 894-895; Miraflores 
to Koerner, April 1, 1863§1 ibido, ppo 895-896; Koerner to Miraflores, 
April 10, 1863~ ibido, PPo 898=900; Koerner to Seward, May 23, 186'.3, 
ibido, po 900; the announcement to rescind the restrictions is in 
Perry to Seward, July 11, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Mini-
sters to'Spain, 1792-1906, The NationaJ. Archiveso 
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Spain's claims. 7 
The initial two-thirds or 1863 were devoid of any mention of 
Spain's claim to a six-mile limit for Cubao Finally on August 10, 
Seward indicated to Perry that the Qest policy for the United States 
was one of continued waiting and watching for Spain to make a move. He 
added that Spain9 s claim was unjustifiable and that there was no pre-
cedent the Spanish could advance to prove United States' acquiescence 
in the mattero Before the August 10 note could be delivered. to Perry, 
Tassara advised Seward that if Cuba's coastal limits were not respected, 
Spain would use her naval strength to enforce them beginning in October, 
1863. Seward responded to this virtual ultimatum by stating that the 
United States regarded the affair to be a question of international 
law. He then dispatched a message to Perry expressing surprise that 
Spain would bypass the embassy in Ma.drido But he wanted Perry to make 
clear to the Spaniards the avowal that the United States would defend 
its rights if attackedo Writing Minister Charles Francis Adams in 
London three weeks later, Seward took the same forthright stance.8 
7Tassara to Seward, May 28, 1862~ Foreign Affairs, ~t ppo 518-
.519, brings up the violation of Cuba's waters; Seward to Tassara, June 
2, 1862, ibid., po 519, contains Seward 9 s rebuttal; Tassara to Seward, 
July 23, 1862, ibido, Po 523, mentions Tassara9 s concept that Cuba was, 
in effect, being blockaded; see also Callahan, Cuba and International 
Relations, po 343; Welles' role is shown in Official&cords of the . 
Union~ Confederate Navies, Series I, Vol. XVII, ppG 249-2.si'i"Beaie, 
(edo), ~ pia;i;x .2!, Gideon Welle~., I, Po 170; John Bassett Moore, ! 
Digest 21. International Law (8 vols., Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1906), I, pp. ?Ob-709, has Seward 0 s negative answer to Tassara 9 s 
claims. 
8Seward 9 s policy is in Seward to Perry, ,August 10, 1863, Foreign 
Affairs, 1863, II, Po 904; Moore, Digest .2i, International ~ 9 I,· ppo 
710-712, also indicates Seward's policy and Tassara's fears about 
Spain's intentions of enforcing her claims; Seward's reply is mentioned 
in Bea.le, (ed.), The Diary ,2! Gideon Welles, I!) ppo 399-400~ Seward to 
Perry, August 14,W63, Foreign Affairs,_ 1863, II, p., 905; notice to 
Ada.ms in London is in Moore, Digest ,2! International.!:!.'!!, I, p. 712. 
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The two routes of Spanish policy that emerged in the middle of 
September, 1863, must have been a source of amazement to Sewardo This 
policy amounted to nothing less than dual diplomacye Led by General 
Concha, the pro .. French clique in the Spanish go,rernment had spotted an 
opportunity to plunge Spain into a struggle with the United States while 
the majority of the Spanish people and government remained in a state or 
ignorance of the schemeo Perry dispatched a record of his first in-
timations of the duplicity in Spanish policy to Seward on September 10. 
Seward's assertion that Tassara's claim to unusually broad maritime 
boundaries was a matter of international law had been efficiently in-
tercepted and buried by the anti-Tassara faction in Madrido Meanwhile, 
orders had been sent to Captain-General D.lloe in Cuba to begin en. 
forcing the six-mile limit in early Ootobero 
Meeting the Prime Minister, the Marquis of Miraflores, on Septem-
ber 12, Perry discovered.to his annoyance that Miraflores had never seen 
Tassara's dispatch communicating Seward 0 s answer to Spain's decision to 
enforce Cuba's territoria.l limitso Miraflores immediately accepted 
Seward's suggestion for arbitration by a third powero9 An unidentified 
Spanish clergyman reported the following conversation he had with Mira-
floras: 
You LYrl.raflorei}' promised that you would not recognize 
the South, why did you tell the French Ambassador that you 
would? 
It was necessary to deceive himo 
Deceit for deceit--who knows whether you deceive Perry 
or the ambassador? 
9Perry to Seward, September 10 and 12, 1863, Dispatches from the 
United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archiveso 
Perry .u2,! Behind Perry is war with the United States, 
but behind the Ambassador what is there? Yet we are obliged 
to do something to get along with France. 
Well now you provoke a war with the United States on a 
question of limits and do not choose to settle it as }Tr. 
Seward offers to do. 
How? Who told you that? I have seen nothing from Mr. 
Seward • 
• e e O O O • 0 • e .••• • e • • e e • • • e e • e e e e • e 
You are carrying Spain into a war with the United States 
for the interest or slavery.lo 
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Fully believing Miranores to be innocent of a:ny intrigue against 
the United States, Perry subsequently elaborated on the American po-
sition regarding Cuba's limits and clarified for Miraflores' murky mind 
the finer points of the American argument. Miraflores then announced 
that Dulce's orders to enforce Cuba's territorial limits had been can-
celled. Moreover, Miraflores accepted arbitration of the thorny prob-
lem by Leopold I, the Ring of Belgiumoll 
Thereafter the question of royal.arbitration of the issue receded •. 
Perry had led the Spaniards to believe Lincoln could act unilaterally 
on the matter; Seward emphasized to Tassara that such was an impossi-
bili ty and informed him tha.t Lincoln wou.1d have to consult the Senate 
if the king was to serve as arbitratoro A deterrent to senatorial ap-
proval was Navy Seo:reta.ry Welles' opinion that the Belgium monarch was 
lOPerry to Seward, September 13, 1863, ibid. The remainder of the 
conversation dealt with Concha' s role and Miraflores' stating he had 
sent an order to Dulce cancelling enforcement instructions. The writer 
feels there is validity in the conversation because the clergy was very 
opposed to a pro-French, anti-U:tµ.on policy, and because Miraflores, as 
all evidence indicates, was ignorant of events. Moreover, General 
Concha's earlier role in seeking to have Spain unilaterally recognize 
the Confederacy fits his position in this case. 
11 
Perry to Seward, September 15 and.19, 1863, ibid. 
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not qualified to settle the issueo 
The question arose again when Lincoln referred to it in his 1864 
annual message to Congress. In the following months, as Spanish govern-
ments changed, so did Spanish policy. Tassara was not delegated the 
authority to negotiate any agreement to bring the Belgian king into the 
picture. The war ended without the question being submitted for ar-
bitration.12 
In retrospect, it is clear that Seward and others in the Depart-
ment of State were awa.re of' the unabashed pro-Confederate, anti-Union 
sentiments of many Cuba.ns. They were even more aware of Cuba's im-
portance as a merchandise mart for the Confederacy. Seward had the 
foresight and patience to see that the Union blockade would remove the 
importance of Cuba as a supply base for the Confederacy. 
The problems arising from the six .. mile claim for Cuba's territorial 
limits constituted a more complicated event. Here again Seward realized 
that time would remove the cause of trouble. On the other hand, the 
threat of war was real only to the pro-French clique as represented by 
General Concha. Most of the Spanish citizenry, under the leadership of 
the Roman Catholic Church, would have refused to participate in any 
such struggle. That there was a slim possibility of war starting over 
Cuba reflects its secondary importance in Spanish-American diplomacyo 
l2The importance of the Senate in the proposed arbitration is in 
Seward to Koerner, October 8, 1863, Foreign A.ff airs, 18648 IV, pp. 1=2; 
Welles' bewilderment is in Bealejl (ed.) 11 ~ Diarx .2.!, Gideon_ Welles, I~ 
PPo 467-468; Basler, (edo), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, VII, 
p.o 37, contains Lincoln° s reference to arbi tra.ticm; Tassar~ is laok of 
authority is in Se~rard to Koerner, February 25, 1864, Foreign Affairst 
~' IV, po 9; Koerner to Seward, May 15, 1864, ibido, Po 28; the 
cha.nge of governments in. Spain is mentioned in Koerner to Seward, June 
27, 1864, Dispatches from the United States Ministers te> Spain, 1792-1906, 
The National Archives; Moore, Digest£!. International~, Ij pp. 712~ 
713, refers to the question having never been submitted for arbitratio:r10 
CHAPTER IV 
SANTO DOMINGO IN SPANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 
In April, 1861, the Kingdom of Spain reincorporated the nation of 
Santo Domingo into the Spanish Empire. A casual glance at the situation 
suggests that the Spa.niards were trea.cherously taking advantage of the 
developing Civil War in. the United States to aggrandize their interests. 
Careful exa.mination of the e'lrents for the yea.r preceding the reincorpo-
ration provides evidence that the Spanish action had been thought out 
well in ad,rance. The Cbril War merely ser'lred as a screen which Spain 
found convenient to dislodge any opposition to her actiona 
Santo Domin.go, now called the Dominican Republic, shares the island 
of Hispaniola with the Negro nation of Haiti. Until 1844 it was con-
trolled by the Haitians; tha.t year the Dominicans threw off Haitian con-
trol and proclaimed their independencea From the beginning, however, 
Dominican independence proired a fragile object. Fear of Haiti wa.s ram-
pant, and the dictatorship that appeared reflected Dominican hope for 
security against its neighbor. Yet even dicta.tors like Pedro Santana., 
when threatened with Haitian invasion, looked for outside help. Thus, 
in 1858, Santana appealed to Spain for aid should Haiti strike. While a 
Spanish reply is not :recorded, the Spa.nish e,rentually notified the Do ... 
minicans that Spain was favorable to the idea of establishing a pro-
tectorate over Santo Dominto. By mid-1860, actual plans for a protec-
torate were being· discussed., Secretary of State Lewis Cass was duly in-
formed that Spain was actively seeking to absorb Santo Domingo and that 
41 
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settlers from Spain and Puerto Rico were ar~iving in Santo Dominto in 
. . b 1 increasing num erso 
Despite the information forthcoming from Americans abroad, the 
Buchanan Administration took no positive steps to thwart Spanish activi-
ties in the Caribbeano Perhaps the lack of action can be attributed to 
the 1860 presidential election and the turmoil within the American na-
tiono Subsequently the entire Dominican question lay dormant until 
Spain's decision for reincorporation in 1861. 
Why was Spain interested in Santo Domingo? Why did she act only as 
the American nation appeared to be hopelessly divided? There are a num-
ber of explanationso The O'Donnell government was not adverse to any 
movement seeking protection 9 as numerous Dominicans maintained, es-
pecially if such a development would enlarge the Spanish Empire. More-
over, the Spanish masses wpuld be able to see tangible proof that Spain 
was a power to be reckoned with, hence they would overlook the backward-
ness of the Spanish stateo Spain would be able to exhibit its strength 
to the wayward nations of Latin America, and Spaniards could explain 
that Santo Domingo had experienced independence and had found it un-
workableo Santo Domingo was unable to cope 'With its inherent problems, 
and for protection against Haiti, the Dominicans had to return to their 
motherlando Sp~nish prestige thus wou.ld climb throughout the Spanish-
lselden Rodman 9 Quisgueya: ! History ,2!, the Dominican Republic 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964J7 ppo 73-74; Charles Co 
Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo 9 1?98-1.§.Zl (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press 9 1938),'J)po 211~212; Preston to Cass, October 9, 
1860, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, 
The National Archives; Elliot to Cass~ October 16, 1860, U.S. Government, 
Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Nations, 1860 
twashington: George W7""Bowmanj 18gl)j I, p~7o ----
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speaking nations of Latin Americao 2 
The Spanish were interested in trying any course to halt the growth 
of the United Stateso From the Spanish viewpoint the United States was 
an octopus whose tentacles were reaching out for ever more lando It 
was only a matter of time before the United States would again be after 
Cuba and even Puerto Rico. Understandable, therefore, was the fright of 
Cuba's Captain=Generalj Serrano, when he learned of American economic 
activities on the nearby guano island of Alto Velae "The Government of 
Hai ti," Serrano wrote 9 ''will acquire the moral and possibly effective 
support of the United States whose dominion in that territory L'santo 
Doming!i}" would constitute a danger to us."3 As the Spanish newspaper 
Cronica blatantly proclaimed 11 "with this island stretching its right 
hand to Puerto Rico and its left to Cuba, we commence a new system, 
giving us the control of the Gulf o 194 With Santo Domingo and its im-
portant anchorage at Samana Bay in its grasp, Spain would frustrate, 
even if only temporarily9 the territorial growth of the United States.5 
With Spanish settlers entering Santo Domingo throughout 1860' and 
2Revue ~ ~ Mondes 9 XfflII (1861), PPo 645, 658-659~ Rodman, 
Quisgueya: ! Histor;y .2!, ~ Dominican Republic, p. 70. 
3The quote is from a lett~r sent by Serrano to the Minister of War 
in Madrid, July 4, 1860 9 David G. Yuengling, Highlights!!'.! !h! Debates 
~~Stanish Chamber .2f. Deputies Relative 12, ~Abandonment£! Santo 
DomingoWashington: Murray & Heister, 1941), pp. 2-3; see also Perkins, 
~ Monroe Doctrine, 1826 ... 1867, p. 283. · 
4Italicized and quoted in Samuel Hazard, Santo Domingo, Past and 
Present; With a Glance at Hal!:i (New York: Harper & Brothers 91S'731,p. 
255. -- - -
5For evidence of America's interest in Santo Domingo, see Rodman, 
Quisgueya: ! History .2!, ~ Dominican Republic, p. 74~ on Spanish fear 
that the United States would obtain Samana Bay, see Rayford Wo Logan, 
The Diplomatic ~lations ,2! ~ United States ~ Haiti, 1.2.2-€.-1891 
(Chapel Hill~ University of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 312; Calla-
han, ~ ~ International Relations, po 350. 
early 1861, it was merely a. matter of time before Spain officia1ly took 
possession of the lando The Spaniards 9 cleverly, allowed President 
Santana the honor of proclaiming the annexation of the island on March 
18, 1861. In so doing, they knew Sa.ntana• s action would help to perpet-
uate the myth that the wishes of the Dominicar, people were being fu.l-
filled. Immediately upon receiving news of Sa.ntana • s act, Serrano em-
barked Spanish troops to occupy the country, ostensibly at the request 
of the Dominicanso 
Thereafter the Spaniards repeatedly stressed that by their action 
they were simply fulfilling the wishes of the Dominican citizens. In 
the opening ceremonies of the Cort~s, for instance, Queen Isabella II 
declared that the "Dominican people, menaced by external enemies, and 
wearied of intestine discords, imroked in the midst of their struggles 
the august name of the nation to 'liJ!lich they owed civilization and life 
• • • • Convinced that their prayers were spontaneous and una.nimous I 
did not hesitate to accede to them. 116 
Foreign Minister Collantes argued along similar lines to Charg~ 
Pe11 ry; Spanish intervention, he said, could be justified by Dominican 
fear of Haiti, the protection of Spanish citizens and interests, and the 
prevention of an eventual takeover by American economic int.erestso 
"Spain might be charged with selfishness," he maintained, "if she re-
mained indif'fe:ren.t to the sincere desire of those who, imroking old and 
close ties, ask to incorporate themselves to the mother country in order 
6Isabella0 s speech is printed in Great Britain, British and Forei~ 
State Papers (Volumes LI to LV, London: William Ridgeway, 1868-1870), 
LIII, pp. 1064-1068; ibidoj LII 9 PPo 1221-1223, contains Santana's Proc= 
lamation of Reincorporation; ibid., PPo 1351-1356, prints Isabella's 
Decree for Reincorporationo See also Perkins, ~ Monroe Doctrine, 
~-1867, Pc 2820 
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to saYe themselves from certain ruino n7 
In the United States the New York Times noted Spain's action with-
out comment. Harper's ~ Monthly; Magazine observed that the Spanish 
promised not to reintroduce slaveryo The Daily Boston Traveller be-
lieved the Spanish a.ction illustrated how readily Spain would take ad-
vantage of American troubles and commented that while Spain's interests 
were at one with the Confederacy's, the Spanish might have seized Santo 
Domingo out of fear that the Confeder~cy might try to do so.8 
The firing on Fort Sumter may explain the lack of extended comment 
on the reannexation of Santo Domingo in the United States. In Madrid, 
however, Ministel:' Preston reacted otherwise. In a note to Colla.ntes he 
reminded him that the United States had abstained from European affairs. 
He then went on to sa.y that 
there is no doctrine LMonroe 9i]' in which my government is 
more fixed than in its determination to resist any attempts 
of an European power to interfere for the purpose of con-
trolling the destiny of the American Republics or reestab-
lishing over them ... -monarchial power, and to--regard any such 
endeavors as the manifestation of a.n unfriendly disposition 
toward the United Sta.tes. 
The United States did not wish to block free choice of government, 
Preston continued, ''but neither.will they consent, that European mon-
archs shall avail themselves of every tumult or intestine struggle to 
establish monarchical governments in the Western Hemisphere." If it 
was true that Serrano had sent vessels and troops to occupy the island, 
he continued, "such haste would convey the impression irresistibly that 
7collantes to Seward, April 25, 1861, Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
BNew York Times, April 3, 1861, po 1, Co 6; Harper's~ Monthly 
Magazine, XXIII (1861), p. 703; the Daily Boston Traveller is quoted in 
Perkins, (edo), Northern Editorials .2!:. Secession, II, pp. 961-962. 
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the Spanish authorities were the instigators of the Revolutiono n9 
Until he left Madrid six weeks later, Preston badgered the Spanish 
about Santo Domingoo When told that Spain was surprised by the Domini~ 
can events, he asked how Spain could justify the seizure when only the 
previous October he had been reassured that Spain had no territorial 
aims in the New World. As for the Dominican people revolting to secure 
annexation, Preston asserted, the true will of the Dominicans had never 
been ascertained. Spain already blocked the mouth of the Mississippi 
River with Cuba; possession of Santo Domingo would only enhance Spanish 
influence and subject American commerce to control "from the Gulf to the 
Atlantic. "lO 
Preston warned Seward tha.t Spain had decided to retain Santo Do~ 
mingo "unless firmly resisted by our government •• oLthen Spa.ii[ will 
retire from its design by asserting that the evidence of the spontaneous 
and free will of the people of Dominica is not sufficiently manifest.,tll 
In other words, the whole Spanish plot would dis~ipate in a moment if 
the United States assumed a bold stance. 
When no instructions were forthcoming from Seward, Preston con~ 
eluded that Spain would formally annex Santo Domingo unhindered. Span-
ish newspapers, he said, were claiming that American protests were not 
important. Preston next reported that a complaint he had d;r>awn .on his 
9Preston to Collantes, Apri.l 12, 1861, Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792~1906, The National Archives; see also 
Perkins, 1h!?, Monroe Doctrine, ~-1867, pp. 290 ... 29i, 293. 
10 · 
Preston to Seward, April 22, 1861, Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Preston to 
Collantes, April 23, 1861, ibid., contains Preston's report. 
llPreston to Seward, April 27, 1861, ibido 
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authority would not be forwarded to the Spanish for three rea.sons: first, 
he was leaving Spain; second, sufficient evidence already existed to 
show the Spaniards that the United States was unhappy with its action; 
third, indicting the State Department for its silence, Preston said it 
"seems to acquiesce in the·seizure of the island. In the short space of 
a month the whole policy of Spain has been changed and the Monroe Doc-
trine has been violated and overthrown."12 
It would therefore seem that Preston was a staunch upholder of the 
Monroe Doctrine, a true American recommending a firm policy as the only 
alternative to outright Spanish annexation of Santo Domingo. On the 
other hand, there is the reality that Preston chose to follow the Con-
federacy. It is quite possible that he was seeking a confrontation be-
tween Spain and the United States with an independent Confederacy as 
the consequenceo However, this remains a speculative point without 
positive evidence to support or deny it. 
Spanish seizure of Santo Domingo presented Seward with his first 
major problem in office as Secretary of State, and he wa.s not equal to 
the challenge. Instead of evaluating the possible courses to follow to 
parry the Spanish threat, Seward quickly formulated a bellicose u.lti-
matum to the Spanish and all Europe. The ultimatum was primarily in-
tended to check the Union's disintegration a.nd rally the nation against 
Europe. Seward undoubtedly shared the ,riew later expressed by his son 
Frederick that "Spain had already openly seized the goverment of San 
/JiJ Domingo, toppled down the Dominican republic and again planted the 
12Preston to Seward, May 19, 1861, ibid.; Preston's reasons for not 
delivering his protest and the protest are in Preston to Seward, May 25, 
1861, ibid. 
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banners of Castile on the island where it first waved four hundred years 
before."13 
President Lincoln modified Sewar.d' s famous "thoughts," but not 
enough to prevent the Secretary from warning Tassara that Lincoln would 
be forced to regard Spanish actions as "manifesting an unfriendly spirit 
towards the United states and to meet the further prosecution of enter-
prises of that kind in regard to either the Dominican Republic or any 
part of' the American continent or i.slands with a prompt, persistent, 
and if possible, effective resistance. 11 4, Subsequent domestic develop ... 
ments forced Seward to backpeddle in an embarrassing manner. Instead 
of seeking to provide "effective resistance," Seward talked of con .. 
tinued protests as America's policy. But he learned his lesson quickly. 
He realized that the United States would be able to vindicate itself 
when civil strife no longer rent the Union. Meanwhile he let Perry, 
Preston's interim successor in Madrid, fulminate against the annexation 
of Santo Domingo.15 
13seward, Reminiscences ,2! !. !'!&.-Time Statesman !!!a Diplomat, 1830-
!.2!i, PP• 148-14§. . · 
14Quoted in Tansill, ~ United States ~ Santo Domingo, !Z.2§.-ll'U,, 
p. 214; for other pertinent literature see Basler, (ed.},~ Collected 
vk>rks .2!. Abraham Lincoln, IV, pp. 316-318.; Callahan, ~ !!!S., Inter-
national Relations, pp. 329-3J8; Bancroft, ~ ~ .2! William l!• Seward, . 
II, PP• 157-161. . 
15Dexter Perkins, historian of the Monroe Doctrine, attacks Seward's 
"thoughts" on two grounds. In an early essay, Perkins says the only real 
reason for a grievance on Seward's part was the reannexation of Santo 
Domingo, and this act had not taken place when the "thoughts" were sent 
to Lincoln. See his sketch of Seward in Malone, Johnson, Starr, and 
Schuyler, (eds.), Dictionary ,2! American Biography, XVI, p. 618. In a 
later essay Perkins maintains Seward's early handling of the Spanish 
intervention was foolish in view of the fact tha.t the Union• s life was 
threatened. See Van Dusen and Wade, (eds.), Foreign Policy !!!S..!.h2. 
American Spirit: '.Essays~ Dexter Perkins, p. 220; Rodman states that 
Seward's paper was leaked to the press 0 and its publication so infuria-
ted the &lropean imperialists that they took sides throughout the 
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Perry continued to follow Preston's emphasis on the Monroe Doctrine. 
Material interest, he told Col.lantes, was a very small factor to be con-
sidered by the United States over Spain's actiono It was the 
moral and political significance of the act of Spain which 
gives it importance, and because this is the first circum-
stance since the foreign policy of the United States was 
announced to the Allied Powers of Europe in 1823, that any 
nation has failed to see its own clear interests in the 
maintenance of policy on the one side and on the other.16 
Shortly thereafter Perry admitted in a message to Seward that the 
Spanish were set in their determi~ation to retain the Dominicans. The 
Queen was quite flattered to believe that the Dominicans had spontane-
ously offered their allegiance to her after "experiencing the evils of 
liberty and republicanism." Collantes had discussed the situationwith 
him, Perry reported, like a "gentleman" and had gone as far as laying 
his hand on his heart when he reached the point about the spontaneous 
action of the Dominican people.17 
A few days later Collantes formally answered Perry's note center-
ing on the Monroe Doctrine. The Spanish Foreign Minister said that the 
United States' position on the Monroe Doctrine had never before been 
laid before the government of Her Catholic Majesty and, :f'urthermore, he 
conflict with the Confederacy."· See 9'Uisgueya; !!, His.,iory ,2t ~ Domini-
.a!U Republic, p. 7.5; Seward's instructions about continued protests is 
in Seward to Perry, May 21, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions o:f' the Depart .... 
ment of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives. 
16Perry to CQllantes, June 19, 1861, enclosed in Perry to Seward, 
July 1, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to ·spain, 
1792~1906, The·National Archives. 
17Perry to Seward, July 1, 1861, ibid. Perry had gullibly reported 
earlier that while Spain had ~played~ little fast and loose" with Santo 
Domingo, the go,rernment was actually surprised at what had happened and 
would probably follow a half-way course--ioeo, follow the will of the 
Dominican people. See Perry to Collantes, June 19, 1861, enclosed in 
Perry to Seward, July 1, 1861, ibid.; Perry to Seward, April 20 and 24, 
1861, ibid. · · 
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could see no reason to look at it then. He reiterated the subterfuge 
idea about the will of the Dominican people. As Perry observed, the 
question revol,red around how spontaneous the mo,rement for annexation had 
been in Santo Domin.go, and the United States and Spain read different 
meanings into Spain's actions.18 
Seemingly Schurz was una.wa.re of any coherent United States policy 
towards Spain's Dominican coup, for shortly after nomina.tion a.s minister 
to Spain he directed a.n inquiry to Seward concerning the course he 
should pursue about Sa.nto Domingo.19 How did the United States propose 
to maintain its protest, Schurz asked, referring to Seward's initial 
directive to him that retention of the Dominican Republic would be "a 
ma.tter claiming very serious attention on the part of the ••• Un:tted 
States."20 Schurz's question was never really answered by Seward and 
the Spanish proceeded to express their attitude toTATa.rd the Monroe Doc-
trine and the United States' weak position w:i. th a proclamation of an-
nexation incorporating Santo Domingo in. the Spanish filnpire.21 
Denied America's full strength to enforce a unilateral protest, 
Seward tried a. last idea to check the Spaniards. He sounded out Great 
Britain about a. ,joint protest, aware of British antipathy to slavery a.nd 
18collantes to Perry, July 9, 1861, in Perry to Seward, Ju.ly 11, 
1861, ibid.; see also Perkins:, ~ Monroe Doctri~, }..8~9-186?, pp. 293-
304. 
19schurz to Seward, June 5, 1861, Dispatches from the United St~tEis 
Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
20seward to Schurz, April 27, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the 
Department of State, 1801-1906: Spa.in, The National Archives. 
21For nmterial touching on the Dominican situation see George E. 
Baker, (ed.), ~ ~ .2f, ~~ !!:.. ~~ (5 vols., Boston: Houghton,. 
Mifflin and Company, 1890), V, pp. 232-2Jo; Moore, ! ~ ,2! ,!E.~-
natiol'}!_l, !,,9,1,,~, VI, pp. 515, 517-.518; Bancroft, 1.lli £?!. m~ !i• _Sewara., 
II, pp. 158-159; Callahan, ~ !!E, ,Inte.,t,l:i.,!i!;tion§..1 !iela.ti~, pp. 330-331, 
334. 
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the fact that slavery existed in Spanish-held Cuba. His hopes were 
crushed when the British responded negat1'rely to his proposa.ls. O'Don-
nell, they said, had assured them that slavery would not be reintroduced 
in Santo Domingo. 22 0' Donnell ha.d cleverly anticipated the chief British 
objection and met it directly with assurances of what Spain. intended to 
do. 
The London Spectator was probably correct in its assessment of the 
British reaction to the reincorporation of Santo Domingo. The Spectator 
noted that Dominican mulattoes were probably in favor of Spain's action 
while the blacks were opposed. If Spain could bring order out of chaos, 
the Spectator said in effect, more power to her. Britain's one duty was 
to prevent Cuba from serving as a "Virginia or Maryland," or in other 
words, from exporting slaves to Santo Domingo.23 Thereafter, for the 
duration of 1861, whene,rer the Dominican problem 'Was broached in Parlia-
mentor newspapers, the government reaction was to state O'Donnell's 
continued assurances that slavery would not be reinstated in Santo Do-
mingo; therefore, Spanish annexation was not contrary to British inter-
ests.24 
Rejected by the British, Seward failed to approach France or any 
other major European power. The French minister in Madrid initially 
22seward to Schurz, June 21, 1861, Diploma.tic Instructions of the 
Department of State, 1801-1906; Spa.in, The National Archives. 
23tondon [}ectator, April 27,, 1861, a.s quoted in Littell's Living 
Age, LXIX (1861 , PP• 628 ... 629. 
24For British interest in Santo Domingo consult Great Britain, .lli!E,-
sard's Parliamentary Debates (Third Series, volumes CLXII to CLXXVI, 
London: Cornelius Bock, 1861"'.'1864), CLXII (1861), pp. 717-718, 1652-1653, 
2044; ibid., CLXIII (1861), pp.; 66-68; ibid., CLXIV (1861), PP• 105=108; 
London Times, August 29, 1861, p. lOf; ibid., September 5, 1861, p. lOd; 
Cramptot to Russell, September 21, 1861, British~ Foreign Sta.t~ Pape~, 
LII, Po 370; Logan, ~ Diploma.tic Relations ,£t ~ United States ..w).t~ 
Haiti, P• 2950 
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communications invobred. 26 
In Madrid the newly arri,red Schurz was unaware of Seward's fluctu.a-
tions and had only the directi,re about continued protests to guide him. 
Frustrated by such a policy, he declared that "a war of notes and re-
monstrances will avail us nothing. If we want to make an impression up-
on Spa.in, we must suit our actions to our words. 11 Otherwise the United 
States might as well take steps to encourage commercial intercourse, 27 
Eventually Schurz was informed about the demands of domestic events 
taking precedence over foreign ma.tters. Seward suggested that this 
being the case and because Spain was obser'Ting the Union's blockade of 
Southern ~arts, perhaps exnloratory negotiations leading to a commercial 
treaty could be worked out. If Spain was being sincere, as Schurz 
stated, about no hostile intentions towards the United States, closer 
commercial relations seemed a distinct possibility. 28 
Replying to the hints of better Spa.nish-American relations, Foreign 
Minister Collantes informed Schurz that from his vantage point a.ny im-
provement hinged on the United Sta.tes' acceptance of Santo ·Domingo's re-
incorporation by Spain. Only then would Spain feel secure from possible 
American hostile action. As Schurz noted, "it is no easy task to dis-
suade the Spanish Government from the idea that we intend to pounce up-
on their transatlantic possessions as soon a.s our internal difficulties 
26seward, Seward il Washington as Senator fil'.!9_ pec.retary of §..t~~, 
II, p. 592; Basler, (ed.), The Collected lt.brks 2f. Abraham Lincoln, p. 
446, deals with the House resolution. 
27schurz to Seward, July 18, 1861, Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
28seward tn Schurz, August 14, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the 
Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives; Moore, A 
Di~est £!. International Law, VI, p. 517; Shurz, Reminiscences, II, pp7 
27 -275, . 
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are disposed of."29 
Thus an impasse was reached concerning any commercial treaty. Spain 
would not relent until the United States assured her of her peaceful in-
tentions or, even better, renounced the weak but potentially dangerous 
policy of continued opposition. Justifying this position, Frederick 
Sewa.rd wrote Schurz that "we ha,re said concerning the annexation of 
San Ltfi{ Domingo what ••• seemed to us were required by a considera-
tion of our rights and by our responsibilities to mankind. 11 30 
The Dominican question thereafter lapsed into a state of semi-
quiescence until early 1863. When Schurz asked Collantes why Isabella 
II had failed to mention the annexation of Santo Domingo in her speech 
opening the Cortes in November, 1861, he was told that Spain still ad-
hered to its proclamat ion of neutrality and any mention of the American 
protest by the Queen might stir talk. Clearly the Spanish ruling circl es 
were not seeking trouble with the United States. Schurz, ready to leave 
Spain, recognized this fact and suggested to Sewa.rd that Spain and the 
United States might coexist in mutual harmony if the latter refrained 
from making harsh statements about Santo Domingo and treated Spa.in re-
spectfully. 
Schurz's temporary successor, Perry, a.s well as the regular aP-
pointee, Koerner, thought similarly. Perry admitted he did not feel i t 
"politic 0 to bring up Santo Domingo after Colla.ntes discussed Spain's 
respect for the sovereignty of other nations. In fact, Perry was 
29schurz to Seward, October 9, 1861, Dispatches from the United 
Sta.tes Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; also Perry 
to Seward, July 31, 1863, ibid. 
30F. W. Seward t o Schurz, November 5, 1861, Diploma.tic Inst ructions 
of the Department of State, 1801-1906 : Spa.in, The National Archives. 
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repeating Spanish arguments for Dominican annexation as late as the sum-
mer of 1864! When a. Peruvian brought up seeming similarities between 
Spanish actions against Santo Domingo and Peru, Perry denied any. Santo 
Domingo, he said, wa.s a. special case. It had an unstable government, it 
was geographically situated between two Spanish colonies, Spain was fear-
f'ul of an outside power seizing the unhappy nation and, lastly, Domini-
can reannexation came as a complete surprise to the Spanish people. 
Koerner felt as Seward did that the United States could not run the risk 
of alienating Spain while engaged in a Civil War.31 
While the Dominica.n question rema.ined relatively quiescent on the 
diplomatic front, American businessmen led by William L. Cazneau and 
Joseph W. Fabens were busily engaged in promoting Santo Domingo as a new 
:Eden for American settlement and investment. A glowing picture was 
drawn of Santo Domingo's potential wealth, enhanced by the presence of 
Spain as a stabilizing factor. The few Americans venturing to the 
island were sadly disillusioned. They found heat, disease, poverty, 
hopelessness, and not least, Spanish haughtiness. The State Department 
began receiving complaints from American citizens of injustices committed 
against them. Seward calmly forwarded these protests to Madrid for ex-
planations by the Spanish authorities, thereby helping to insure con-
tinued tranquility in Spanish-American relations )2 
31schurz to Seward, November 9, 1861, Foreign Affairs , 1861, pp. 
477-478; Schurz to Seward, November 11, 1861, Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Perry to 
Seward, July 7, 1862, a.nd August 15, 1864, ibid.; Koerner, Memoirs, II, 
pp. 287-288. 
32Tansill, ~ United States~ Santo Domingo, 1798-1873, pp. 215-
217 , 219-220; Allen Nevins gives a sketch of the careers of Fabens and 
Cazneau in Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration, 
PP• 252-256; Seward to"'"ioerner, May 9, 1863, Diplomatic Instructions of 
the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives. 
56 
One such case dealt with regulations imposed by Ca.tholic Spain on 
the activities of Protestants in Spain and her possessions. Needless 
to say, United States citizens cons~dered any infringement on their re-
ligious rights harsh, and they subsequently complained. When Koerner 
discussed the matter with the Marquis of Miraflores, the latter replied 
that the people of Santo Domingo, by their free and spontaneous wish for 
reincorporation into Spain, subjected themselves to Spain's conception 
of the unity of law and religion. Therefore, American Protestants had 
no basis for their complaints.33 
The final blow to any commercial dreams held by Cazneau, Fabens, 
and other Americans evaporated with the large scale Dominican insurrec-
tion of 1863. Thereafter the Americans could only attempt to salvage 
the undamaged property they owned. Seward continued his restrained 
policy concerning compensation, and as a result he refused to seek dam-
ages aga.inst Spain in conjunction with other nations. Furthermore, he 
directed that if Cazneau should seek aid through the American ministry 
in Madrid, he should be referred directly to the Department of State in 
Washington. By his adroit handling of the problem, Seward prevented a 
major flareup from developing between Spain and America that would neu-
tralize the effectiveness of the Dominican revolt.34 
The revolt that erupted in 1863 was the primary reason for Spain's 
33Koerner to Seward, June 19, 1863, Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
34rhe question about joining with other powers to seek damage com-
pensation is in Koerner to Seward, February 14, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 
1864, IV, p. 8; Seward to Koerner, March 12, 1864, ibid., pp. 12-13; 
Seward's moderation in face of damages done to Americans is illustrated 
in Seward to Koerner, February 22, 1864, Diplomatic Instructions of the1 
Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain , The National Archives; the di-
rective about dealing with Cazneau is in F. W. Seward to Perry, Septem-
ber 3, 1864, ibid. 
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evacuation of Santo Domingo in 1865. In the midst of the Civil War the 
people of the United States could do little but watch events and specu-
late on the eventual course of the insurrection. The first rumors of 
revolt against Spanish authority appeared a scant six weeks after Spain's 
formal proclamation of annexation in 1861. Denied in Spain, the embers 
of revolt smoldered until February, 1863, when news reaching the outside 
world forced the Spanish to admit that a revolt had broken out. News of 
this should not have surprised Seward or other informed Americans. From 
Santo Domingo came stories of mismanagement, the high cost of living, 
and excessive taxation. Dominicans charged that they had been led to 
expect their land to be governed as a province of Spain; instead, they 
found that Santo Domingo was being governed as an overseas colony like 
Cuba. Finding their only recourse was arms, they revolted.35 
As the Spanish sped reinforcements to Santo Domingo, they sought to 
determine the causes of the revolt. Rather than accept responsibility 
themselves, Spanish journals affirmed that "the revolt is supported by 
the Federal /jjni ted Statei/ Government. 1136 Shortly afterwards a rumor 
35Rodman, Quisgueya: ! History 2! ~ Dominican 'Republic, p. 77, 
mentions the uprising after six weeks of Spanish rule; denial of the 
early revolt is in Schurz to Seward, August 5, 1861, Dispatches from 
the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; 
sources to consult on the origins of the 1863 insurrection include Rod-
man, Quisgueya: ! History 2! ~ Dominican Re442'lic, pp. 77-79; Welles, 
Naboth's Vineyard: ~ Dominican Republic, 1§__ 1924, I, pp. 241-242; 
Hazard, Santo Domin~o,~ ~ Present, p. 255; New York Times, March 
22, 1863, p. 4, c. ; ibid., March 29, 1863, p. 2, c. 3; London Times, 
April 10, 1863, p. 6d; Jaeger to Seward, April 1, 1862, U. s. Govern-
ment, Commercial Relations 2! ~ United States with Foreign Nations, 
1862, I, p. 649; Elliott to Seward, January 13, lsb3, ibid., p. 588; 
Jaeger to Seward, October 3, 1863, ibid., p. 589. 
36r.ondon Times, October 5, 1863, p. lOb; see also the letter of 
Cuba's Captain-General Dulce, September 14, 1863, Yuengling, Highlights 
1!l ~ Debates in ~ Spanish Chamber 2! Dem:ities Relative ~ ~ 
Abandonment 2! Santo Domingo, p. 176. 
58 
swept Spain that two American ships loaded with arms and munitions des-
tined for rebel use had been destroyed by a Spanish wa.rship.37 Investi-
gating the sources of the tales, Koerner discovered French journalists 
responsible. They alleged that Lincoln wanted the island of Hispaniola 
as an area to colonize free Negroes from the United States and thus had 
formented the revolt.38 
On his own authority, Koerner denied that the United States had any 
connection with Dominican rebels, and Seward shortly confirmed Koerner's 
assumption. The United States, Seward declared, had nothing whatsoever 
to do with the rebellion. Seward again reiterated his long standing 
sentiment that all ID.lropea.n attempts to establish governments in the New 
World contrary to the wishes of the people would come to naught.39 Im-
plementing official United States policy, Navy Secretary Welles ordered 
Rear Admiral J. L. Lardner, commanding the West Indian Squadron, to be 
alert for illegal, waterbound American aid for the insurgents. Lardner 
eventually informed Welles that while no American vessels were violating 
Dominican waters, British ships were. He also stated that he had re-
fused an opportunity to meet an individual proposing to put Santo Domin-
go under the protection of the United States. The refusal to rush head-
long into the Dominican maelstrom reflected Seward's growing diplomatic 
maturity. Stung more than two years before with his brash "thoughts," 
37London Times, November 24, 1863, p. 12a. 
38Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 379; Koerner to Seward, October 8, 1863 , 
Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The 
National Archives. 
39Koerner to Seward, October 8, 1863, ibid.; Seward to Koerner, 
November 17 and 23, 1863, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of 
State, 1801-1906 : Spain, The National Archives ; Callahan,~~ 
International Relations, pp. 348-349, dates the insurrection from 
August, 1863. 
Seward sawwith reflection that time was working to America ' s advan-
tage.40 This realization is illustrated in a dispatch to Tassara con-
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cerning revolts in Santo Domingo and elsewhere. The United States, the 
Secretary cleverly said, would "avoid throwing themselves across the 
way of human progress, or lending encouragement to factious revolu-
tions."41 
The Lincoln Administration was directly confronted with the ques-
tion of extending recognition to the Dominican rebels when the latter 
proclaimed the restoration of the Dominican Republic on September 14, 
1863. Immediately thereafter the rebels sent William Clark and then 
Pablo Pujol to seek recognition and aid for the insurgent causeo 42 Bot h 
were rebuffed in their efforts to see Seward, who told Koerner that the 
revolutionists ••• have ••• appealed to this government 
for recognition, for aid, and for sympathy •••• We have 
not received any agents of the revolution, even informally, 
nor have we in any way responded to them, while we have given 
instructions to the ministerial offices to see that the neu-
trality laws of the United States are regularly maintained 
and enforced.43 
It might also be argued that in addition to Seward's realization that 
40official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series I, 
Volume II, pp. 504.-511; ibid., pp. 492-493, 589, contains Welles' di-
rective to Lardner and the Admiral's replies; see also Seward to Koer ner, 
March 12, 1864, Foreign Affairs, ~, IV, p. 12; Perkins, ~ Monroe 
Doctrine, ~ -1867, pp. 308-309. 
4lseward to Tassara, February 3, 1864, Moore,! Digest .2f Inter-
national~' VI, p. 24. 
22lo 
42Tansill, The United States~ Santo Domingo, !Z.2§.~1873, PP• 220m 
43seward to Koerner, March 12, 1864, ibid., pp. 222; Wellesj ,llii-
both's Vineyard:~ Dominican Republic, ~1924, I, pp. 280- 281, 
states that Seward met Pujol unofficially and tha.t s t r i ct neutrality Wc:, S 
not observed by the United States. He alleges that nothing was done t o 
prevent the fitting out and sailing of ships under the Dominican flag 
from New York City. Not having discovered any of what Welles maintains 
in the documents, the author inclines toward Tansill 's interpretation. 
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time was on the side of the United States, he was also realistic enough 
to see that any American aid to the Dominican rebels could be recipro= 
cated by Spanish dealing with the Confederacyg 
Seward continued his circumspect diplomacy in a conference with 
the Haitian representative in the United States. The latter told Seward 
that Haiti desired an independent Santo Domingo as its neighbor. Be-
cause Haiti lacked the requisite prestige, he suggested that the United 
States, Britain, or France attempt to mediate the quarrel. He implied 
that Spain's presence next to Haiti was partly due to Spain's fears 
, 
about American desire for Samana Bay. Seward admitted that previous ad-
ministrations had expressed interest in Samana Bay, but times had 
changed. The United States possessed ample land to settle without need 
for either Samana Bay or Santo Domingo. When Koerner, following Seward's 
instructions, asked if Spain would accept mediation by an impartial 
power, he was promptly told no--unless it be by France. He was also told 
that opinion had shifted from the United States to Ha.iti as the nation 
supplying the rebels. 44 As no French offer was forthcoming, Spain's re-
fusal to face mediation by the United States or Britain meant that the 
Dominican insurrection had to run its bloody coursee 
Writing almost a decade after the insurrection, Samuel Hazard noted 
that he had 
neither the space o • o nor the inclination to detail the 
horrors of this war o •• the details of some of the acts 
of the Spanish officials show that, while they have not 
forgotten the example of crimes perpetuated in this very 
island by their bloodthirsty ancestors 9 the civilisation 
44Haiti 0 s role in the Dominican controversy is included in Seward 
to Koerner, May 6, 1864, F..Qreign Af~s, 1.§.6..4, IV, pp. 19-20; KoP~ner 
to Seward, May 30, 1864, ibid., PP• ?9-30; see also Logan,~ Diplo-
matic Relations .2f ~ United States~ Haiti. 
of the present day has done nothing towards softening thosa 
instincts engendered by the blood of these same ancestors. 5 
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Hazard did not overstate the ferocity of the insurrection, for its very 
nature would have made it bloody. The Spanish, finding their authority 
challenged by guerilla warfare, responded in kind, and both sides stooped 
ever lower in the fighting. To make the situation more desperate, there 
were two complicating factors: tropical climate with its inherent dis-
eases such as yellow fever, and worse, the tendency toward racial war--
white Spaniards pitted against dark Dominicans--which distressed Seward 
deeply.46 Even the Spanish admitted that the "conflict in Santo Do-
mingo has become a war of races. The negroes commit the most atrocious 
cruelties on any whites that fall into their hands.,,47 
Toward the end of 1863 Koerner noticed a change in Spanish public 
opinion. Initially the o• Donnell regime was popular for its expansion .• 
ist policy resulting in the annexation of Santo Domingo. The revolt 
dampened enthusiasm considerably until numerous Spaniards openly advo-
cated withdrawal from the accursed island.48 But this change in senti-
ment did not reach the ranks of the governing elite. Queen Isabella II 
typified the opinion of this segment of Spanish thought when she stated 
45Hazard, Santo Domingo, Past !!19. Present, p. 264. 
46r,or the effects of the climate on the Spanish soldiers see Welles, 
Naboth's Vineyard:~ Dominican Republic, 1844-1924, I, pp. 247-248; 
Beale, (ed.),~ Diary .2f. Gideon Welles, I, pp. 519-520, records Se-
ward's distress. 
47The Correspondencia as cited by the London Times, November 23, 
1863, P• lOd. 
48Koerner to Seward, October 24, 1863, November 20, 1863, and De-
cember 28, 1863 , Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spainj 
1792-1906, The National Archives; Perkins , The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-
1867, PP• 305-307. --- ~ 
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that "the honour of our flag must be preserved • .,49 As a result, Spain 
stepped up preparations to subjugate the rebels until many observers 
shared the opinion that it was only a matter of time before no Domini-
can dare challenge Spanish authority. 
Throughout most of 1864 the press described a succession of Spanish 
victories: one rebel group after another was being crushed; rebel 
leaders were fleeing over the Haitian border; rebels were making peace 
overtures to Spanish authorities.50 Yet the struggle continued. War 
costs soared until one British newspaper stated that occupation of San-
to Domingo from 1861 to June JO, 1864, had cost Spain J0,000,000 
pounds, a "dead loss. 1151 
As the war dragged on and the toll of casualties and treasure 
mounted, the transformation in Spanish public opinion began to penetrate 
the government's higher echelons. Still the Spanish maintained that 
honor prevented withdrawai.52 Seward saw that time and the war would 
insure a change in Spanish policy. He understood the Spanish position 
completely, and as he wrote Koerner, "nothing is more sensitive than 
49 
British~ Foreign State Papers, LV, pp. 908-911. 
50see the London Times, December 24, 1863, p. 9b; ~rch 5, 1864, 
p. 14a; July 18, 1864, p. 12a; October 15, 1864, p. 9e; November 4, 
1864, p. lOa; November 7, 1864, p. lOb; see also the New York Times for 
February 7, 1864, p. 5, c. J; April 28, 1864, p. 9, c. 4; May 26, 1864, 
p. 2, c. 4; July 20, 1864, p. 5, c. l; Harper's New Monthly Magazine, 
XXVIII (1864), P• 41J. 
51tondon Times, September 29, 1864, p. lla. 
52see Koerner to Seward, February 14, 1864, Foreign Affairs~ 
~, IV, p. 8; Koerner to SewArn, March 20, 1864, ibid., p. 13; Koerner, 
to Seward, April 18, 1864, ibid., pp. 17-19; Koerner· to Seward~ April 10, 
1864, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, 
The National Archives; Koerner to Seward~ May JO, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 
1864, II, p. 465. -
National Honor~" and Spain° s honor was on trial in Santo Domingoo53 
Thus Lincoln@s comment at the end of 1864 that the war in Santo 
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Domingo exhibited no indication of an early settlement seemed appropri-
ate. Even as the President uttered this sentiment, however, opinion in 
Spain had matured to the point that the government was asked to furnish 
the truth about the Dominican situation. In her yearly spAech opening 
the Cortes, the Queen no longer mentioned vindication for Spain's flag. 
Instead she alluded to the pro-annexationist will expressed by the Do-
minicans in 1861.54 In other words, Spain was setting the stage for a 
withdrawal from Santo O,mingo because the will of the Dominican people 
had changed. 
That Isabella spoke against her will emerged in a dispute she had 
with the new prime minister, Marshal Narvaez. It developed that Narvaez 
was determined t o intr oduce a measure in the Cortes pointing to aban-
donment of Santo Domingoo Opponents immediately circulated false ,stor-
ies that the Marshal was doing such because he was cowed by Britain's 
and the United States 9 extension of belligerent rights to the rebels. 
Isabella seized a chance to lobby for retaining the Dornini~qns. In re= 
ply, Narvaez resigned, forcing the Queen to humble herself by asking 
Narvaez, the only candidate with enough support, to form a new govern~ 
ment. Hence Perry came to believe that Spardsh evacuation of the island 
was assured.55 Narvaez used the standard, hackneyed expression about 
53seward to Koerner, May 4, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 190 
54Basler, (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, VIIIj po 
138; London Times, Dec~er 13, 1864, p. 9c; The Amer ican Annual Cycle~, 
paedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1864 (New York: Do 
Appletonand Company:-1865), p. 754. - - - -
55Perry to Seward, December 19, 1864, Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792~1906, The National Archives. 
61~ 
the will of the Dominicans cha.nging. A French newspaper suggested that 
the real reason existed in Spanish fears that the insurrection would 
spread to Puerto Rico and other colonial possessions.56 
Narvaez's only serious opposition came from O'Donnell's followers 
in the Cortes. O'Donnell stated that if he had been in command, "he 
would have guaranteed with his head to put down the rebellion in three 
months" and, furthermore, he was still ready to assume command.57 Perry 
reported America's name was being used as a ''bugbear by the ••• op-
position ••• that the occupation of Santo Domingo by the Spaniards was 
the only way of averting the annexation of Dominica to the United States 
and the consequent ruin of Spanish interests in the West Indies."58 Se-
ward testily retorted to Perry that if he had been nearby when such a 
charge was leveled, he would have informed Spanish officials that "there 
is one national passion which the United States has not developed, and 
are not likely to develop as strongly as other states, namely, the pas-
sion of conquest. 1159 
Before Narvaez's proposal was put to a vote, a full scale debate 
allowed the Cortes' members to air their views. Those members among the 
more liberal elements in Spain charged, just as Perry had to Seward, 
that the United States' name was being used to frighten Spaniards. The 
United States would not be interested in post-war expansionism, but 
would put all her strength into rebuilding and consolidating the Union .. 
56tondon Times, January 5, 1865, p. lOa; January 9, 1865, p. 6d; 
January 14, 1865, p. 6f. 
57Ibid., January 28, 1865, p. 12a. 
58Perry to Seward, January 31, 1865, Foreign Affairs, 1865, II, p. 
471. 
59seward to Perry, February 27, 1865, ibid., p. 508. 
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Moreover, they asked, why should the United States or any other nation 
covet a poor nation like Santo Domingo? Lastly, O'Donnell and other 
Spaniards interested in expansion ought to have realized that America 
would attempt to sustain the Monroe Doctrine as soon as the Civil War 
ended.60 
Opponents like Saavedra Meneses asked why, if the United States 
was not really interested in Santo Domingo, a company had been formed 
to exploit Dominican resources in America. Referring to Cazneau•s pre-
mature colonization plans, he implied the possible consequences of 
success. 61 Another speaker discussed the changing attitude of the 
United States: 
And what would the North Americans say of us? They hate to 
speak of this war, they hate to speak of old Europe. Not 
only do they feel that they are a great race but they ex-
aggerate their force, and in those newspapers wd read that 
now they are not limiting their aspirations to the Monroe 
Doctrine, but they extend them to suppose that the hour has 
struck, the moment has arrived to car~ their arms, their 
power, and their influence to Europe.62 
Yet another Cortes member, seeing almost inevitable war, declared that 
"if the United States breaks lances against European intervention in 
America with Santo Domingo or with out Santo Domingo, a conflict threat-. 
ens. Keeping or not keeping a foot in Santo Domingo will not increase 
or diminish it."63 
While the abandonment question was building to a climax, Perry 
60yuengling, Highlights !,u the Debates 1!! the Spanish Chamber sz! 
D:iputias Relative .!:2, ~ Abandonment .2f. Santo Domingo, pp. 24-25, 50-
51, 74-75. 
61Ibid., PP• 39-40. 
62Ibid., pp. 112-113. 
63Ibid., P• 132. 
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wrote Seward that the Haitian minister to Spain had approached a Span-
ish politician with the idea of neutralizing the island of Hispaniolao 
He had assured the Spaniards that the United States acquiesced to the 
plan. When the Spaniards broached the subject to Perry the American 
representative was dumbfounded, but promised to discover Seward's senti-
ments. The latter was quick to reply he would be delighted to see neu-
tralization of the troublesome island, but he disclaimed any possibility 
of American cooperation because of earlier precedents. Seward's re-
jection was enough to founder the neutralization scheme. 64 
The neuralization scheme had not been lain to rest before the good 
news arrived from Spain that Cortes members had voted for abandonment 
of Santo Domingo and that the Queen had sanctioned the bill. After the 
expenditure of thousands of lives and millions in treasure, the last 
Spanish soldier departed from Santo Domingo in July, 1865.65 
With the evacuation of Santo Domingo one of the most serious chal-
lenges to the United States' hegemony in the Western Hemisphere ended. 
Of all the reasons forwarded for Spain's decision to evacuate, in none 
will one find much about fear of the United States.66 As shown, there 
64Perry to Seward, March 11, 1865, Foreign Affairs, ~865, II, pp. 
514-515; Seward to Perry, April 4, 1865, ibid., p. 522; Perry to Seward, 
May 12, 1865, ibid., p. 55. 
65For coverage of Spain's decision to evacuate see Perrv to Seward, 
Ma.y 7, 1865, ibid., pp. 534-536, and Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; London 
Times, April 3, 1865, p. 12a, and May 1, 1865, p. 12a; ~ American 
Annual Cyclz.:aedia and Register .2f. Important Events Ef. 2 ~ 1864, 
PP• 733, 75 755; The American Annual C*=lopaedia and Register of Im-
portant Events .2f. the ~ 1865, pp. 75 755, 768; Welles, Naboth8s 
Vineyard: ~ Dominican Republic, 1844-§92~, I, pp. 294-298; Tansill, 
~ United States~ Santo Domingo, ~-!§1.2, p. 220; Callahan, ~ . 
~ International Relations, pp. 350-351; Moore,! Digest£! Inter-
national~' VI, p. 5180 
66Ibid. 
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were Spaniards who worried about America's post-war course and vindica-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine. Not once, however, did the United States 
deliver an u.ltimatum for what was seemingly a clear violation of the 
Monroe Doctrine. 
The reason for the apparent contradiction in American policy was, 
again, the nature of the Civil War. While the nation's life was at stake, 
all lesser issues were put aside. By the time danger had passed, the 
United States found that the Spanish were conveniently vacating New World 
territory. Yet, in view of Seward's prodding of the French in Mexico, a 
prolonged Spanish occupation could have led to strained diplomatic rela-
tions or perhaps even an ultimatum. One ha.sonly to ponder the lessons 
of the Cuban revolt from 1868 to 1878 and from 1895 to 1898. Thus, dis-
missing the reasons for Spanish involvement in the first place, with-
drawal in mid-1865 was to the advantage of all parties concerned. 
Secretary Seward, after his initial bungling "thoughts," handled 
the Dominican crisis with masterful grace. Avoiding chauvinism, but not 
a touch of righteousness, he let events take their course while maintain-
ing a continued prote~t. In the end, time and the Spaniards' own blun-
dering insured the Dominican insurrection and Spain's final humiliating 
exit. 
CHAPTER V 
SPAIN AND THE MEXICAN QUESTION 
Mexico, the onetime jewel of Spain's American empire, had won inde-
pendence early in the nineteenth centuryo Thereafter, she proceeded on 
a highly erratic course, being governed by a succession of despots and 
becoming invobred in numerous incidents wi t h foreign powers. Hence, it 
was not surprising that Spain should choose to use force in an attempt 
to gain redress for grievances inflicted on her by her late colony. 
Disputes had plagued the diplomatic relations of the two nations 
from 1836. In the mid-1850' s, with the outbreak of civil wa.r in Mexico 9 
the situation rapidly deteriora.ted when Mexicans killen several Spanish 
citizens near Cuernavaca.j Mexico. The Spanish ambassador was insulted 
and declared unacceptable as soon as the forces of Benito Juarez gained 
control of the Mexican capital. The Spaniards retaliated by staging 
naval demonstrations near Vera. Cruz and ejecting Mexico ' s representatbre 
in Madrid. Even more important, emigrant Mexicans and Spanish citizens 
arrived in Spain with tales of insults and injuries, nor was it for~ 
gotten that Mexico owed Spain a ten-million dollar debt. Thus the 
Spanish government was confronted with crucial problems concerning her 
future Mexican policy when news arrived that the ambassadors of Britain 
and France han broken diploma tic relations with Mexico in July, 186L 1 
lsee Henri Leonardon, "L' Espagne et la question du Mexique, 1861-
1862, 11 Anna.les des Sciences Politigues, XVI (1901), pp. 59, 62; Revue 
des Deu.x Mondes-;-xr. (1862) , p. 737; Egon Ca esar Corti, Maxi.nilian !!2.9. 
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Would Spa.in join Britain and France to discipline Juarez Os waywa.rd 
go,rernment1 Or would Spain's pride assert itself and that nation take 
unilateral actions to protect her own interests? What would be Amari-
ca• s reaction to Spanish inte?"lrention? 
When it appeared in 1860 that Spain would take action against 
Mexico, Tassara, the Spanish minister in Washington~ was warned that 
the United Sta.tes would regret seeing unjust claims made ar,dnst Mexico. 
Furthermore, he was tolci, the United Sta.tes "would not allow hostilities 
to be waged against her legitimate government."2 Later that same year, 
Tassara wa.s notified that because the United Sta.tes had vital interests 
in Mexico, she would be strengthening her navy off Vera Cruz. However, 
this did not mean that Spain could not press demands for grievances, but 
that the United States would be glad to see Spanish-American difficul-
ties settled by arbitrationo Why the change in American policy? No 
official reason can be given 1 but perhaps the looming struggle between 
North and South entered the calculations of President Buchanan and his 
fipirehead Secretary of State, Cass. In any event, Spain did not take 
! 
any action in 1860. In March, 1861, debate still raged in Madrid over 
what, if anything, should be done. About the only common ~9ntiment 
shared by all interested Spaniards, Preston reported, was a tendency to 
Charlotte of Mexico (2 vols., London a.nd New York: Ao A. Knopf, 1928), 
I, pp. 74,94-95; Moore, ! Di__gest .2£ Internatio~na1 La.:i7 , VI, Po 484~ 
bia.sed and only oartially reliable is Madame Ca.rette 0 s Recollec~ of 
~ Court of~ Tuileries (New York: D. Appleton and t;ompcu1y , 1890), 
pp. 237-238, the ten-million dollar figure is from Cha-rle1; Sumner. The 
i'brks 2f. Charles Sumner (11 vols., Boston: Lee a.nd Shephar~, 1870-1875), 
VI, p. 370; especially pertinent is Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826= 
1867, P• 353; William Spence Robertson, "The Tripartite Treaty of -
London, 11 Hispanic American Historical Review, XX (May, 1940), pp. 167= 
168. 
2Ibid., P• 167. 
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blame the United States for Juarez 0 s actions. 3 
Confronted with a civil war~ President Lincoln chose sixty~seven 
year old Thomas Corwin of Ohio to serve a.s American minister to Mexico" 
Lincoln owed Corwin a political debt from the 1860 election and he could 
not have been unaware that Corwin had unalterably opposed the Mexican 
War fifteen years previously and would therefore be welcomed in Mexico. 
In fact, the non-Spanish speaking Corwin was a happy choice and com-
pletely outclassed his Confederate opposite, John Pickett, a braggart 
who made no secret of his desire to see Mexico partitioned between Spa.in 
and the Confederacy. Corwin provided Secretary of State Seward with a 
steady stream of information about Snain and the Mexican question. 4 
The summer of 1861 saw the American Civil War take a new slant with 
the Confederate victory at the First Battle of Bull Run. Meanwhile, 
luckily for Secretary of State Seward's peace of mind, no dispatches 
hinting at Spanish interference in Mexico arrived in Washington. Only 
in October did a disquieting note arrive from minister Schurz in Madrid. 
According to Schurz, the decision had been made for Spain to intervene 
in Mexico to seek redress for her grievances. Under no circumstances 
would Spain attempt to impose a new form of government on the Mexican 
3Preston to Black, February 26 and March 7, 1861, Dispatches from 
the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; 
the unaccounted for change in American policy is in Cass to Preston, 
September 7, 1860, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 
1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives. 
40n Corwin see J. Jeffrey Auer, "Lincoln Q s Minister to Mexico," 
2h12. .§.!:_ate !!chaeological and Historica.l Quarterly, LIX (Apr il, 1950) , 
pp. 115-128. Auer makes absurd statements to prove how Corwin wooed 
success in Mexico. Thus, "his brilliant personality and even his swar-
thy complexion might count heavily ••• to his advantage. " Ibid., pp. 
118~120. For Pickett, see ibid., pp. 121-122; James Morton Callahan ~ 
American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York : The Macmillan 
Company, 1932), p. 284; J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New 
York: A. A. Knopf, 1926), p. 233. - -
people. The decision had been hasty, Schurz disclosed, because Spain 
would look like a caboose instead of a locomotive if she waited for 
France and Britain to act. Moreo,rer, rapid intervention would fore-
stall the criticism expected from the opposition in the soon-to-open 
Cortes. 
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Little more than a fortnight later, on September 27, 1861, Schurz 
sent a long dispatch that corrected hi s earlier views on why Spa.in 
would intervene in Mexico. Redress of grievances was only a minor con-
sideration, Schurz reported; the truth was that Queen Isabella II was 
tending to think of herself as another Isabella I (1479-1504), when Im-
perial Spain was on the road to empire . All court officials flattered 
the Queen in this respect. The government of O' Donnell harkened to 
such a mirage because it would appeal to the Spanish masses . These 
sentiments were not a new phenomenon, Schurz sa.id; Spain had long been 
casting envious eyes on Mexico even while astute Spaniards realized 
what an intolera.ble fina.ncial burden any new empire would create. 
Shrewdness, Schurz noted, was not given its proper attention in Spain's 
governing circles. To preclude any possible American outcry wh en actual 
Spanish intervention should occur, the Spa.nish would use agents to pre-
pare the way for their a.rrival and thus minimize possible charges of 
interfering with Mexico's internal a.ff airs "against ~ ~ .2f. ~ 
Mexica.n people." 
In sum, it would be a ••repetition of the San JJ,iJ Ihmingo comedy,'' 
Schurz observed, his memory filled with the guises the Spanish had used 
when they seized that tragic Caribbean land the previous April. Ulti-
mately, the Spanish planned to put a Bourbon prince on Mexico's throne 
with Spain providing any needed protection from her bases in the West 
I ndies . Whom did the Spanish ha.vein mind? "Don Juan de Bourbon the 
72 
son of Don Carlos 1-::ihose name had come uiJ. . . is not thought of here, 0 
Schurz answered. "He is considered an idiot and incapable of doing any-
thing that requires sence [si9] and force of chara.cter." The most like-
ly was Don Sebastian, Isabella• s uncle a.nd a. repentant follower of Don 
Carlos. He had married "a half-foolish sister of the King" and gained 
"royal favor by being a. fierce church man, and entirely in the hands of 
the clergy." 
With these factors in mind, Schurz recommended as countermeasures 
dispatching agents into Mexico to counteract Spanish emissaries and 
working to create dissension among the allied powers--England and Spain 
united against France, or Spain and France united against England. On 
his own Schurz reported he had adopted the position that the 
United States are ma.terially interested in the welfare of 
the Mexican Republic. They entertain no ideas of conquest 
and it is their sincere desire that the Mexican people 
should enjoy the blessings of a stable and orderly go'7ern-
ment, but no government imposed upon Mexico by foreign 
interference can be stable and permanent, unless estab-
lished with the consent of the United States • .5 
Clearly Schurz wa.s warning the Spaniards that intervention without. 
America.n acquiescence was bound to fail because the word "stable" in t he 
American lexicon was synonomous with a republican form of government, 
while the Spaniards thought stable was equivalent to a monarchical form; 
the former connoted popular support, while the l atter would result in 
government of, by, and for the chosen few. In this light, interventior 
by any power was foolish. Desoite this and despite the offer of Ameri-
ca's good offices to mediate the dispute COt!-pled with a warning that 
subjugation of Mexico by an alien power would be construed as a menace 
5schurz to Seward, September 11 and 27, 1861, Dispatches from the 
United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
to Araerica's safety9 j oint interventi on took place in late 1861. 6 
It would be foolish to maintain that Spain did not have other 
reasons than redress of grievances to intervene in Mexico. Official 
Spanish spokesmen, of course, stressed this point as la.te as May, 
1862. 7 Isabella IP s speech at the openin.g of the Cortes in November 
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emphasized the Mexican need for "an example of wholesome vigor and evi-
dence of magnanimous generosity." Spa.in wished to see all New World 
nations enjoy the blessings of liberty a.nd independence. 8 Much more 
blunt and more interesting io Americans was the semi-official newspaper 
~ Epoca which stated that 
we ••• would entreat our country, our government, and 
public to support measures tending to ••• two supreme 
results • • • • constituting a stable condition of things 
in Mexico--preventing ~absorption~~ United States, 
and keeping up the intimate alliance of the three western 
powers in t he face of the eventuality to which the Ameri-
can question ~he Civil Wa-r}' may give rise.9 
Not all Americans denied the fact that Spain had just ground s to 
demand redress of grieva.nces from which war "not of an utterly dis-
honorable character" might result, as the Daily Boston Traveller re-
corded . And, as the same paper observed, if Mexico should fall into 
Spanish hands, it would be better than seeing her in the Confederacy ijs 
6seward, Seward~ W~shington !!§. Senator and Secretary .2£. State, 
II, p. 637; Schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 290-293. 
?perry to Seward, May 25, 1862, Dispatches from the United States 
Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
Bschurz to Seward, November 9, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 
478-4?9. 
9 
. Perry to Seward, March 15, 1862, Dispatches from the United States 




Schurz was not the only American diplomat to make predictions and 
warn Seward concerning Spanish intentions regarding Mexico. Corwin al-
so warned Seward about Spain's goals, and he also predicted that any 
attempt by the Spanish to impose a monarchy on Mexico would fail be-
cause "hatred of the Spanish race is extreme here, and has been so since 
1820. ttll Perhaps this was one of the deciding factors in t.l-1e decision 
for joint intervention in Mexico instead of unilateral Spanish action. 
In any event, the diplomacy of the Mexican question cannot be under-
stood unless the joint intervention of Britain, France, and Spain is ex-
plored at some length. 
Great Britain set the course of European diplomacy during the Civil 
War. If the British had intervened in the war, there can be no doubts 
as to the course the rest of ID.lrope would have followed. In fact, Bri-
tain was the arbiter of ID.lrope. The same was true for Mexico as will 
subsequently be shown. The British had their own interests to protect 
in Mexico, and they were aware that other nations like France and Spain 
also possessed vital interests in the strife-torn land. The British 
were willing to see the vital interests of her own citizen~ and those 
of other nations safeguarded, but they were especially interested in 
seeing that no single nation dominated Mexico. Prime Minister O'Donnell 
certainly knew this, for he assured the British ambassador at Madrid, 
lOPerkins, (ed.), Northern Editorials on Secession, II, pp. 961-
962; see also the Atlantic Monthly, IX (1862), pp. 364-365. 
llcorwin to Seward, November 29, 1861, U. s. House Ex:ecutive Docu-
~ Number 1QQ., 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 1862-1863 (Washington~ 
Government Printing Office, 1862), p. 35 , in compilation entitled "The 
Present Condition of Mexico." 
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Sir John Crampton, as early as Octoberj 1860, that Spain had no inter= 
est in acquiring new territory in America at Mexico's expenseo Spain, 
he said, sought only to protect the rights of Spa.nish citizens •12 
Almost a year later O'Donnell was still emphasizing the same themes 
to Crampton. The latter noted one difference from O'Donnell's earlier 
assurances: O'Donnell was stressing Spain9 s necessity to protect her 
rights immediately via joint intervention by Britain, France, and her-
self, whereas nothing of this nature was discussed in 1860. O'Donnell 
still sought to quiet a,ny British fears about intervention in Mexico• s 
internal affairs by stating his belief in the patent impracticality of 
establishing a monarchy in the New Worldo But even as O'Donnell tried 
to reassure Crampton, the Spanish ambassador at Napoleon III's court 
was agreeing to the necessity of a Mexican monarchy. Furthermore, a 
Mexican royalist, Tomas Murphy, had visited London in August to sound 
out English opinion on a monarchy in Mexico.13 
Rumors began to circulate in London that Spanish troops were ready 
to move momentarily against Mexico. O'Donnell denied these stories 
while cleverly extolling the virtues of joint intervention and holding 
out the threat of unilateral Spanish action using the augmented Spanish 
forces stationed in the Western Hemisphere. When Crampton indicated 
fear that Spanish action against Mexico might lead to a situation like 
the annexation of Santo Domingo, O'Donnell denied the validity of any 
12Preston to Cass . Oct.oher 25, 1R60. Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
13crampton to Russell, September 13, 1861, House Document 1Q.Q., pp. 
302-303, contains O'Donnell's assurances about Spaines intentions; the 
French ambassador's activities are in Robertson's "Tripartite Treaty of 
London,'' Hispanic American Historical Review, XX (1940), p. 172; Mur-
phy's mission is in Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, pp. 375-
376. - --
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comparison. He pointed out that in unfriendly ha.nd s Santo Domingo en-
dangered Spanish possession of Cuba because of its close proximity to 
the latter. Shortly thereafter, when Crampton brought up the United 
states and said she should be invited to join any joint intervention, 
O'Donnell tried to evade the question by stating that America was too 
busy with her own affairs. Pressing O'Donnell further about American 
involvement, Crampton could only elicit O'Donnell's announcement that 
he reserved his decision. To O'Donnell, the very fact that Spain sought 
joint, not unilateral, action was sufficient proof that she was not 
seeking any advantage from America's distress. Crampton discounted 
O'Donnell's altruistic reasoning for joint action. The reason Spain 
supported a joint intrusion, he said, was that Mexico would probably re-
sist a single invader, but not three.14 
Thus , notwithstanding British apprehension, the Spaniards sought to 
prod the English into an arrangement of mutual satisfaction. Repeatedly 
the Spaniards alluded to the insults suffered at the hands of the Mexi-
cans; repeatedly t hey hinted that Spain would have to take unilateral 
action if no agreement be reached. The British initially insisted that 
they would have nothing to do with intervention in Mexico's internal af-
fairs, especially as both factions were equally cruel. Then the British 
began to weaken. Admitting Spain's just demands for a. redress of griev-
ances, Lord John Russell said Britain would accept joint intervention if 
the United States was asked to join and if the joint powers agreed not 
to interfere with Mexico's internal affairs. The Spaniards hedged and 
14crampton to Russell , September 16, 21, and 24, 1861, House ~ -
~lQQ., pp. 303, 357-359; Crampton to Russell, September 21 , 1~61, in 
British~ Foreign State Papers, LII, p. 370; see also the Revue~ 
~ M:mdes, XL (1862), p. 740. 
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then talked of exercising a European "moral influence" in Mexico. 
Eventually the European powers were able to arrive at a mutually accept-
able agreement.15 As Mlnister Charles Francis Adams wrote Seward from 
London, "Spain seems to be ea.ger to accept the advance in the movement, 
encouraged by its success in the case of Dominica and by the hope of 
profiting by the present difficulties of the United States. 1116 
Despite Minister Ada.ms• fears, the incompatibility of the Anglo-
Sp~nish agreement was illustrated by the intense jealousy with which 
each nation regarded the other. For instance, the early Spanish attack 
on Vera Cruz in November, 1861, led the London Examiner to declare that 
Spain was not the most trustworthy of allies; the Spanish attack, the 
Examiner declared, would probably be approved just as "the lawless and 
unprincipled aggression upon the Republic of San {ti] Domingo." Further-
more, allied intervention in Mexico will result in forfeiting "the right 
to protest" against the Confederacy should it try to expand into Mexico 
under the subterfuge of bringing order out of chaos.17 O'Donnell, 
meanwhile, found it necessary to reassure Crampton that he regarded any 
attempt to establish a. monarch in Mexico as foolish and foredoomed to 
failure.18 Seemingly the British and Spanish were again in accordo 
15Britain's gradual acceptance and modification of Spain's desire 
for joint intervention can be traced in Isturiz to Russell, September 
23 , 1861, House Document 1.Q.Q., p. 307; Russell to Crampton, September 27, 
1861, ibid., p. 310; George P. Gooch, The Later Correspondence .2£~ 
~ Russell, 1840-1878 ( 2 vols. , London: Longma.ns, Green and Company, 
1925), II, pp. 320-321, containing a. letter from Russell to Queen Vic-
toria; Spain's grudging acceptance is in Crampton to Russell, October 9, 
1861, House Document 1.Q.Q., PPo 360-3610 
16Adams to Seward, September 19, 1861, ibid., p. 191. 
l?The Examiner as quoted in Littell's Living Age, LXXII (1862)i, p. 
18For O'Donnell's reassurance see Crampton to Russell, January 30, 
1862, British~ Foreign State Papers, LIII, pp. 381-382; Perkins 9 ~ 
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However, another party, Napoleonic France, must be considered if the 
collapse of the joint intervention in Mexico is to be understood. 
While the Spanish government was following an on-again, off-again 
policy concerning intervention, France was consulting its own best 
interests to determine what diplomatic course should be followed con-
earning Mexico. French citizens had been insulted and, furthermore, the 
Mexicans showed signs that they were ready to default on debts owed to 
foreign powers, among whom was France. Napoleon III had already brought 
some glory to France through the Crimean War (1854-1856) and the brief 
conflict with Austria (1859). In Indo-China, France participated in a 
joint punitive expedition with Spain, thereby laying the foundation for 
a future empire. 
But the Anglo-French treaty of 1860 leading to a lowered tariff 
schedule between the two nations had hurt Napoleon°s popularity in 
France. 
.,,, 
There was also Eugenie, Napoleon's Spanish-born, arch-Catholic 
wife who despised America and was willing to go to any extreme to humble 
the North American colossus. Thus, examining the situation, Napoleon 
saw that glory and increased prestige might accrue from action against 
Mexico on one hand, while Ellg~nie and her Catholic intimates would be 
placated on the othero The definite Mexican suspension of payments on 
her foreign debt (July 17, 1861), served as the catalyst for Napoleon° s 
plans. Aware of Brita.in~ s importance, the French sought to entice the 
British into agreeing on a joint Anglo-French policy. 
At the same time, the Spanish 9 as already shown, were seeking to 
prod the Briti sh into agreement with their proposed plan of action. 
Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1~~7, p. 377n; Leonardon, "L'Espagne et la ques-
tion du Me:rlque, lSbl-1 2," Annales des Sciences Poli tigues, XVI (1901) 9 
p. 80. 
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Hence, out of the common Franco-Spanish desire for British co-operation 
the Tripartite Treaty of London emerged. The first person of importance 
to see the advantage of joint action appears to have been France's am-
bassador to Britain, Dubois de Saligny, who wrote Foreign Minister 
F.douard Thouvenel in late July, 1861, urging the seizure or· important 
Mexican ports to support British and French claims. Spain, he added, 
"has many just grievances to avenge and will certainly ask nothing 
better than to join us."19 Thouvenel was quick to grasp the opportunity 
presented. He realized that Cuba would provide a convenient spring-
board for launching any force against Mexico; thus he asked that lord 
Russell be sounded out for his sentiments about asking Spain to join in 
any Anglo-French actions. At the same time the Spanish were telling the 
British they would act alone unless an agreement was forthcoming. 20 
Although the official records do not say so, it appears that the 
Spanish and French were working together at this juncture. Both real-
ized Britain's predominance as well as the dangers from the United 
States if Britain were left out. Perhaps the Spanish and French thought 
that once Britain committed herself, they would be free to seek their 
own goalso Here the record becomes even cloudier. The Spanish, as al-
ready mentioned, had ambitions for a Bourbon to occupy a Mexican throne. 
The French, too, developed such a dream, but apparently did not state a 
preference for any candidate, leading the Spanish to believe their nomi -
nee would be sanctioned by France. How else can account be made for 
Spain's ambassador in Paris writing Collantes~ "I know that the idea of 
19Robertson, "The Tripartite Treaty of London," Hispanic American 
Historical Review, XX (1940), p. 168. 
20Ibid., pp. 169-170; Cowley to Russell, September 5, 1861, House 
Document !QQ., p. 300; London TimesJ October 4, 1861, p. 8c. 
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a monarch there is agreeable; the occasion is favorable for a solution 
because we are all offended and the United States very weakened."21 
Minister Schurz was aware that Spain, France, and Britain were en-
gaging in negotiations, but his inquiries to Collantes led to the lat-
ter's same hackneyed answers: Spain was not aware of what France and 
Britain would do, and Spain was not interested in interfering in the 
internal affairs of any nationo However, Schurz was ominously told, 
Mexican institutions needed to be put on a sound footing and Spain would 
not remain idle if France and Britain acted. Noting the enthusiasm for 
intervention in Madrid newspapers, Schurz concluded that Spain had more 
than debt collection in mind and that negotiations were underway in 
which Spain would be seeking an opportunity to install a monarch in 
Mexico or, at the very least, to aid the clerical party. Schurz recom-
mended that Seward should try to come to an understanding with Britain 
whose interest, Schurz suggested, did not lie in seeing a government 
dominated by France and Spain. Schurz was misled into believing such 
an accord was possible by the innocent declarations of Crampton who 
first told him that he was unaware of any proposed joint intervention 
and then said that in any joint agree111ent Britain would go no further 
than seeking redress for her grievances.22 
2lteonardon, "L0 Espagne et la question du Mexique, 1861-1862," 
Annales ~ Sciences Politigues, XVI (1901), p. 630 
22Schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 289-290; Schurz to Seward, Sep-
tember 7, 1861, and October 9, 1861, Dispatches from the United States 
Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Thouvenel told 
Minister Dayton in Paris that Spain could join Britain and France 
against Mexico, but only if she agreed not to seek any Mexican territoryi 
see Dayton to Seward, September 21, 1861, House Document lQQ., p. 212; 
Schurz's recommendation and Crampton's assurances are in Dispatches from 
the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archivesc, 
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The Convention of London was sigri.ed by Britai n, France , and Spain 
on October 31, 1861. According to the official text the contracting 
powers disclaimed any desire for t erritorial gain, and they agreed to 
abstain from intervention in internal affairs. 23 But, as the Revue~ 
~ Mondes noted in 1862, the true sense of the Convention of London 
was to insure a strong government able to protect foreign citizens and 
property against popular outbreaks. Such guarantees would only be 
worthwhile with a strong monarchical government in power. Schurz felt 
this when he asked Collantes about the possibility of Spanish inter-
vention in Mexico' s internal affairs. The latter replied that Spain 
would not force a government on Mexico although Spanish actions might 
give new strength to the conservative party composed largely of Catho-
lies and monarchists . He r eadily admitted that the calling of a consti-
tutional convention had been discussed by the three contracting powers , 
but the proposal had been definitely re jectea.24 
Schurz believed Spain meant no hos t ile expression to the United 
States through her a.dharence to the Convention of London. He interpre= 
ted the Spanish action as the work of dreamers who believed in Spai nis 
restoration to the glory of former days . American policy should be one 
of not questioning the rights of the three powers to make war on Mexico; 
23!.eonardon, "LcEspagne et la question du Mexique ," Annales ~ 
Sci ences Politigues, XVI (1901), p. 64; British~ Forei gn .§:tate Papers, 
LI, pp. 63=65. 
24Revue ~ ~ Mondes , XL (1862), p. 742; Schurz t o Seward , No-
vember 3 , 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers t o Spain , 
1792-1906, The National Archives. I n London, Charles Francis Adams had 
talked with a Republica.n Mexican and asked him if a repetition of the 
Dominican episode--annexation through the will of the "people"--could 
occur. He was told that it was unlikely since almost all Mexicans 
would be opposed to any such action. See Adams to Seward, October 24, 
1861, House Document 1QQ., Po 200. 
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the United States should clearly state its wish not to see an alien type 
of government forced on Mexicoo Secretary Seward followed this policy 
exact.lyo He furthermore declined American pa.rticipation in interven-
tion even though American citizens possessed claims against the Mexica1:1 
governmento SUch participation would be alien to the United States• 
long established policy of avoiding entangling alliances. The United 
States instead would attempt to alleviate the diffiou.lties between 
Mexico and the allied powers.25 
T.rl:i.th the allied powers agreeing on intervention, what proved to be 
an important choice was made when a. Spanish general, Juan Prim y Prats, 
was selected to lead the expeditionary force to Mexico. T.rl:i.th Spanish 
newspapers glorifying Prim as the new Cortez who would restore Spain's 
New World empire, Schurz coolly a.ppraised him. He reported Prim to be 
a great favorite of the Spanish people 9 a pompous and va.in liberal, 
violently anti-clericaL The latter quality led the British to ac-
quiesce to his appointment. As commander of the expedi tiona.ry force, 
he would be removed from sight of the O'Donnell ministry. Schurz sat 
next to Prim a.t a banquet in mid-November, 1861, and reported that Prim 
had assured him that a. monarchical form of government for Mexico was a:n 
absurdity and that he preferred Benito Juarez to any clerical candida.te o 
He went so far a.s to lampoon the concept of a monarchy, "1,,lhy, if there 
is to be a throne established in Mexico under Spanish auspices, why 
should not the commanding genera.1 sit on it?tt As com.ma.nder, Prim said 5 
he would act in accordance with his political belief so He went on to 
praise America and American institutions and said that he would be 
2.5schurz, Bemin~§.cences, II, ppo 27.5=291, Moore, ! ]2:i.ge1?i 2! .!r1k\o= 
national Law, VI, ppo 485-488, succinctly sta.tes American policy; see 
also Callahan, Cuba and Interna.tional Relations, po 339; Sumner, vJorks 
.2£, Charles Sumn'e;-;-VI, p. 3690 -- ·· 
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pleased to see an American diplomat agent attached to his headquarters. 
Schurz took him seriously and recommended sending a diplomat fluent in 
French and Spanish to accompany Prim.26 
Another factor in Prim's selection was the preponderance in numbers 
of Spanish troops available in CUba for the initial action against Mex:i ... 
oo. Even before Prim arrived, at Serrano's behest Spanish soldiers had 
begun landing at Vera Cruz, the operation the London Examiner acidly 
commented upono Xavier Isturiz, the Spanish Ambassador in London, 
sought to sooth British fears by stating that the expedition had been 
ready for some time and must have sailed in ignorance of the conclusion 
of the Convention of London. The British eventually accepted this 
reasoning supplemented by Isturiz's further clarification that the dis-
patches informing Serrano about the tond~n signing had been sent via 
New York and reached Havana too late to recall the expedition.27 
In Mexico Corwin initially reported his belief that Spain was try-
ing to fulfill her own selfish desires and that Spain would try to pre-
vent any settl.ement with the allied powers until Spanish control of 
Mexico was a fact. Little more than a month later, Corwin had become 
much more optimistic and he said he had no fear whatsoever that Spain 
26schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 293-300; Bancroft, (ed.), Speeches, 
Correspondence !m! Poli tica.l Papers ,2! ~ Schurz, I, p. 204; Schurz to 
Seward, November 16, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers 
to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
27on Prim's selection consult Leonardon, "L'Espagne et la question 
du Mexique," Arinales ~ Sciences Politiques, XVI (1901), pp. 68-69; 
Revue~~ Mondes, XL (1862), pp.· 743m745; John Bigelow, Retrospec~ 
tions of an Active Life (5 vols., New York: The Baker and Taylor Com ... 
pany, 1909)"', II, pp. 375-376; for Spain's early dispatching of troops 
to Mexico see Cowley to Russell, November 14, 1861, House Document .!Q.Q., 
P• 370; Isturiz to Russell, December 22, 1861, ibid., pp. 392-393; 
Russell to Isturiz, January 16, 1862, ibid., p. 421; Isturiz to Russell, 
January 18, 1862, ibid., p. 422; Russell to Crampton, January 19, 1862, 
ibid., PP• 423-424. 
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would impose a monarchy on the unwilling Mexican people.28 How is Cor-
w.i.n's change in sentiment explained? Here one confronts the nub of the 
illusive Spanish policy towards her allies and Mexico. The Spanish 
were as interested in establishing a monarchical government in Mexico 
as were the French. However, the two powers differed over who was to 
occupy the newly established throne. So it was that the French used 
the excuse of initial Spanish numerical preponderance to reinforce the 
French troops already in Mexico. Then the Spanish reverted to the 
clauses of the London treaty concerning the interference in internal af-
fairs and proclaimed their opposition to any French plan to install a 
monarch in Mexico as long as the monarch was non-Bourbon. 
If the Spanish had had their way and the French had acquiesced to 
their candidate, the history of the intervention might have taken a much 
more dangerous course a.nd threatened the United States' national secur-
ity. 29 As it was, Napoleon III fulminated that "General Prim seems to 
be animated by moti,res of personal ambition ••• Prim has, so to speak, 
abased himself before Juarez' s go,rernment •••• It is very unfortunate 
that Spain has entrusted this weighty mission to such a man. n30 The 
28corw:tn to Seward, December 24, 1861, ibid., p. 38; Corwin to 
Seward, January 26, 1862, ibid., pp. 47-48. 
29on Franco-Spanish co-operation in the early phases of interven-
tion see Harper's New Monthl~ Magazine, XXIV (1862), p. 700; Perkins, 
~ Monroe Doctrine, 1826-18 7, pp. 374-.375; for the decision to rein-
force French troops in Mexico see Russell to Cowley, January 20, 1862, 
House Document 100, pp. 422-423; Adams to Seward, February 14, 1862, 
ibid., p. 209; Corti, Maximilian !!'.,l.g, Charlotte ,2! ~xico, I, pp. 126-
127, 130; the beginning of the Franco-Spanish split are in Dayton to 
Seward, February 13, 1862, House Document 100, n. 216; London Tim.esj 
January 31, 1862, P• 8d; Koerner, Memoirs, II, pp. 291-292; L~onardon, 
"L' Espagne et la question du Mexique," Anna le§. ~ Sciences Poli tigues ~ 
XVI (1901), ppo 64-67, 79, 91; for Spain's position on a non-Bourbon 
monarch, see Corti, Maximilian~ Charlotte ,2! Mexico, I, pp. 113, 123, 
129-130. 
30Napoleon III to Ferdinand Max, March 7, 1862, ibid., p. 370. 
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final split in the allied front occurred with the signing of the Con-
vention of La Soledad in mid-April, 1862. Shortly afterwards the 
British and Spanish contingents withdrew from Mexico, leaving Napoleon 
alone with his Mexican schemes. 
Occupied by a Civil War, the United States could give only verbal 
support to the Juarez government in 1861 and 1862, and in this context 
the disruption of the convention powe:x,s was especially fortunate for the 
United states. All one needs to do is compare Seward's ac'!,~ice to Presi-
dent Lincoln in April, 1861, to his course of action regarding the Mexi-
can question in late 1861 and early 1862. In April, 1861, Seward was 
advising I.iincoln to wage war against Spain and any other power audacious 
enough to interfere in the Western Hemisphere. This bombastic pronounce-
ment was also meant to solidify the disintegrating Union, and was quite 
a contra.st to United States behavior when allied troops actually were 
present in Mexico. It appears that Seward did not dispatch warnings o~ 
ultimatums to Britain, France, or Spain. Instead came Seward's tardy 
recognition that perhaps the three powers had justifiable causes to try 
and bring the Mexican government to account. However, Seward was not 
being a hypocrite, but simply a diplomatic realist. He recognized that 
only when the war ended would the United States have sufficient strength 
to deploy against outside forces in the New World. With the nation's 
very life at stake the best the Secretary of state could do was to wa.it 
with folded hands and hope that time would be to America's adva.ntage. 
A note sent from Lincoln to the comrention powers reflects this senti-
ment as well as the imp.lication that any involvement in Mexico could 
only lead to an ever deepening abyss. The President warned that no 
foreign form of government could hope to flourish in Mexico unless it 
was supported by military means "and this would be the beginning rather 
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than the ending of revolution in Mexico."3l 
Aside from Seward 8 s hope and Lincoln's veiled warning, there was 
little the United States could do. From his Spanish viewpoint, Perry 
continued to report that Spaniards were quite proud of Spain's actions 
in Mexico. Spa.nish pride began to defiate when news arri1red that the 
French intended to increase the number of their soldiers in Mexico; the 
Spaniards believed they alone would be responsible for land operations. 
Then stories that the French were backing Maximilian of Austria started 
to circulate in Madrid. Perry noted another blow to Isabella's dreams 
of grandeur. Even as the disheartening news reaohed the Spanish capi-
' ta1 the O'Donnell government fell back on its old cliches. Again of-
ficials reiterated that Spain sought only to see a strong government 
a 
ruling Mexico with the consent of the Mexican people. Indeed, Spain 
would never seek to force a monarchy on the hapless Mexicans. 
The.true feelings of expansionist Spaniards leaked temporarily when 
it appeared that the aged General Winfield Scott, at the behest of the 
United States government, would be embarking on a mission to forestall 
the allies through negotiations. The newspaper!!, ;mpoca declared that 
the "mission of Scott is probably to calm the excitement produced among 
the irritable Yankees by the pressure of European troops on that conti-
nent."32 As quickly as it arose, the Scott story faded and Perry again 
heard the usual Spanish justifications for the Mexican venture. When 
Collantes expressed fears that the United States would absorb its 
southern neighbor, Perry assured him that the Republicans in power in 
31seward to Perry, March 3, 1862, Moore, ! Digest .2! International 
Law, VI, P• 489. -
32Perry to Seward, March 15, 1862, Foreign Affairs,~, pp. 484-
488. 
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the United States had no desire to rule Mexico. 
Only in May, 1862, were the full details of Prim' s actions in Mexi ... 
co known in Spain. Perry was highly gratified, but all he could do was 
offer indirect support to Prim. Upon meeting Collantes, he told him 
that Spain had placed herself in the right by Prim' s disa.ssociation frc>m 
the Frenoh interest. Spain, Perry said, was bound to gain more respect 
from the various Latin-American repu.blics. She had also shown that she 
was not a paper tiger; Spanish power had vindicated Spanish national 
honor in a sensible fashion. Vain as he was, Collantes enjoyed Perry's 
remarks immensely. He replied that Spain had fulfilled her goals and 
thus was complying with the provisions of the Convention of London by 
withdrawal. The discussion then shifted to France's intentions and 
Collantes expressed doubt that Napoleon III would be as foolhardy as to 
engage in a permanent intervention. Perry skillfully brought up the 
interests of the United States, Britain, and Spain in seeing Mexico re-
main free of French control. As Spanish colonies intersected French 
communications to Mexico, Perry suggested, Spain had more interest in 
seeking the defeat of French armies than the United States. In response 
to this line, the Spanish foreign minister declared to the contrary, that 
Napoleonic intrigues wou.1d be an American matter. T,Jhile Perry did not 
acquiesce, he maintained that Napoleon was wise enough never to directly 
challenge the United States, and he sought to illustrate the advantages 
of a unified British-Spanish-American front to French dreams for a Mexi-
can empire.33 
33Perry to Seward, April 1.5, 1862, ibid., pp. 492-493; Perry to 
Seward, April 17, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to 
Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Callahan, ~ !!!2. Internation-
!1. Relations, p. 341; Perry to Seward, May 25, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 
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Spanish-American relations definitely improved as a result of the La 
Soledad agreement. Seward even instructed Perry to inform the Spanish of 
his pleasure o"lter their withdrawal. More than ever, he was confident 
that any power enmeshing itself in Mexico's internal affairs only harmed 
itself. At this juncture news that the United States was negotiating a 
loan to Mexico in return for collateral consisting of several Mexican 
provinces swept Spain. Perry immediately repeated his earlier assuran-
ces that under no ciroU111stances would America seek territorial aggran-
dizement a.t her weaker neighbor's expense. Investigation revealed that 
Minister Corwin had recommended the previous November that the United 
States assume the interest on the Me:x;ican debt in return for a mortgage 
on Mexican land. Sumner's Foreign Relations Committee had agreed with 
Corwin's proposal only to run afoul of the rest of the Senate. 
Before these facts could be exposed ferry reported the American 
proposal had strengthened the pro-French clique in Madrid. Thereafter 
for the remainder of the Civil War, Perry and Seward found one of their 
duties to be to counteract French influence in the Jt,zantine world of 
Spanish politics. In July, 1862, Perry disclosed that the pro-French 
clique led by Alexander Mon was in official favor; in fact, war materiel 
from Havana was being put a.t France's disposal. Five months later 
Koerner wrote Seward of the Spaniards' fear of Napoleonic li'rance coupled 
with the Queen's backing of Prim's conduct before the·Cortes. Before 
that body Prim had delivered a three-day defense of his withdrawal from 
Mexico. Prim believed France desired to erect a monarch,y in Mexico, 
contradictory to the terms of the Convention of London. Furthermore, 
1862, pp. 498-499; Perry to Seward, May 30, 1862, ibid., PP• 504-506; 
the French attitude can be traced in the Revue des Deux Mondes, XL 
(1862), pp. 760-761;. ibid., XLIII (1862), pp. 507, m-512. · 
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the F-!"ench were simply deluding themselves because both North and South 
were committed to the Monroe Doctrine and would vindicate it after the 
end of their internecine strifeo34 
America9 s diplomatic stance regarding Mexican intervention can be 
understood, then, on.1y in the light of complex British, French, and 
Spanish aims. Once again S~ward vindicated his diplomacyo Maturing 
rapidly in the office of Secretary of State, he realized the suicidal 
result of any war involving a split United States against three Euro-
pean powerso Instead he let time work to America's advantage and the 
divisiveness among the Convention powers bore out the soundness of his 
policy. At the same time, America benef'itted from the age-old Euro~ 
pean rivalries: English suspicion of the Spanish, the general Spanish 
hatred of the French, and French visions of a New World empire through 
a. diplomatic double cross. One would lose sight of these factors if 
one examined Spanish-American diplomacy as if it existed in a vacuumo 
Time saw United States power increase while Na.poleon III had to 
confront an ever more ominous situationo The British never entered into 
the Mexican question other than to collect debts owed them. The Spanish 
wished to install a Bourbon on the throne Maximilian occupied, but find-
ing themselves frustrated, they sulked like spoiled childreno What if 
34P-or Sewardvs belief in the improvement of Spanish=American re= 
la.tions see Seward to Perry, June 23; 1862, ForEz,._iffn Affairs, ~' po 
471; Seward to Koerner, August, 1862, ibido, ppo 74,~475; the proposed 
loan to Mexico is cmrered in Sumner, Works ,2! .Qharles Sumner, VI, ppo 
368, 374-375; Perry to Seward, July 7, 1862, Foreign Affairs, ~ 9 ppo 
507-.509; Perry to Seward, July 8, 1862, Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; the con= 
flict between factions within Spain between 1862=1865 can be gleaned 
from the appropriate volumes of Foreign Affairs~ Dispatches from the 
United States Ministers to Spain, 179:?-1906. The NA~c.ion~l Archives, and 
Koerner 0 s Memoirs, II, pp. ~92-293i 295-296, 308-310, 381-384. 
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the Spanish had accomplished their objective? One has only to consider 
Maximilian's fate. Any Spanish nominee probably wou.ld have met the same 
end. Refiecting on Spa.in° s melancholy four years in Sa.nto Domingo, the 
inevitable conclusion is that Prim did Spain and America an unmeasurable 
favor by supporting the La Soledad agreement and the early evacuation 
of Spanish troops from Mexico. 
CHAPTER VI 
FRICTION IN NEW ORLEANS 
New Orleans, the largest city of the Confederacy, wa.s es'()ecially 
important beca.use of its stra.tegic location on the Mississippi Rbrer and 
its usefulness to the South a.s a ,ri tal port for the consignment of the 
South's staple crops. Cotton was tracled with the Spa.nish-controlled 
port of Havana. Somewhat contrary to the June, 1861, proclamation, Ta.s-
sara, the Spanish Minister in Washington, had sent a letter to the Span-
ish consul in New Orleans, Juan Ca.llejon, giving him the authority to 
clear shipping under the Confederate flag for va.:rious Spanish ports.1 
When New Orleans fell to Union forces in the early months of 1862, 
it was virtually ineiri table tha.t friction would arise between foreigners 
:residing in the Crescent City and Northern commanders. When Major Gen-
era.1 Benjamin Fo Butler ·was placed in command of the Union forces, an-
other omen wa.s added to the prospects for trouble. Suffice to say that 
wherever the Massachusetts lawyer-turned-soldier a.rri ved ~ cont:rmrersies 
soon deireloped. 
Butler 0 s sentiments about foreign consuls in New Orleans were 
plainly stated in his declaration that consular offices were "asylums 
1 Go:rdon Wright, "Economic Conditions in the Confederacy as seen by 
the French Consul," Journal 2f §.2.uther!!_ Histo:cy, VII (May, 1941), p. 
200, mentions the New Orleans-Havana cotton tra.de; Tassa.raws letter to 
Ca.llejon is contained in Boswell Bach to Jefferson Da,ris, September 19j 
1861; Richardson, Messages !!2£ Papers ,21. ~ Confederacy, II, p. 81., 
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where rebels are harbored and rebellion fosteredo 112 Almost immediately 
strife arose between Butler and the French Consul, Edouard Majano 
Eventually Butler forced Meja.n to leave New Orleans, and upon his de ... 
pa.rture the Frenchman bitterly :rema.rked that the commander probably had 
bribed one of his servants who had in return invented an inflamatory 
story Butler wanted to hearo In another instance, on Butler9 s orders 
Union officers seized money from a Dutch residento Only after an in.,. 
vestigation by an official dispatched by Secretary of State Seward de .. 
te:rmined Butler wrong, was the money returned to its proper owner. 
Butler totally disregarded the protests of the Dutt.ch representatives in 
New Orleans during the affairo Numerous other outrages involved Butler 
and the consuls of Belgium, Greece, Switzerland, Britain, Russia, and 
Prussia.' · Not surprisingly, Spain had her share of difficulties with the 
Union commanda.nto 
In mid-February, 1862, the prize Confederate steamer Magnolia was 
captured by the Union forces. Among the papers uncovered was a letter 
mentioning that the Spanish consul in New Orleans was to receive a five 
per cent share in the profits of a proposed sale of 80,000 muskets to 
the Confederacyo Some months later the Spanish consul complained to 
Butler that his mail was being openedo Butler acidly replied that the 
2Private .9:nd Official Corresnon~,c,,,,~e o+' r~ne'!'."'31 'Riomi"1min ,:;,. 'Rnt.li:,r 
(5 volso' Norwood, Ma.ssachusettsg PlimptonPres.s, 1917), II, p;- 3470' 
3Mejan•s troubles 'With Butler are covered in Wright, "Economic Con= 
ditions in the Confederacy as Seen by the French Consul," Journal ,2! 
Southern History, VII (1941), Po 197; Manfred Co Vernon, ''General Butler 
and the Dutch Consul, " Q:ml l'!!!:. Hi stor:y, V ( September 9 19 59) , po 273 , 
deals with Butler• s handling of the Dutch Consul; the list of nations 
whose consuls had difficulties with Butler is f'rom Hans Lo Trefousse; 
~ Butler: The South Palled!!!!!!. Beast (New York: Twayne Publishers, 
1957), Pe 29s;-note 4oo · 
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mail should be sent through regular channels, not through blockade run.. 
nerse 
The next minor happening invobred Callejon°s fear tha.t Butler had 
decided that foreign citizens who had resided in New Orleans thirty 
years or more had forfeited their natiire citizenshipo Butler quelled 
this notion by flatly den;yi.ng it in a letter to the consulo Next Butler 
had to deny that Spanish citizens were being held illegally in the 
United states despite the fact that their.credentials were in order. 
Only after Butler m.et Callejon did the American realize that a la.rge 
part of the trouble came from. a lack of understanding by each sideo The 
problem, however, was never resol~red while Butler was in command of New 
Orleanso 
To a.lleviate increasing diplomatic troubles in the city, Seward an-
nounced to Tassara that a provisional court would be established in New 
Orleanso Sew.rd was caught between the necessity of placating foreign 
opinion and agreeing to the demands of the war as Butler presented ito 
Butler 0 s contemporary biographer, James Parton, claimed Seward generally 
took the side of the foreign consuls in international disputes 9 thereby 
casting Butler in the 'W'l1:"ongo This conclusion is not borne out in the 
evidence concerning &.tle'.l' and the Spanish consulo Actually Butler 
showed all foreigners that the power of the United States was a tangible 
thing, and he instilled in them respect for Amerioao4 Remembering the 
4.rhe captured letter is in Officia.l Records of the Union and Con= 
federate Navies 9 Series I~ Volo I, ppo 142=143;-Butler8 s troub:r;-witii' 
the Spanish consul is touched on in the Correspondence of General Butler 9 
II~ ppo 205~ 331~ 345, 494-496; 1bido 9 ppo 281~282 contains <mention of 
the proYisional court; Seward 9 Seward at Washington as Senator a.nd Sacre= 
tary .2£. .§.!:_ate9 III~ Po 139 9 notes the uproe,r in. New Orleans; Butier~= 
chief apologist was James Parton, General Butler in New Orleans (New 
York: Mason Brothers~ 1864) 9 ppo 355=3560 ~ ~ 
.. .,. .... 
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occasions when Seward had clipped his wings, But.ler later wrote that the 
Secretary "was in distress whenever I did anything that caused a little 
whipper-snapper emissary from some government in Europe to complain of 
my treatment of a man who claimed to be a consul, and this caused per-
petual interference and was an annoyance."5 
The primary problem Butler encountered in New Orleans was the deadly 
yellow fever, a perennial scourge of the city. His partial solution was 
to establish a quarantine, and with the installation of the measure, the 
Spanish consul beci;ime a prominent figure in his life. Indicative of the 
virulent nature of the disease were the deaths of eighteen thousand 
people during the interval between 1853 and 1856. With the coming of 
the Civil War and the imposition of a partial Union blockade in 1861, 
the number of yellow fever oases dropped considerably and no deaths were 
registered which listed yellow fever as the cause. 
Butler was well aware of the problem he faced in the spring of 1862, 
He believed residents of New Orleans actually were hoping for another 
wave of the dread disease because it most certainly would decimate the 
ranks of the Union soldiers. Casting a.bout for measures to halt any 
fresh outbreak, Butler questioned an old New Orleans physician a.bout 
methods of prevention. While the doctor said no means for absolutely 
eliminating yellow fever existed, he admitted. tha.t a quarantine of in-
coming ships might be helpful. Butler proceeded to order a strict quar-
antine to be enforced on the Mississippi River below New Orleans. All 
shipping had to stop downriver from the quarantine station at Fort St. 
Philip for initial inspection by a health officer. If the officer 
5Benjamin F. Butler, Butler's Book: A Review of His t 8gaJ' Poli ti-.2!!. !!l2, Military Career (Boston: A.M.Thayer and Compariy; 1 92 , P• 426'. 
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approved the "ressel, Butler permitted it to proceed to New Orleanso All 
ships on which an infectious sickness wa.s present and all vessels ar-
riving from ports 'Where yellow fever was active were required to wait 
forty days for the ma.nda.tory inspection. 6 "With these stringent requirc3= 
ments on shipping, difficulties were bound to develop, a.nd since New 
Orleans was a particula.rly busy port, additional problems would prove 
excessive for the American officials. 
At the end of June, 1862, an irritated and a.mazed Tassara. wrote So-
ward that the Spanish vessel Cardenas, loaded with a cargo of perishable 
fruits, had been detained at Fort St. Philip even though no earlier 
notification ha.d been given that a. quarantine was in effecto To com-
pound Tassara' s bewilderment, the Roanoke, a "North American steamer,'' 
had touched at Havana, the same port from which the Cardenas had sailed, 
but had been admitted to New Orleans without being subjected to the 
forty-day detention period. With the case of the Cardenas prominent in 
his thoughts 9 the Span.ish consul became understa.nda.bly recalci tra.nt 
about granting clearance to the Roanoke~ 'Which wa.s making rea.dy to re= 
turn to Ha.vanao Butler ordered the consul to clear the Roanoke for tho 
Spanish port. When the consul refused and added he wuld force the 
Roanoke to wait in New Orleans the same number of days that the Cardenlt,§., 
had been delayed at Fort St. Philip, Butler responded 'With the thinly 
veiled threa.t that the consul could expect to leave New Orleans perma"" 
nently aboard the Cardenaso To Tassaraes request that Butler be Oirer= 
ruled, Seward promised the ca.se would be imrestigated o 7 
6Jo Ann Carrigan, "Yankee versus Yellow Jack in New Orleans, 1862"" 
1866," Civil~ History, IX (September .. 1963), pp. 248=2.520 
?Tassa.ra to Seward, June 28, 1862 9 Foreign Affairs, ~, ppo 520= 
522; Seward's reply is in Seward to Tassa.rs~ July 16~ 1862, ibido, PPo 
522-523. 
96 
The remainder of the summer was spent in the Cardenas-Roa.noke con-
troversyo Tassara continued to stress the inconsistent treatment ac-
corded the Cardenas in comparison with freely admitted ships such as the 
Roanoke, the Virginia Antoinette, and the !!!lg,£!!:.. Tassara maintained 
disease conditions in New Orleans were, if anything, worse than in Ha-
vana. The idea that Butler was deliberately discriminating against 
Spanish ships was suggested by Tassara who also implied that Cuban ports 
could practice the same procedures age.inst America.n vessel~. On the 
legal front, to compensate for the dama.ges suffered by the Cardena.a as 
a reSlllt o:f' Butler's quarantine, the indignant Tassa:ra filed a bill :f'o:r 
$].6, 34?. 00 on behalf of the Cuban Genera.l Steam Naviga.tion Cc,mpan,y. With 
justifiable anger, Tassara reported to Seward tha.t Butler had threatened 
to sink the Cardenas if the vessel's captain failed to submit to Butlercs 
orders.8 
Seward again tried to mollify the Spanish diplomat by telling him 
the Cardenas affair was being investigated by Secretary of War Edwin M.. 
Stanton. But, he noted, he personally doubted if Butler was unjustly 
administering the quarantine lawso In a New Orleans conversation with 
Consul Callejon, Butler insisted he was merely trying to kaep the city 
safe from yellow fever and intended no affront to the Spanish nationo 
Writing Stanton, Butler continued to justify the quarantine measure as 
essential to the health of the cityo As for the charge of discrimina-
tion, against Spanish shipping, ·Butler a.ssured Stanton such was not the 
case. The Roanoke and other vessels cited by the Spanish had no diffi= 
culty passing quarantine inspection because they had stopped tn Havan~ 
8Tassara to Seward, August 7 and 26, 1862, ibido, pp. 524-526 9 52B, 
530; Tassara to Seward, September 3, 1862, Foreign Affair..z.~ 1863, II, 
pp. 907-909, contains Tassara.'s complaint and claims for the Cardena.so 
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for only a short time and had scarcely contacted the shore. The real 
trouble, Butler suggested, could be explained in terms of simple eco-
nomic jealousy.9 Blltler's reply obviously satisfied Stanton and Seward 
because they made no move to overrule him. Moreover, his quarantine 
campaign was a complete success. The scourge of yellow fever passed by 
New Orleans in 1862 as it had in 1861010 
Butler next became embroiled in a dispute with the Spanish over the 
case of another ship, the Blasco ~ Gara:v. Initially this ship wa.s also 
entangled in a snarl with the qua.rantine laws, but Butler had done all 
he could to rapidly clear away the red tape. A month later, however, 
near the end of September, 1862, the Blasco~ Garay attempted to leave 
New Orleans without having been inspected. But.1er immediately suspected 
that escaped prisoners were on board, so he wrote for and received per-
mission to look for prisoners aboard the ship. In the meantime Butler 
sent an anonymous tip he had received to Consul Callejon claiming numer-
ous rebel passen.gers were on board the Blasco £! Garay. Ca.llejon re-
plied to Butler that no man would be denied the right of asylum if he 
was involved in political dif.ficulties, but he promised that common 
criminals would be returned to American custodyo After an inspection 
of the Blasco ~ Garay revealed an escaped murderer, Butler indignantly 
9seward to Tassara, September 10, 1862, ibido, p. 909; Seward to 
Tassara, September 17, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, po 531, for Sewardqs 
answer; Correspondence .£! General Butler, II, pp. 192 ... 193, 274-275, 34<)= · 
345, 347, contains Butler's justifications for his actions~ 
lOParton, General Butler in New Orleans, ppo 394..399, asserts .that 
but one case of yellow fever was recorded in 1862 and that it came in 
from Nassau; T. A. mand, Life .£!. Benjamin Butler (Boston: J;,ee and Shep= 
hard, 1879), pp. 108-109, says no lives were lost in New Orleans due to 
yellow fever during the days of Butler9 s administration; Carrigan, 
"Yankee versus Yellow Jack in New Orleans, 1862-1866," Civil War Histo~~ 
IX (1963), pp. 255, 259-260, men.tions two deaths from yellow fever during 
Butler's days in New Orleans. · 
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objected to the unneutral behavior of Spanish shipping. Numerous rebels 
had been found on the Pinta and Maria Galanti, two other Spanish vessels. 
He sent a clipping to. Seward from a Havana newspaper to bolster his argu-
ment about the illegal removal of passengers from New Orleans.11 
Seward formally complained to. Tassara in Washington about the ac-
tivities of the Spanish ships. Butler forwarded to Seward two affada-
vi ts supposedly proving the Blasco ~ Garay had periodically granted 
asylum to political refugees on certain occasions. Tassara duly prom-
ised to have the matters investigated.12 
Apparently Seward was not content with the minister's promise be-
cause he sent the papers relating to the Blasco~ Garay. to Koerner, 
United States minister in Madrid. By the time Koerner received the 
papers, Prime Minister O'Donnell's government was·in'the midst of a 
crisis. The collapse of the O'Donnell government led to a lull in the 
case until June, 1863, months after Butler had relinquished command in 
New Orleans. It was Ta.ssara, in fact, who recalled the affair to Se-
ward's attention. In the eyes of the Spanish government, offering re-
fuge to political outcasts was the humane and proper thing to doo An 
extradition treaty could be worked out to insure the return of criminals 
should they secure passage to Cuba under the guise of political refugees. 
In any event, Tassara said, a mishap such. as the Blasco .9.2. Garay case 
should not be allowed to sour Spanish-American friendshipo Seward's 
rejoiner to Tassara stressed that when the Blasco~ Garay incident 
11corresEondence 2!, General Butler, II, pp. 182, 324-325, 373-375, 
419-420; Parton, General Butler ,!n~ Orleans, p. 394, repeats the tale 
of the murderer found on the Blasco~ Garay. 
12seward to Tassara, November 3, 1862, Tassara to Seward, November 
5, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1863, !I, pp. 909-910; Correspondence .2!. 
General Butler, II, p. 512. 
occurred, New Orleans was under military control and compliance with 
rules of the government was mandatory. In other words, the State De-
partment continued to support their former governor of New Orleans. 
Thereafter the Blasco~ Garay case was closed.13 
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The last local issue between Butler a.nd the Spanish consul centered 
on the role of Spa.nish merchants. The initial incident involved the 
Spanish merchant house directed by the Puig Brothers. Butler alleged 
that they were implicated in illicit trade since they used cargo brought 
in by blockade runners. The resident partner of the firm complicated 
matters at that point by fleeing to the Blasco~ Garay for re:f'uge.14 
Butler's interest in the mattsr was then diverted to the 11!1.1.ah more sig ... 
' nificant case of the Avendano Brothers who alleged that Butler had de-
manded they grant him a payoff of $9,600.00 on no justifiable grounds. 
When Seward queried Butler for details, the general responded that the 
Avenda~o Brothers had been engaged in blockade running, and that the 
capture of the vessel Fox in May of 1862 had confirmed this fact through -
bills of exchange found on board. Again Seward took Butler's side and 
told Tassara about the proof revealed by the Fox's capture. Furthermore, 
13For Seward's transmittal of the Blasco~ Garay papers see Se-
ward to Koerner, December 18, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, Po 888; 
the crisis that prevented Koerner from discussing the matter is men-
tioned in Koerner to Seward, January 10 and 15, 1863, Dispatches from 
the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792 .. 1906, The National Archives; 
Tassara's revival of the incident is in Tassara to Seward, June 5, 1863, 
Foreign Affairs, 9863, II, pp. 913-914; Seward to Tassara, July 2, 1863, ibid., pp. 915-91, contains Seward's answer backing Butler; see also 
Moore, A Digest ,g! International ~' I, pp. 570-571. 
14 Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 291, mentions the troubles o,rer the 
New Orleans merchants; the rest of the disclosures about the Puig 
Brothers is in~ Correspondence 2£. General Butler, II, pp. 204-206, 
368 .. 371. 
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' the payment of' $9,600.00 demanded by Butler from the Avendano Brothers 
was a "just penalty for their crimes against the United States and as a 
preven.tative of such treasonable activities in the f'uture. "l5 
On the matter of violation of' individual rights as claimed by Tas-
sara, Seward once more demurred. He eXplained that thousands of for-
eigners had resided in New Orleans for many years and had enjoyed the 
privileges of' American citizenship. When the revolt 'began, Seward 
theorized that these aliens owed a uniq:ue allegiance to the United States 
and had a moral obligation not to aid the Confederates. As the crisis 
developed and their specia.l position no longer appeared to be advantag ... 
eous, these individuals began clamoring for the protection of' various 
consuls in New Orleans. Thus Seward asserted that the individuals con-
nected with the old mercantile houses were subject to the rules and 
regulations imposed on them by the military commander of' the area.16 
Again Bltler's actions were exonerated by the Department of' State. 
In late 1862 ~ajor General Nathaniel P. Banks replaced Butler as 
military governor of' the New Orleans area. Notifying Spanish Foreign 
Minister Serrano of the change in command, Koerner said Butler's "su,o-
cessor is known for his great moderation and prudence and will undoubted-
ly conduct matters there Liew Orlean!i{ in a manner which o •• will avoid 
as much as possible all complications arising from the peculiar condition 
15Sewa.rd to Tassara, November 15, 1862, Foreign Affairs, ~~ pp., 
540-541. 
16correspondence relating to the Avendatio Brothers may be found in 
The Correspondence of' General Butler, II, pp. 279-281, 387-388, 390; 
Seward to Tassara, September 9, 1862, Foreign Affairs, ~, po 527; 
Tassara to Seward, September 11, 1862, ibid., ·po 531; Seward to Tassara, 
November 15, 1862, ibid., pp. 537-541, quotes Butler saying of the 
Avendano Brothers, "They should have been hanged; they were only finedo" 
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of affairs incidents to a civil wa:r."17 
Undoubtedly Seward was glad to see the departure of the cont:rover-
sial Butler for the sake of harmony in Spanish-American :relations. While 
admitting Butler had ruled New Orleans 'With an iron hand, Seward said 
the general had maintained order and prevented an outbreak of yellow 
fever through his vigorous sanitary regulations.18 
General Butler's primary problems in New Orleans stemmed from the 
methods he chose to enforce his decisions, not from the validity of his 
orders. Despite his questionable Civil War reputation, Butler proved 
himself to be an able administrator in a difficult locale .. Proof of 
the soundness of his measures affecting Spain is indicated by the extra-
ordinary support given him by Secretary Seward in practically every dis-
agreemen.t with Spanish officials. General Banks soon proved the area 
could be governed with equal efficiency but without the disturbances 
created by Butler0 s tactlessness. Never again during the Civil War did 
New Orleans crop up in the correspondence exchanged between Spain and 
America. 
17Koerner to Seward, about a message delivered to Serrano~ ,January 
20, 186~. Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain9 1792= 
1906, The National Archives. · 
18seward, Seward _!1 Washington~ Senator~ Secretary .c:.! State 9 
III, p. 139; Gerald M. Capers, "Confederates and Yankees in Occupied New 
Orleans, 1862-1865," Journal 2t Southern .filstory, XXX (Novemberj 1964), 
p. 406, attributes Butler;s recall to Europe 0 s unfavorable view of 
BuUer0 s rule in New Orleans as well as his difficulties with the for ... 
eign consuls. 
CHAPTER VII 
INCIDENTS IN SPANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 
In the routine of daily diplomatic relations among sovereign states, 
it is inevitable that small disputes will erupt over the conduct of j,ndi-
viduals. A war, especially a civil war, multiplies the opportunities for 
such incidents and creates a greater chance that they will evolve into 
disputes of major proportions. The American Civil War brought forth nu-
merous events that could have made Spanish-American relations even more 
torturous than they were. 
Immediately a~er the outbreak of strife Secretary of State Seward 
warned :Minister Schurz enroute to Madrid to make sure that American con~ 
suls proceeded energetically to prevent the outfitting of Confederate 
privateers. The June 17, 1861, Spanish neutrality proclamation led 
interested Americans to believe Union cruisers could enter and leave 
Spanish ports at will while the Confederacy9 s cruisers would be allowed 
in only for "necessary" repairs. Ideally, the proclamation and Ameri= 
can watchfulness should have eliminated potential maritime problemso1 
However, with many ports to keep under surveillance together with the 
occasional pro-Confederate sympathies of Spanish officials, frequent 
maritime disputes developed. 
Less than a month after the June neutrality proclamation was issued 
1For Seward's warning to Schurz consult Seward to Schurz, June 22, 
1861, Foreign Affairs,~, p. 264; Koerner, Memoirs, II, po 2580 
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by Queen Isabella II, the c.s.s. Sumter slipped into the port of Cien-
fuegos, Cuba, with several American vessels.,as prizes. Ml.ch to the cha~ 
grin of the Americans involved, the Sumter was reprovisioned and allowed 
to depart and ravage more American commerce. Nor was that all, for 
Cuba's Captain-General Serrano refused to allow the release of the Sum~ -
ter•s prizes. Ol"lly after Secretary of State Seward protested to Tassara, 
Spain's representative in Washington, were the vessels released.2 
Six months later in January, 1862, the SWnter :reappeared to tempo1~ ... 
arilybecloud Spanish-American relations when it entered the south Span ... 
ish port of Cadiz for supplies and emergency repairs. Learnin.g of the 
SWnter•s presence, members of the American mission made prompt and ener-
getic protests. The only immediate answer elicited from the Spanish 
disclosed that the Sumter was being allowed in Cadiz on humanitarian 
grounds; if emergency repairs were not administered, the lives of the 
crew would be endangered.3 Using this excuse, the necessary work was 
done, but because of continued American diplomatic pressure the SWnter 
had to weigh anchor for Gibraltar while her commander, Raphael Semmes, 
wrote admiringly of the successful pressure applied on Spain by the "red 
Republican German refugee, Carl Schurz, old Abe 9 s worthy representa-
tive."4 
2The SWnter affair is covered in Seward to Tassara, July 15, 1861~ 
Foreign Affairs, 1.§fil., pp. 267-268; Seward to Schurz, July 20, 1861, 
ibid., p. 269; Tassara to Seward, August 9, 1861, ibid., p. 271; Cal-
lahan, ~!!:!2 International Relations, p. 333. 
)The trouble over the Sumter's presence in Cadiz is mentioned in 
James D. Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe 
,2!: ,li2! ~ Confederate Cruisers ~ ;f!jguipped (2 vols.;" New York: Thoma:S 
Yoseloff, 1959), II, p. 281; Seward, Seward !! Washington !.[ Senator !..:rul 
Secretarl .2! State, III, P• 69. 
4official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series II, 
Vol. II~ p. 142·~ - - - -
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The waters washing the coast of South Carolina provided more than 
their due share of ma:ri time incidentso Trvhile lying at anchor in the 
harbor of Union-occupied Port Royal in December, 1861, the Spanish ves-· 
sel Nuest:ra Senora sl! Regla wa.s searched by United States officials. 
They found Confederate mail and the official correspondence of the 
Captain-General of Cuba; the latter's mail was mistakenly opened, but 
not :read, or so the Secretary of Sta.ta assured the skeptical Tassa:ra. 
The Federal Government in this pa.:rticula:r case elected to hold the ship 
and Emilio Puig, an individual found on board who claimed to be a Span-. 
ish citizen living in Charleston, :responsible for the correspondence for 
judicial proceeding} 
The same month another Spa.nish ,ressel, the bark Pro,ridencia, sail-
ing from Hava.na to New York, was boarded off Cha.rleston, South Carolina. 
Finding a. disc:repa.ncy of 105 miles between her position and her master• s 
reckoning, the boarding party ordered the ship's mate to board the U.s.s. 
Monticello with the Pro,ridencia's pa.pars. Engine trouble led to the 
separation of the ships, but the following day the Providencia was 
boarded by men from another Navy ship, the U. S.S. Alabama, who ordered 
her to sail for New Yorko As a. result of these a.ctions the Spanish 
government instituted claims for damages a.nd delay to the Pro1ridencia. 
In early June, 1862, referee Moses Taylor a.warded $2,791.91 to her owners 
for the navy's actions. 6 
Minister Tassara. in Washington, zealously continuing to watch ove:r 
Spain's interest, noticed a story in the February 17, 1863, edition of 
5 Seward to Tassara, December 10, 1861, Foreign Affairs 9 1861, ppo 
517-518. 
6navid Hunter Miller, (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts 
.2!, ~ United States 2.f. America (8 vols. , Washington: Government P.rWing 
Office, 1931-1948), VIII, pp. 681-689. 
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the New York Herald insinuating Spain's consul in Charleston wa.s acting 
in an unneutral way. In answer to his subsequent protest, Secretary Se-
ward declared he had obser,red nothing offensive in the Herald's story.? 
U1 timately this and any other difficulties remaining from the Charleston 
area were salved towards the end of the war by Seward's assurances to 
Tassara that no sealed or unsealed Spanish mail would be read by Ameri-
ca.n military authorities. 8 
Throughout the war numerous cases arose of suspicious vessels using 
Spanish ports or territorial waters. 
I 
In August, 1862, Charge d'Affaires 
Perry reported the sailing from Barcelona of the Ma.rv Scaife for Vera 
Cruz. While in port this ,ressel had been sold under mysterious circum-
stances despite America.n protests. W:i th the declared destination of 
Vera Cruz, Perry expected her to dart for any open Southern port when 
opportunity arose. What eventually happened is not known, because the 
Mar;y: Sea.if e was ne,rer mentioned again. 9 Shortly after the Mary Scaife 
episode, Minister Koerner wrote Seward that strange craft flying English 
colors were recoaling at the Cana.ry Islands. He then suggested American 
,ressels visit the area. The Canary Islands were reportedly the scene 
for the recoaling of the Keang-~, a ship flying the Chinese flag but 
I English-manned, according to Charge Perry who not only notified Seward, 
but Minister Adams in London. While Seward sent no rep.ly about the 
Keang-.§2.2., Minister Adams answered somewha.t haughtily that he had no 
7Tassara to Sewa.rd, March 17, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 
912; Seward to Tassara, March 20, 1863, ibid~, PP• 912-913. 
~oore, ! Digest .2f International Law, VII, p. 319., 
9Perry to Seward, August 16, 1862, Foreign Affairs,~, p. 511, 
relays information about the Mary Scaife from the American consul in 
Barcelona; see Little to Perry, August 7, 1862, ibid .. , p. 512. 
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reason to be suspicious of it or any other Chinese vessei.10 
Yet another flouting of neutrality by Spain was reported to Seward 
by .American Commercial Agent William W. G. Jaeger in Santo Domingo. 
Jaeger declared that the Spaniards residing in Santo Domingo were friend-
ly in sentiments for the Confederacy and openly allowed the dreaded Con-
federate commerce raider Alabama to operate out of Dominican territorial 
waters. How much truth was contained in Jaeger's declaration can only 
be conjectured because he was quite biased against the Spaniards who 
were then shattering his dreams of personal wealth.11 
While any of these minor episodes could have developed into serious 
diplomatic quarrels, none did because proof of Spanish complicity was 
unattainable. But in attempting to suppress any possible trade or aid 
with the rebellious states, the United States Navy became involved in 
two important disputes: the affair of the Blanche and, later, the re-
ception of the c.s~s. Stonewall in Spain. 
The Blanche only assumed that name after being given an English 
registration in the port of Havana. While engaged in blockade running 
for the Confederacy, she had been called the General~. Commanded by 
a native of New Orleans, R. H. Smith, the Bla.nche had enjoyed a very 
active and profitable career running from Matamoras, Mexico, to Havana~ 
Indeed, so successful had she been that her renown spread to the block-
ading squadrons of the United States Navy in the Gulf of Mexico. Admiral 
10on the role of the Canary Islands con.sult Koerner to Seward, 
April 11, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, pp. 899-900; Perry to Seward, 
July 5, 1863, ibid., pp. 901-902; Adams' reply to Perry is in Perry to 
Seward, July 16, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to 
Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
11Welles, Naboth' s Vineyard: ~ Dominican Republic, 1§.!±.!i-1224, I, 
PP• 242-243, details Jaeger's account. 
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David Go Farragut was especially anxious to see her adventures halted. 
The opportunity came in late September, 1862, when the _Blanche slipped 
out of Port La Vaca, Texas, with a cargo containing 569 bales of cotton 
valued at $142,000. 
Early in October the Blanche docked at Mulato, Cuba., to secure a 
pilot and coa.lo Shortly thereafter she met her end when she encountered 
the u.s.s. :t!9ntgomery lying off the light of Morro Castle, Havana. The 
commander of the Montgomery:, Captain Charles Hunter, must ha,re been well 
aware of the opportunity to take the Blanche. Personnel of the Gulf 
blockading squadron ha.d frequently observed ,ressels at anchor in Havana 
Harbor only awaiting a cha.nee to steal awa.y and enter an open Confeder, ..• 
ate port. In this situation, frustration must always have been present. 
In any eventj seeing the Blanche close to shore, Hunter ordered her to 
heave to and when she continued on course, a. warning shot was fired and 
she stoppedo 
The distance between the Blanche and the shore at the time of this 
meeting is not clear. Since Smith, the Blanche 9 s commander, was able to 
bea.ch the ship 11 it would appear that the vessel was close to land. In 
the mea.ntime 11 a boarding party f:rom the Montgomery sought to inspect 
the Blanche 0 s papers. Suddenly smoke began billowing fo-rth. The board= 
ing party did not examine the 'lressel Os authentic papers, but only a 
10provisional" registration. La.ter it developed tha.t Smith ha.d ordered 
his books and papers burned in the fireroom.12 
Appropria.tely enough, one of the first American navs.l officers to 
learn of the episode was Connnodore Charles Wilkes of Trent fame. 
12 Albert Gleaves, "The Affair of the Blanche~" United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings, XLVIII (October, 1922), pp. 1661=1665. --=-=-'~ 
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Arriving in HaYana on October 13, Wilkes found the populace highly ex-
cited and, after he learned the reason, he hastened to see Captain-
General Serrano to assure him that appropriate action would be taken to 
discipline those responsible; he further assured Serrano of America's 
desire to preserve friendly relations w.1 th Spain.13 
The event was brought to Seward's attention in a long note from 
Tassara on October 20, 1862. The Spaniard claimed that the manche, 
first thought to be Confederate, had, in reality, been English. The 
ship had been pursued, the note stated, within Spain's maritime bound-
aries at Mariano, Cuba, and had hoisted the Spanish flag over the 
English flag she was flying. All this had been to no avail because the 
vessel was burned by the boarding party from the Montgomery:. Moreover, 
the Americans had been disrespeot.ful to the Spanish citizens on board. 
Thus Tassara demanded the restoration of the Blanche's pilot, respect 
for neutral rights by the United States Navy, and punishment for those 
responsible. Furthermore, because the Spanish believed the Montgomery 
had been notified about the Blanche by the American consul in Havana., 
the right of American ships to communicate with shore by boat in Havana 
harbor was suspended (see Chapter III). Replying to Tassara, Seward 
stated that he was not fully informed about the incident; however, he 
let it be known if Tassara 0 s version was correct, those responsible 
14 would be punished. 
In Spain the initial reaction to the filanche incident was strong 
13orric~~~ Records 2f. ~Union!!'!! Confederate Navies, Series I~ 
Vol. I, p. 505. . 
14Tassara to Seward, October 20, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, ppo 
532-536, Seward 9 s reply is in Seward to Tassara, October 23, 1862, 
ibid., pp. 536-537; see also Seward to Koerner, October 21, 1862, Diplo-
matic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801=1906: Spain, The 
National Archives. 
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enough to lead Perry to doubt if Queen Isabella II would receive Koerner, 
the newly arrived minister. Only after a ha.sty explanation, in "Whicl:i 
Perry assured the Spanish tha. t the guilty party would be punished as 
soon as the facts emerged was Koerner receivea.15 The semi-official 
press used the B.lanche-Montgomery episode in an attempt to bolster popu-
la.:r support fo:r 09Donnell. ~ Correspondencia, fott instance, gloated 
that 
when the insult put upon our flag in Mariano was fi:rst made 
known in Madrid the Council of Ministers deliberated whether 
Her Majesty the Queen ought to receive the credentials of 
the new Anglo-American Minister. The difficulties disap-
peared by Mr. Perry, charge d'affaires of the United States, 
having manifested in a prolonged conference held with the 
Minister of State that his Government could not do otherwise 
than disapprove what had happened and Mr. Koerner having 
interposed in his speech the phrase tha.t since the time of 
his appointment nothing had occurred with~ ~nowledge .2! 
consent 21:, ~ Government ,g! ~ United States capable of 
weakening the friendly relations which exist between it and 
that of Spain.16 
When Koerner complained that the press was using the affair in a 
shameful, overcritical ma.nner degrading to America, fervent reporting 
in Spanish journals cea.sed. Nevertheless, with the opening of the 
Cortes, Koerner had to report that 0'Donne11°s opposition was using it 
as a political weapon and was demanding an increase in Spanish naval 
strength in Cuban waters. Shortly thereafter Koerner discussed the 
Blanche 0 s fate with Foreign Minister Collantes. The latter manifested 
the Spanish Government's desire to see justice done and he recalled 
that Captain Wilkes had been promoted after the Trent confrontation be. 
tween Britain and America less than a year before. Koerner immediately 
15 
Koerner, Memoirs, II, pp. 265, 267; Perry to Seward, November 4, 
1862j Dispatches-from- the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, 
ThA National Archiveso 
16Ibid. 
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replied that the cases were completely different. Later that same day, 
Koerner, apparentl,y hoping to cool Spanish passions, brought up the case 
ot. the .American ship Daniel i[ebJter · at the Spanish port of Malaga. A 
crew member ot that vessel had been charged with a crime and carried oft 
the ships when American ottioera protested, the1 were th!'eatened with 
'bodil:, harm. :Despite the faot that this episode had ooourred some time 
before and obviously not on the orders of the Spanish Government, no in .. 
vestigation had even started. Thus, Koerner oonoluded, Spain could not 
expect the Blangb•·l?ntsem.•tx: 0111 to be. settled immediately without an 
appropriate inV"estigation,17 
Captain Hunter, the H9nt10;1£,;Z''I commander, failed to tile a repo~t 
on the lr1Pah1' 1 demi11 and tor thi1 r111on Seor,tarr ot th, Navy Well•• 
ord1r1d h~m to be relieved of hie command, :tn 1pit1 of Admiral Parra-
gut•1.1ttM11pt1 to defend Hunter's oonduot and the ~'bmi11ion of his re-
port, H\:l~ter relinqui1h1d his command in J,anuarr, 1863, quite perturbed 
over the furor created bJ hia aotion,18 
In Februar1, 1663, H\:lnter was tried b1 a Navy- court-martial in. 
Boston on charges ot violating the territorial waters of a neutral na-
tion and setting fire to the Bla.nohe. Despite discrepancies in the ao ... 
counts of what happened, Hunter was found guilty of the first charge and 
ordered dismissed from the service. However, clemency was recommended 
17Koerner, Memoirs, II, P• 2?1; Koerner to Seward, November 9, 
1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, 
The National Archives; Koerner to Seward, November 15, 1862, ibid.; the 
Pfniel Webster oase was settled in December when Collantes sent Koerner 
a note aiscla1ming aey disrespect for the American :f'lag and the in.for-
mation that the sailor carried off the ship had been forced. Koerner 
to Sewrd, December 20 9 1862, ibid. 
18Glea.ves, 0 The Affair of the ~anche," United States Naval Insti ... 
tute Pr s, XLVIII (1922), PP• 1667-1670; 9ff'1oif1 ~2.53..!. a,t 1.th,tt 
'union !ll- on ed ate Navie,1, Series I, Vol. XIX, PP.• 2?1-272. 
111 
on the grounds that Hunter wa.s in reality guilty of being overzealous in 
fulfilling his dutyo Subsequently Hunter was placed on the navy's re-
tired list and the Spanish Government was awarded $200,000 as an in-
demnity.19 
In Spain Minister Koerner belie,red tha.t the whole affair had been 
settled by an apology from Seward to Tassara. In Ma.rch, 1C63, he in-
fo:rmed Seward that he had unofficia11y heard tha.t Hunter had been ac-
quitted; if this was the tru. th, Koerner fore saw an impediment to solu,.. 
tions of outstanding problems in Spanish-American diplomacy. When the 
t:i.•ial facts finally rea.cheid Spain, the Spanish GoYernm.ent signified its 
satisfaction with the disposition of the case. 20 
As the Civil Wa.r in America drew to a close, the last ma.ritime 
problem in Spanish=American diploma.cy emerged in the form of the C.S.S. 
Stonewallo Ea.rly in February, 186.5, this ship slipped into the Spanish 
port of Corunna for emergency repa.irso 
, 
Immediately Charge Perry oegan 
bombarding Seward in Washington, Adams in London, and Minister c}'ohn Big-
elow in Paris with informa.tion on the Stonewa1lo It developed that the 
Stonewall wa.s French built and had been purchased from Dermiark by the 
Confede:racyo 
Aware that the ironclad Stonewall could play havoc with America's 
disminishing mercha.nt marine should she escape, Perry acted on his own 
responsibilityo He sought to bring to the Spanish Government 9 s 
l9Ibid.~ pp. 267-286 deals with the whole situation and trial; 
Gleaves, "The Affair of the Blanche," United States Ninral Institute 
Proceeding_s~ XLVIII (1922)~ pp .. l6?l ... lb?63 the $200,000 settlement is 
clisclosed in Callahan, ~ !!,2 International Relations, ppe 343-3440 
2°Koerner, Memoirs, II, pp. 270-271; Koerner to ,':qward, March 29, 
1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792 ... 1906, 
The Na.tional Archives; Perry to Seward, July 10~ 1863, ibid. 
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attention simila.r cases in which France and Britain had deta.ined iron-
clads and empha.sized that Spain had nothing to gain but America's en-
mity for allowing repairs on a vessel a.t sea under the fla.g of a soon-
to.be-extinct na.tion.o Moreo1rer, he pointed out, any help extended to 
the Confederate ship would contradict the June 17, 1861, proclamation 
of Spanish neutrality. 
Perry9 s protestations were to no avail because the Spanish decided 
to permit limited repairs on the Stonewall on humanitarian grounds. The 
charge' then attributed the Spanish actions to his lightweight status as 
charg; !2_ interim and suggested the preposterous idea that the Spanish 
would have paid more a.ttention to him if he held a. higher rank such as 
ministert He a.dmitted that other factors existed such as the govern ... 
ment0 s fear of the opposition ovDonnell party, but primary importance 
was put on his title. 21 
,I 
Finally, replying to the charge~ s frequent dispa.tches, Seward let 
Perry know it would be his duty to inform the Spanish Government that 
the United States could not "endure piratical warfare from Europe under 
the care of an insurrection that is without ports or courts."22 Seward 
then suggested that Spain would be making a wise move toward a la.sting, 
friendly relationship with America by forcing the Stone-wall to depart 
Corunna harbor. However 9 Seward 0 s message could not reach Perry im= 
mediately and so the Stonewall remain.ea in Corurma and its adjacent port 
of Ferrol until the first day of April. 
In the interim two United States Navy warships, the u.s.s. Niagar~ 
21Pe:rry to Seward 91 February 8, 186_5, ibid.; Perry to $award, Febru.,, 
ary 14, 1865j ibid.; Perry to Seward, February 19, 1865, ibid. 
22 Seward to Perry, February 20, 1865, ibid. 
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a.nd the u.s.s. Sacramento, reached the area. to watch the St9newa.ll. Bt:tt 
neither Perry nor Navy Secretary Welles was happy over excuses of the 
commanding officer, Thoma.s T. Craven, for not exhibiting eagerness tp 
offer battle. While Welles was describing Craven as a "little timid ar1d 
inert by nature," Perry was informing Minister Bigelow in Paris of his 
belief that Craven wa.s a.fraid of the Stonewall because it was an iron-
clad. 23 When Perry inquired directly of Craven abo1,1this intentions 
should the Stonewall attempt to leave, the latter indirectly indicated 
he would do nothing by stressing the Stonewall' s techn.ological supe-
riori ty and his humiliation a.t the realization he could not hinder the 
ironclad 0 s movements. 24 
The upshot was that the Stonewall left port on April 1, 1865, com .. , 
pletely unmolested. A month later she a.rrbred in Havana. h~.:rbor a.nd 
surrendered to Spanish authorities. Perry had performed his duties and 
bears none of the responsibility for the Stonewall's departure. 25 
Besides maritime difficulties, the United States and Spa~n dis .. 
agreed in another area, that of slavery. Mu<;1h earlier in the century, 
in 1817, the Spanish had a.greed to suppress the slave trade north of the 
equator. As the British were responsible for the pressure that led to 
Spain° s acquiescence, they ha.d provided a.. money payment to sweeten 
23Beale, (ed.), .!.b!, Dial] .2f. Gidecm Welles, II, PPo 261, 267; Perry 
to Seward~ Foreign Affairs, 1 65, II, p. 502. 
24Perry to Seward, April 1 9 1865, ibid., ppo 520 ... 521; Perry WJ:'Ot~ 
Craven on March 7 that an informant had told him that the Sacramento's 
officers had, while in Cadiz, Spain, made dispara.ging rem.arks a.bout 
President Lincoln a.nd expressed the wish to see tln.e 11da.m-11ed ya.nkees" 
lose the war. Perry asked if this was the reason behind the repeated 
failures of the Sacramento to do its duty'? Perry to Sewa.rd, March 10, 
1865, Dispa.tches from the United States Ministers to Spa.in, 1792-1906, 
The .National Archives. 
25Perry to Seward, April 21, 1865, ForeJgn Affafrs, 1865, II, p. 
524; William. Hunter to Perry, May 30, l8b5, ibid., pp. 539-5.50. 
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Spanish reluctance. 26 Despite Spain's ~greement to halt the odious tre.f-
fic, it continued to operate both openly and clandestinely, depending 
chi~fly on who occupied the Goirernor-Generalcy of Cuba.. Seward dir~eted 
Koerner in February, 1864, to inform Her Catholic Majesty's Government 
that by the ninth article of the Anglo ... America.n (Webster-Ashburton) 
Treaty of 1842 9 both signatories agreed to protest and continuation of 
any slave importations of which the Spanish possession of Cuba was guil-
ty. As Seward wrote, "Spain is believed to be the only Christian state 
in whose dominions African negroes are now introduced as sla.ves. 112? In-
deed, for the year ending September 30, 1863, it was estimated that 
seven to eight thousand new sla.ves were brought into Cuba. compared w:i. th 
slightly more than eleven thousand for the year ending September 30, 
1862. The smaller figure for 1863 was due primarily to the vigilance of 
Dulce, the anti-slave tra.de Governor-General. But, a.s Brita.in' s am-
bassador Lord Lyons warned Seward, the situation could cha~ge for the 
worse with Dulce's departure. With this undoubtedly in mind, Seward's 
dispatch to Koerner is understandable. 28 
Koerner, well a.ware of Spanish sensitivity, broa.ched the subject 
towards the end of February~ 1864. While he did not indicate Spanish 
reaction,. it was probably simila.r to that encountered by Perry a year 
and a half previously when Foreign Minister Collantes greeted the news 
of an Anglo=American accord to suppress the slave trade with.a. query as 
26Harold Nicolson 9 The Congress of Vienna: A S)udy in Allied Di- . 
plomac;z::, 1812'."'~ (New Tork: The Viking Press, 1963 , pp:-213-214.-
27The quote is from Seward to Koerner, February 6, 1864~ Foreign 
Affairs, ~, IV, pp~ 65..,66; see also Koerner0 s Memoirss II, pp. 399-
402; Seward, Seward il Washington il futU~~ and Secre'tar~ .2£. State, 
III, P• 215. 
28tord Lyons to Seward, February 4, 1864, .Foreign Affairs, 1864, 
IV, p., 61; see also Harper's New Monthlx: Maga.zi:ne, JCXIX {!864), ~2 ~ 
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to why the United states had fought such a measure so long and then 
given in so easily? While the war ended without any positive steps 
being taken to halt slavery, an important one imrobr:j.ng a. Spa.nish citi~ 
zen who had engaged in the slave trade allowed the U?P- ted States tQ ex-
press its opposition to slavery a.nd the slave trade in concrete terms.29 
The well-known fact that slaires were being transported into Cuba in 
the early 1860's has been observed. It has also been noted that the en-
forcernent measures seekin.g to obliterate the slave trade depended upon 
the Governor-General, and Dulce, Cuba's chief in 1863-1864, was unalter-
ably opposed to the trade. Therefore, Dulce roust have been delighted 
when newly arrived Africans in the environs of Cardenas, Cuba, were 
seized from slavers and sent to Havana. His subsequent chagrin is 
understandable when he discovered that a Spanish officia.l, Jose Argue~-
' les, had received a $15j000 reward for helping to expose the case and 
then quietly sold app1 .. onmately 140 of the freed slaves back into slav ... 
ery and fled to New York City, his crime undiscovered.30 Dulce mani-
fasted his sentiments toward Arguelles by labelling him a "scoundrel, 
worse than a thief or highwa.ymano"31 
While Dulce continued his f'ulminations against Arguelles, Minister 
Tassara in Washington laid the facts before Seward and implored him to 
29Koerner to Lorenzo Arrazola~ February 27, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 
~, IVi ppo 67=68; Collantes' :remarks to Perry are in Perry to Seward,· 
July 11, 1862, Foreign Affairs, ~, po 509; it was not until 1886 that 
slavery was finally extinguished in Spa.in~ s coloniesQ See Rafael Al-
tim:;i.ra, ! Histor:y £! Spain (New York: D. Van Nostra.nd Company, Inc., 
1949) ~ p .. 57~L 
30savage to Seward, November 20 9 1863, Foreign Affairs, 18649 IV, 
po 69; Savage to Seward, March 5, 1864, ibid .. , PP• 58-590 -
31 
Savage to Sewa.rd, March 27, 1864, ibid., pp. 59=60Q 
per:mi t Arguelles' extradition back to Cuba, even though the United States 
had no extradition treaty with Spain. Despite the la.ck of a treaty, Ar-
guelles was ta.ken into custody on May 11, 1864, and promptly sent to 
Cuba where he arrived less than two weeks later admist rumors that he 
had been kidnapped from New York.32 
The forces within the Lincoln Administration w~ich sanctioned Ar-
guelles• return a.re not clear. Secretary Seward apparently believed 
that failure to turn over Arguelles to Spanish authorities would, in 
effect, be condoning the slave trade. On tne other hand, he wrote that 
"a nation is never bound to furnish asylum to dangerous criminals who 
a.re offenders against the human race." Moreover, "Spa.nish slave dealers 
who have no il1ln'!llnity in Havana will find none in New )'.'ork,"33 However, 
Attorney-General Edward Bates recorded in his diary the opirµ.on that 
Seward had acquiesced to Arguelles' extradition in an attempt to win 
.favoritism with the anti-slavery crowd. In fact, Bates indicated that 
he had not even been consulted about the affair in any Cabinet meeting;. 
he found out about the case from Robert Murray, th~ Federal Ms.rsna..11 in 
New York. 34 It is conceivable that Seward and Lincoln were influenced 
by the presso The New York Times, for instance,'called Arguelles' 
crime "heinous" and praised Lincoln for having Arguelles "arrested apd 
32Ibid.; Tassara to Seward, April 5, 1864, Foreign Affair~,~, 
IV, Po 63; Savage to Seward 9 April 23, 1864, and May 23, 1864, ibid., 
PPo ?lj 72. 
33sewa:rd to Koerner, June 24, 18($4, ibid., ppo 55 ... 56; the quot9,-
tions a.re from Seward, Sews.rd il Washing:ton as §fill?;tor ~ ~creta:a: .2.£. 
State, III, p. 216, and George E. Baker; ( ed:-Y, ~ Ji2rk~ .2,! Wiliiam l!• 
Seward . (5 vols. , Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Compa.ny 1 1890), V 9 p. 20. 
34 
Bea.le, (ed.), ~ Diar,v E£. Edward Bates, 1859.,,~, p .. 374~ 
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sent to Havana, where he will doubtless be convicted and sentenced to 
the chain-gang, which he deserveso" The same newspaper printed a letter 
signed by "J" and reputedly f:r,om Havana. "J" said Arguelles "had his 
soul disposed to this traffic. He had calcu.lated his gains, prepared 
his plans, and his plan was robbery, his plan was infamy."35 
Nevertheless, certain segments of the Union's population were in-
dignant at what they judged to be the high-handed method of handling 
the case. Yet, time and Seward's use of moral and legal persuasion (es-
pecially invoking an Act of Congress of May 15, 1820, that had declared 
the slave trade to be pira.cy, a,nd Article 9 of the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty), were sufficient remedies to placate the discontented. Thus 
there was little reaction to the news that Arguelles had been conyicted 
and sentenced to the chain gang for a long term in April, 1865)6 
These maritime and other incidents help to prove the realities of 
Spanish-American diplomacy in the early 1860' s. Thety suggest that jus-· 
tification for war was present if either nation so wished. Any of the 
events above oou.ld have been exploited toward such an end, but due to a 
genuine desire on both sides to avoid a conflict, all problems were re-
solved. Again Secretary Seward exhibited statesmanshipo The Blanche 
incident 9 potentially the most explosive, illustrates this~ Seward 
promised prompt action against those guilty only after an investigation., 
35New York Times, May 25, .1864, P• 4, Co 3; ibid., May 29, 1864, 
P• 3, cc~ 5~ 6. 
J6seward to Koerner, June 24, 1864, Foreign Affairs, ~, IV, pp ... 
J8rm55; Seward to Lincoln, May JO, 1864, ibid., pp. 68-69; Savage to 
Seward, April 13, 1865, ibid., p. 86, disclosed Arguelles' !:Jentence. Ais 
late as 1865 some Americans could not ~esist turni1;S a fast dollar by 
assisting in the slave trade. For instance, Charge Perry reported to 
Seward that two successive American consul$ in Cadiz had allowed slave1"'s 
to clear that port under the American flag in return for large bribes. 
See Perry to Seward, January 13, 1865, Dispatches from the United States 
Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. 
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He used the same occasion to remind the Spa.~iards of their handling of 
the Daniel Webster.. When in due course it became clear that Captain 
Hunter was at fault, he was dismissed from the service, despite the f~ot 
that his brother, ll'Jilliam Hunter, was a long-time employee of the Stat~~ 
Department with direct access to Seward. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SPANISH-PERUVIAN PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 
Early in 1863 President Lincoln's attention was drawn to a mis-
understanding that had developed between Spain and the South American 
republic of Peruo Spain claimed insult and bodily harm had been dealt 
her peace:f'ul citizens residing in Peru. Not wishing to see the Spanish-
Peruvian difficulties erupt into a major conflict, Seward instructed 
Koerner in Madrid to offer America's good offices to settle the dispute. 
When Koerner received the instructions, the government of Prime Minister 
O'Donnell had fallen and had been replaced by one headed by the Marquis 
of Miraflores. Accordingly9 Koerner must not have been too surprised to 
find that the Marquis was completely unacquainted with the details of 
the Peruvian situationl,l but he indicated he did appreciate the offer of 
America's good offices and promised to get acquainted with the pertinent 
facts. A month later 9 Koerner could report no change whatsoever; in 
fact, he said, the whole question was being evaded by the government and 
the press.1 
1The best evaluation of Spani~h=America.n difficulties is to be 
found in Davis, The Last Conquistadores; Seward to Koerner, February 9, 
1863, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: 
Spain, The National Archives, informed Koerner of Lincoln's discovery of 
the Spanish-Peruvian difficulties, Koerner to Seward, March 14, 1863, 
Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The 
National Archives 9 refers to Miraflores' ignorance; Koerner to Seward, 
April 1, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 186;, II 9 po 897; Seward's instructions 
are also mentioned in Koerner, Memoirs, II, Po 291; Seward, Seward!:!:_ 
Washington.!§. Senator !ll9. Secretary ,2! State, III, p. 157. 
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One year 1,ter amidst a flurry of a9tivities among the Spaniards 
and Peruvians, Koerner again offered America's diplomatic assistance tP 
prevent a repetition of a conflict as bloody as America's own. Again 
the offer was to no avai.1 and ~he reason was not di;f'f+cult to find, fP:r 
Spain had seized the guano-rich C~inoha. Islands. 2 
Formal possession of' the Chincha Islands was taken on Apr:;ll 14, 
1864, with the Spanish alleging that tqe reru.vians were being overly 
stubborn in refusing to see a special agent sen~ f'rqm Madrid on a tri-
vial technicality of diplomatic protocol~ The initial American re~pqnse 
to Spain's action was to urge Peru to send an agent qlothed with Ml 
powers to negotiate to Madrid~ Failing Spanish approval.of tlu.s step, 
Sewa:rd announced that the President cou,ld suggeist arbitration by some 
other friendly power. Two days later, on May 19, 1864, Seward did a 
complete turnabout when he oonfident1.ally informed Koerner that the 
United States could not remain indifferent if Spain attempted to crush 
Peru and possibly reannex it as she had·annexed Santo Domingo in 1861.3 
2The interim and revival of Spanish-Peruvian difficulties are in 
Nathan L. Ferris, "The Relations of the Uni tad States with South Ameri .... 
ca during the American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, 
XXI (February, 1941), pp. 69-70; Seward to Koerner, Aprill, 1864, 
Foreign Affairs, ~, IV, pp .. 15-16; Koerner to Seward, April 24, 186l~, 
ibid., pp. 18-19; Seward's instruction to again offer .Americavs good 
offices after the seizure of the Chincha Islands is in Seward to KQer~ 
ner, May 7, 1864, ibid., pp. 21-22. 
30n Spain's seiz1,1re of the Chincha Islands consult Harper• s ~· 
Monthli Magazine, XXIX (1864), p. 263; Ferris, "The R,elations Qf the 
United States with South America during the American Civil War," ~-
panic American Historical Review, m (1941), p. 70; P~rkins, .:!'h2, !12.u• 
~ Doctr;j.ne, 1826-ga67, p. 310; the American reaction is in Seward to 
Koerner, May 17, 18 , Foreign Affairs,~, IV, p. 23; Seward to Koer~ 
ner, May 19, 1864, ibide, pp. 23-24, contains Seward's chen~e in senti~ 
ments. See also Perkins, ~ M:mroe Doctrine, ~-1867, p. 312; Moore, 
! Digest ,g! Internationa.1 ~, VI, p. 507; it is odd that Koernf)r felt 
his efforts to solve the PerQ.vian-Spani.sh clash unimportant in view of 
Seward's May 19 dispatch. See Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 405. · 
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The New York ,!!m,e~ echoed Seward's confidential dispa.tch by noting 
Spa.in' s vigorous actions against other nations while the United States 
was embroiled in a civil war. The Times said the day was approaching 
when the United States would say to Spain, "'thus far shalt thou go and 
no farther.•u4 
In spite of w:ha.t the Times and Seward said, the basic Amerj,can de-
sire was for a. peaceful settlement with America: doing all that was pos, .. 
sible to speed the process. It was in this spirit that Seward saiq 
Koerner might drop the information that Peru had approa.ched the United 
States for ships and arms to defend herself aga.inst Spain. 5 Meanwhile, 
Koerner dangled the of fer of American arbitration in front of the Span.-
ish, promising to "support any demand on the part of h\ilr Catholic Ma ... 
jesty•s government founded on the principles of justio(;cl, equity, and 
international law, and Lthe United Statei/" will use its best effor~s to 
persuade and induce the Peruvian go1rernment to comply with all such de,~ 
d .,6 ma.n s. 
Seward's velvet-gloved, big-stick a.pproach toward Spain's Peruvian 
difficulties was successful for a number of :reasonse Seward could not 
help but be aware of Spain's weakness by 18640 The logistical diffi= 
oulties of trying to wage war thousands of miles from the homeland with 
other commitments gnavrl.ng at the nat,ion° s vitals must hmre entered his 
calculation. He knew also that France was urging the Spanish to adopt 
4New York 11,!)l~~ May 22, 1864, p. 4, cc. 3, 4o 
· .5 America's desire for a peaceful settlement is in Se1,:ra.rd to Koerner, 
May 24, 1864, foreign !f!a;~, 1864, IV, pp. 24'..25; Seward to Koe:rner 9 
May 25, 1864, ibidG, pa 25, contains Peru's appro~.ch for 2.rms. 
6Koerner to Seward, Ma.y 30, 1864, ibido 9 PP• 26=27. 
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conciliatory gestureso On the other hand, Seward was not then aware that 
Spain was pathetically denying any intentions to seize Peruvian territory 
to Minister Koerner and British Ambassador Crampton. 7 When all these 
£actors were known and synthesized, the stage was set for further .Ameri-
can efforts to bring about a peaceful Peruvian-Spanish settlement. 
Seward realized that in time the best interests of Spain and Peru 
were at work in seeking to prevent war. Thus, instead of instructing 
Koerner to ·.offer again American good offices to effect a settlement, 
Seward wrote Koerner to stay alert and to do his best to bring about a 
rapprochement in Spanish-Peruvian relations by using informal diplomacy. 
He indicated his firm belief in a peaceful settlement.8 
Seward's confidence in an eventual settlement was well founded not 
only because of his knowledge of Spain's position in 1864, but because 
the Spaniards and Peruvians publicly and privately evinced an interest 
in peace. An example of this was when the Peruvians• special envoy 
broached th~ question of Spain's real aim, the conquest of Peru, to 
Charg, Perry; Perry assured him that fifteen years in Spain had' made it 
evident to him that the Spanish had no· interest in reconquering 
?Denials of Spanish ambitions are in ibid. and in other items in 
Dispatches fro.m the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The 
National .Archives; Koerner to Seward, June 3, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 
1864, IV, p .. 30; Perkins, lh! Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, p. 313; Se-
ward's knowledge about French efforts for conciliation are in Seward to 
Koerner, May 17, 1864, Foreign Affairs,~, IV, p. 23; the attitude of 
Britain and France as observed by Koerner is in Koerner to Seward, June 
3, 1864, ibidc, pp. 30-31; see also Great Britain, Ha.nsard's Parliamen-
tary Debates, Series 3, Vol. CLXXV (1864), pp. 911-912; Ibid., Vol. 
CLXXVI (1864), PP• 1902-19030 . 
Bseward to Koerner, June 17, 1864, Foreign Affairs,~, IV, PP• 
33-34, contains Seward0 s instructions about informal. diplomacy; Seward 




On such occasions when Spain or Peru began delaying a settlement, 
the Secretary of State always poss_essed an effective remedy. When dis-
patches from Spain and Peru denoted a firm.er policy was to be taken by 
the respective powers, Seward shrewdly repeated all of his old warnings 
about the terrible costs in blood and trea.sure that followed in i;,he wake 
of war. The Spanish Government was also gently informed that the United 
States still regarded the 1846 treaty 'With Colombia (then New Granada) 
as binding. In other words, the United States could inte;t'Vene in Colom-
bia and prevent the Spanish from conveying men and munitions across the 
Isthmus of Panama.10 Aware of the logistical problems confronting the 
Spanish, Bates, Lincoln's sage Attorney General, remarked, "Spain could 
not wage much of a war around the hom. 011 
Upset over the possible role of the United States in a Spanish-
Peruvian war, the Spanish made an inquiry to Perry whether or not the 
United States wou.ld sell ams to Peru in case of trouble. Perry, 
9The interest in peace on both sides is in Koerner to Seward, Ju.ne 
21, 1864, ibid., pp. 34-35; Koerner to Seward, July 11, 1864, ibid., po 
90; Perry to Seward 9 August 6, 1864, ibid., p. 94; Perry's assurances 
to the Peruvian emroy a.re in Perry to Seward, August 15, 1864, Dis-
patches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The Nation= 
al Archives; the Peruvian desire for peace is reported in the New York 
Times, June 12, 18649 po 4, Co 3o 
lOstiffening attitudes are reflected in Perry to Seward, October 
14, 1864, Dispatches from the United States ~finisters to Spain, 1792-
1906, The Nat.tonal Archives; Seward to Perry, September 19, 1864, !2!,-
eign Affairs,~, IV, pp. 99-100, illustrates Seward's use of the 
blood and treasure argumento The possible importance of the 1846 treaty 
with New Granada can be gleaned from E. Taylor Parks, Colombia fil25! the 
United States, ~-~ (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 
1935), PP• 254-255; the Spanish undoubt~dly saw the decision of Attorney 
General Bates on the 1846 treaty in the L:>ndon Times, September 24, · 
1864, P• 12e. 
llBeale, (ed.), ~ £!an; -2!, Edward Bates, .!.§.22 .. ~, pp. 437-.438, 
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missing no chance to get in unfavorable comments about the actions of 
some neutrals like Brita.in against the Union, assured the Spanish that 
the United States would remain completely neutral. The Spanish must 
have remained disturbed o,rer what the United States would do. Perhaps 
to forestall any American movements, they a.ssured Perry that they c.ove.m 
ted no Peruvian land and wou.ld fully respect the Monroe Doctrine.12 
Evidently Perry eventually became fa.tigued by the seel"'1ingly endless 
diploma tic stalemate in which the Spanish and Pe;ruvian.s were locked be,~ 
ca.use on his om he offered to help ml;ldiate the dispute. He told the 
Spanish Foreign Minister, Alejandro 4lorente y Lann9s, that the diffi-
cul ties with Peru could be "reduced to this • • • Spanish honor seemed 
exaggerated to Peru and ••• Peruvian honor seemed unreasonable to 
Spain. The proposition to yield anything directly in such a question 
suggested, it seemed/) the idea of humiliation. nl3 Llorenta ca1m.1y said 
he would consider Perry0 s offer and convey the essence of their dis-
cussion to other members of the government. 
Fully two months passed before a reply was forthcoming from the 
Spanisho In Dec:eraber 9 18641l Ilorenta told Perry that Spain 'Wtrn grateful 
for the American offer, but could not accept ito Instea.d C::,~dn would 
0011.tinue to follow a calm a.nd wary policy :;tn deal:i,ng with the irascible 
Peruvians. In the interval between Perryfl s offer and the Spanish an= 
swer, Secretary Seward had indicated neither approval nor disapproval 
of Perry9 s course of action. Nor h3.d he deigned to forward any firm 
1 2Per:ry to Seward, October 2, 1864, Foreign Affair~, l§§.~ IV, p. 
101, contains the Spanish inquiry about America 0 s possible posture; the 
assurances about the Monroe Doctrine a.re in Perry to Seward, September 
24, 1864, ibid., p. 100. 
13Pe:rry to Seward, October 2, 1864, ibid., pp. 102"1"103. 
125 
policy tha.t the United States would follow if guano from the rich de-
posits on the Chincha Islands was shipped to an American port. Clearly 
Sewa.r~ felt that the less officially said about the question by the 
United States the betterG14 
If Seward ~eemed quiescence the best policy for Americans to follow 
in late 1864, President Lincoln erred in announcing that American in-
fluence had been used to remove Spanish-Permrian misunderstanding. This 
looked especially true when news came from Peru of an ul tima.tum by the 
Peruvian Congress for Spa.in' s e,racuation of the Chine ha Islands or else 
to suffer the consequences of an attack on the Spanish fleet. At long. 
last reality intervened and settlement wa.s agreed upon in January, 1865, 
providing for the Spanish evacuation of the guano-rich islands·in return 
for an indemnity to be paid to Spain for the expedition's costs.15 
Despite the assurances gi~en by the Spanish to the American repre-
sentatives in Ma.drid that Spain coveted n.o American territories and had 
14spain's reply is in Perry to Seward, December 4, 1864, Foreiga 
Affairs, 1865, II, ppo 468~469; Seward's course over Perry0 s action is 
in Seward to Perry, October 17, 1864, E£reign Affairs,~' IV9 p. 
103~ Seward to Perry, October 26, 1864, ibido, po 104; Seward to Perry, 
November 17, 1864j ibida, po 105, contains Seward 9 s statement about what 
the United States would do if the gua.no question arose. Per:ry had 
ra,ised the question in Perry to Seward, October 28, 1864, Foreign !f.= 
fairs~ J_§,ci2_ 9 IIj ppo 464-465; more than a year earlier Perry had gone 
to Valencia to investigate the killing of' an American sailoro Here he 
observed six American vessels loaded with guano from Peru. See Perry 
to Seward, August 24, 1863, ~spatches from the United States Ministers 
to Spa.in, 1792-1906 9 The National Archives. 
15Lincoln° s pronouncement is in &Isler, (ed.), The Collected Works 
of Abraham Lincoln, VIII 9 p. 138, for the Peruvian u.ltimatum consult · 
the London Times 9 December.30,-1864, p. 10a; ibido, December 31, 1864, 
po 12a; the settlement is mentioned in Ferris, "The Relations of the 
United States with South America during the America.n Civil War," His-
panic American Historical Re,riew, XXI (1941), p. 719 London Times-;--
Februa.ry 3, 1865, p. 9b; ibid., February 17, 1865, p. 12a; Koerner, 
Memoirs, II, p. 406, Perldns, ~ Monroe Doctrine, lli£.=1867, pp. 314... 
315. 
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no intention or seeking to restore the grandeur of Spain, the Peruvian 
adventure represented another attempt by certain visionaries of the 
Spanish government to revive the .glories or old.· In the e~d, reality 
forced the Spanish to come to a settlement with the Peruvians in 1865. 
It is true the Spanish had difficulties with the Chileans in l8Q5-1866 
and even more troubles with Peru. The January, 1865, settlement marked 
a moment of reality when the Spanish admitted that the past eould not 
be restored. The certainty of Peruvian independence, t~e difficulties 
of waging war around Cape Horn, and especially the volatile state of 
Spanish internal politics in 1864.1865 insured this. Thus it was only 
in 1895 that Spain finished recognizing her former New World colqnies,16 
Pride and Spain's "bitterly hostile attitude to the cause of human 
freedom" combined to prevent an..y earlier period for extending recog-
nition.17 And when recognition was extended by Spain, as to the A~~ 
gentine Republic and Gua.temala during the Civil War, Minister Koerner 
classified the agreements as mere smoke screens to quiet fears of Lat,in 
Ame1'"1cans arising from Spain's clash with Peru.18 
16The date is from William Spence Robertson, "The Recognition of 
the Spanish Colonies by the Motherland," Hispanic American Historic~ 
Review, I (Febru,ary, 1918), pp. 90~91. · 
17L1ttell's Living Age, LXXII (1862), p. 519. 




The more than eighty years of Spanish-American diplomatic contact 
prior to the firing on Fort Sumter had left a sour taste in Spapish 
mouthse The cause is easily identified. W!rl,le Spain lost a lar~e part 
of her empire in the early nineteenth century, the new United States 
grew by leaps and boundso While Spain remained backward under the con~ 
trol of weak, corrupt, and dissolute rulers, the United States surged 
a.head, and democracy seemed to prove itself. 
The eruption of the American Civil War was unbelievably good luck 
in the eyes of many Spaniardso At long last Spain would be able to re-
pay the grasping Yankees for their overzealousness in acquiring Florida 
and for giving encouragement to Latin-American ~ebelse To biased minos, · 
the Ci,ril War also indicated that <;lemoora.cy and repuhlicanism did not 
suffice as a means of government. At the same time, Spain happened to 
be under the control of the 0°Donnell faction, well aWq.re of Spain's 
shortcomi:ngso In fact 11 it was with these in mind that O'Donnell 
launched Spain on a belligerEmt 9 expa.nsionist 9 foreign pol;i.cyo Spain 
either verbally chastised or directly intervened in Cochin-Chinese and 
Moroccan affai:rso In the New World, Venezuela. and Mexico drew Spain's 
weath. Not only did 0°Donnell succeed in distracting Spaniards fvom 
the realities of the homeland with his ta.o~ics, but many began to be-
lieve that a restoration of the old Spanish Empire was a distinct pos-
sibility. 
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In this context it is easier to understand Spain°s movements in the 
Western Hemisphereo In Santo Domingo the Spanish believed many of their 
own rationales for meddling, such as the Dominican fear of Haiti and the 
Dominican desire to be 11reincorpora.ted" into the bosom of the Spanish 
Empire. Spain~s primary aim, however, was the aggrandizement of her own 
empire and weal thQ When the Dominica.n people recognized this and real~, 
ized that their only recourse was to rebellion, a revolt broke out in 
1863. 
The United States could only stand by a.nd :issue warning so Spain 
was reminded that the Dominicans would not be receptive to a.n alien form 
of goirernment and tha.t she was violating the Monroe Doctrine by reinco1·-
porationo Nevertheless, the United States was not able to prevent the 
Spanish takeover and could only wait unt:i,1 Spanish thoughtlessness 
turned the Dominicans aga.inst them. Eiren when the Dominicans had raised 
the standard of revolt 9 the United States refused to extend recognition 
to the rebels B.nd denied aid to the insurgentso More than any other 
example~ American policy on Santo Domingo reflected the overwhelming de-
sire of the United States to settle its internal struggle before meeting 
the challenges of Eu.ropea.n. interlopers in the Western Hemisphereo It JLs 
possible that the Spanish beliEnred the United States would side with the 
Dominicans once the Civil War ended, but the Dominican revolt had pro= 
gressed so far and Spain had squandered so much trea.sure and life tha.t 
the Spanish fou:nd it expedient to wi thd:ra.w in mid=l865 before any dra.s~-
tic change in American policy occu:r:redo 
The Mexican question provides yet another example of the American 
predicamento Seward had argued for war against any po-we:r bold enough 
to challenge the United States through inter1rention in the New World in 
his well-known "thoughtsn of April, 186L The joint intervention of 
1?9 
Spain~ France 9 and Britain provided him with the opportunity. Instead 
of war or the threat of war, Seward meekly allowed that the trinartite 
powers had the :right to inter,rene in o:rder to · gain redress of g:rievanc13s. 
American opposition would have been disastrous. The B:ri tish, French, 
a.nd Spa1'lish would perhaps have dealt the United States irreparable harm. 
It seems certain tha.t the Confederacy would have gained its indepen-
dence. As it was, time proved the best American agent. The joint 
powers were extremely jealous of each othe:r, and when it became obviou.g 
tha.t Nepoleon III had designs on a throne fo:r Maximilian, the Spa.nish 
a.nd British withd:rewo The Spa.nish acted the pa.rt of a. knowledgabl(;'l by,. 
sta.nder :reproving the French for foolishly attempting to i-rnuose a. for-
eign monarch on the Mexican people. In rea.lity, as has been shown, they 
were inter0ested in seating their own Bourbon candidate on the proposed 
throneo The British and Spa11ish wi thdra.wa1 left the United States to 
cope only with France in Mexico when the Civil War ended. 
Spanish :intervention in Peru is a. much less complex case. There 
the Spanish OYerreacted to an e:ffront and exhibited their pride. Per-
haps they also had the fleeting glimpse of a Peru again in the folds of 
the Spanish Empire a In a.ny e,re:nt Y America traditionally exhibited 
aloofness to any fo:t"!8ign irrtervention in the Western Hemisphere when 
such inter,re:n tion was fa:ro away as j for example :i in the Falkland Islands 
dispute emd the joint inte:r·1rention in the Rio de 1a Plata region. Se= 
ward sought to have the Peru.vians and Spanish use the gooc offices of 
the United Stateso But distance~ time~ and the instability of Spain's 
government insured the peaceful settlement of the dispute. 
Outside of Spanish intervention the most potentia.lly explosi,re 
question in Spanish~Amel"iC;!lll'l diplomacy existed in the question of 
Spain° s recognition of the Confedera.cy as an independent na.tion. The 
autho:r believes tha.t Spain would have granted this recognition if Spa.in 
had possessed the requisite power. BeM.use the nation was weak, how-
ever, she could only follow in the wa.ke of the British a.nd F::rench. If 
either o:f these two powers had recognized the South, there wa.s a good 
cha.nee Spain would have followed suit. They did not, and the bel'licos(~ 
Spa.niards were forced to swallow their pride a.nd helplessly view a 
fleeting opportunity. 
The Spa.n:ia.rds did not surrender easily, howeYer, a.s the numerous 
small incidents nea.:r Cuba illustrate. Seeing another chance to force 
Spain into war with the United Stt,Jtes, the pro-French fa.ction led by 
General Concha a.cted to foment a. confrontation m thin the six-mile 
limit claimed by Cuba.. More temperate Spaniards stepped in to wa:rd off 
a.ny serious incident, but such a. bizarre a.ttempt demonstrates the By-
zantine :na.ture of Spanish politics as well as the possible importa.nce 
of seemingly minor occurrences. 
Perha.ps it wa.s for this reason that both nations worked diligently 
to insure 11 peaceful continua.tion of relations. The Spanish thus 
shifted their course over Cuba's supposed limits. The United States 
also sought to prevent an eruption from any small incident. One ha.s 
only to look a.t the ,tlontg_o,rn~~-Blanche affairo A yea.r previously whe:n 
Captain Wilkes, comma.nding the United States ,ressel San Jacinto had •.,... __.~
ta.ken two Confederate emissaries off the Bl."'itish ~, he was publicly 
lionized and promoted. When Captain Hunter, commanding the .tfqr;tgo.!!!er;y) 
acted in a no more brash manner, he found himself relieved of his com-
mand. 
There are several possible a.nswers. Wilkes~ action came at a time 
when most believed in a short wa:t• and when Yictories had been few. 
Bearding John Bull had helped solidify Union sentiment. October, 1862, 
131 
presented a different situ at ion, for the wa.r was older, a.nd had con-
tinued longer than a.lmost all had foreseeno Some major accomplishments 
had been registered and, moreover, Spain wa.s not the caliber of Great 
Britain and hence was not the same value a.s a. ra1lying symbol. Most im-
porta.nt of a.11 perhaps wa.s the added saga.city and ma.turi ty of the State 
Depa.rtmento Seward readily a.ssured the Spa.nia.rcls tha.t if an imrestiga-
tion proved guiltj action to punish would be taken. True to his word, 
the Secretary of State saw to it that Hunter was remoired from his com ... 
mand and e;rentua.lly cou:rt-ma.rtia.led o 
Hunter 9 s fate does not p:rmre Seward to ha,re been cowed by foreign 
clangerso One has only to turn to New Orleans .for evidence to the con-
trary. There the Secretary of State and the Lincoln Administration, de..,, 
spite the claims of General Butler a.nd his a.pologists, usually backed 
the measures taken by the controYersial Massachusetts law;yer. It should 
be pointed out that Butler p:roYed a good a1though heavy-handed military 
governor in a. potentially explos1're situation. 
In his book, ~ American Secretary !2f Stat~, Alexander De Conde 
ra.tes the Secretaries of State a.nd concludes that Seward was second in 
that office only to the brilliant John Quincy Ada.mso Certainly Adams 
was confronted by major problems after the end of the Napoleonic Warso 
But Adams ha.s been the subject of a Pulitzer Prize winning biography by 
Samuel Flagg Bemiso Seward 9 on the other hand, has been relatively neg~ 
lected by biographer=histo1"'ianso It is the author0 s contention that Se-
wa.rd has been the greatest Secretary of Sta.te in American history. Cer~, 
ta.inly his tenure of office covered the most trying years of American 
historyo Insofar a.s he dealt with Spainj his foreign policy reflects to 
his credit and helps to explain his g:reatnesso 
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